Showing posts with label German Communist Party. Show all posts
Showing posts with label German Communist Party. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 26, 2016

*From The Archives Of The “Revolutionary History” Journal-A German Communist in the Spanish Civil War-Eva Eisenschitz

Click on the headline to link to a Leon Trotsky-related post from his Internet Archives.

Markin comment:

This is an excellent documentary source for today’s militants to “discovery” the work of our forbears, whether we agree with their programs or not. Mainly not, but that does not negate the value of such work done under the pressure of revolutionary times. Hopefully we will do better when our time comes.

*************
from What Next? No.13, 1999

A German Communist in the Spanish Civil War-Eva Eisenschitz


This article appeared originally in 1986, under the title At the Front During the Spanish Civil War – The Experience of a Communist Emigrant in the Civil War and the Prisons, in a special issue of the Tubingen University students journal Tüte which was devoted to the Spanish Civil War. The article provides a first-hand account of the early revolutionary phase of the war, and of the crushing of the revolution in 1937 at the hands of the Stalinist reaction. We are grateful to Mike Jones for providing a translation.

The author was born Eva Laufer in Berlin on 27 March 1912. She joined the Social Democratic school pupils’ organisation in 1927, and in 1929 became a member of the youth section of the KPD(O) (Communist Party of Germany – Opposition), the party led by Heinrich Brandler, August Thalheimer and others expelled from the official Communist Party of Germany for opposing its then ultra-left politics. In 1933, following Hitler’s rise to power, Eva emigrated to Holland. Along with her husband, Hans Sittig, in 1936 she went to Spain to assist in the resistance to Franco. There they worked with the POUM (Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification), a dissident Communist organisation with which the KPD(O) had links.

After her escape from Spain, Eva found refuge in Britain. She joined the ILP, which subsequently dissolved into the Labour Party. She worked for the BBC, as a teacher and, in the early 1970s, as a translator for Ian Mikardo MP. At the time the article was written, she was living as a pensioner in London, where she later died.


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WE ARRIVED in Perpignan in August 1936, a month after the outbreak of the civil war in Spain. A lorry was to bring us (Hans, myself and a couple of comrades already waiting) to Port Bou. It was a hair-raising journey, sharp bends up in the Pyrenees and just as steep again going down, at a crazy speed. I would have prayed, had I been religious. But we arrived in Port Bou and journeyed on in a car to Barcelona, to the Hotel Falcón on the Rambla Catalunya, the POUM headquarters.

The atmosphere in Barcelona was indescribable. Today one would call it a ‘high’, as after taking drugs, intoxicating and intoxicated. From early in the morning to late at night, the barrel-organs on the Rambla played revolutionary songs. Of course, that could not continue; but while it lasted it was unrepeatable.

All of Barcelona’s 58 churches were burnt down; many still smouldered. Only the large ‘sagrada Familia’ cathedral by Gaudi withstood everything – if is made of cement. The militiamen, without uniform but with armbands of the POUM or the CNT (anarchists), rifle over the shoulder, go to the front early on, come home again for dinner, hold their siesta and towards four o’clock in the afternoon go off again.

The Hotel Falcón teemed with foreigners, mostly Americans, French, German and Italian emigrants. Many had been living in Spain for some years and immediately made themselves available. We were organised by Else, a German, who spoke fluent Spanish. Her husband Gerhard was a medical orderly at the front.

The big villas on the hills around Barcelona were abandoned by their owners and occupied. They now served the authorities as an administration centre. We were allowed to go in and readily shown around. The shooting of the priests, big farmers and factory owners was over and the revolution was under way. The anarchists and the POUM were the driving forces. The civil war was no longer regarded as a passing trifle; the militias exercised – though still without uniform – and one had to be very economical with the ammunition. Then a ship arrived from Mexico, the Magallanes, with 20,000 old Mauser rifles and 20,000,000 cartridges. It was not much, but it arrived at the right moment and there were no conditions attached. The celebration was indescribable. The first officers were elected and their orders – after detailed discussion – were followed.

We received some pocket money and made ourselves available. On the second evening we met a former school friend of mine from Berlin who, with her friend, had worked in Catalonia since 1933. Great joy. They invited us in and gave me a pair of shoes for the front. The next day I found a note in the hotel: ‘We have gone to Paris.’ I was extremely disappointed. Nothing had indicated that they were against the revolution. For us, as German anti-fascists, it was a moral duty to assist the Spanish Republic. And both had left! Perhaps we were naive.

I waited for the next ambulance going to the Aragon front. The first had been full. Ruth, a German nursing sister, had gone with it. We hoped that we would meet up. It never arrived. During the first night on the way to the front it was surprised by Franco’s Moors, with bare feet and curled knives, who cut the throats of everyone. I had to write to Ruth’s old father and describe her heroic death. We could not tell him the truth.

The first Spanish women with whom I spoke wanted to know how we succeeded in not having a child every year. They saved up money from the household budget to enable their husbands to visit the brothel. And only male children counted. A Spanish comrade told me that he had no children. His comrade laughed and said: he has six daughters.

Another point. They wanted to know why I had come to Spain, and why I was even prepared to separate from my husband in order to go to the front. It was surely not because of politics, it could only mean that I was looking for a man. And detailed propositions rained down upon me. We had hour-long discussions about the role of women in the socialist society. Lenin was right: ‘The emancipation of women must begin with the men.’

We were sixteen in the ambulance, which had been donated by the British ILP. We were stationed in Tierz, a village near Huesca, which was in Franco’s hands. The Aragonese Pyrenees, blue and covered with snow, stood in the background. The front stagnated. The first casualty I treated as a medical orderly was characteristic of the Spanish mentality. The ideal human type would unite Prussian disciple with Spanish individuality. For example, it was not considered ‘manly’ to use the latrines in the dugout. One did it outside in the fresh air standing up. We lost several good comrades that way. The digging of trenches also contradicted masculine dignity

I met Else’s husband Gerhard. He had been the manager of the Breslau Theatre, spoke fluent Spanish and could talk for hours about art We read Don Quixote together. The October nights were very cold and we all received long underpants.

I only experienced one real attack. Beforehand we got rum in our coffee and marijuana cigarettes. Neither affected me. Afterwards we had neither advanced nor retreated, but had many wounded and three dead. Gerhard and I were in the line of fire a few times. I was terrified!

As I am blood group ‘0’, I am a universal blood donor. There was no other test at that time, only the four groups. The blood was directly transferred. I lay beside the casualty and my blood flowed into his. It was very satisfying to see how a pale face with blue lips would gradually take on colour. After the attack, every week I gave around 200cc of blood.

After six months I received leave. Hans worked in ballistics in Barcelona and awaited his transfer to Lérida. While I was in Barcelona, I met Major Clem Attlee, who would become Labour Prime Minister in 1945, and Fenner Brockway, the Chairman of the ILP. Both wanted to speak with POUM officials and anarchists. I accompanied them everywhere and translated. In the evenings we went together to the café. Fenner wanted to know more than I was able to report to him in my poor English. But it was a very interesting week for me, and I got to know the background which later would lead to the street-fighting in Catalonia.

I was able to get myself transferred to Lérida, and worked in orthopaedics at a hospital for the wounded. We lived in a monastery cell. Hans had a car and chauffeur at his disposal and once took me with him to Manresa, the monastery of the Holy Grail. It was being used by the Catalan War Ministry. A fairy-tale castle.

April 1937 was a good month. We both worked and made plans for our future life in a socialist Spain.

May 1937. The Soviet Union had sent technicians and food. No weapons. [1] Condition: restoration of the status quo in Catalonia and Asturias. The factory owners and landlords should have their rights restored; the clergy, insofar as it was not openly fascistic, should also be permitted; and all non-Communists, that is, anarchists and POUM members, should be purged. The Communists occupied the telephone centres in Barcelona and L6rida; street-fighting resulted, and there were dead and wounded. It was the Russian intention to give the Spanish revolution a respectable face, in order to make it acceptable to the western powers, Britain and France. The untrustworthy generals were again called up, resulting later in democratic strongholds such as Malaga being betrayed. The bourgeoisie emerged from its holes. It was like Germany in 1918, when the reaction hid itself behind Noske and Scheidemann. One had the sense of déja vu, only this time the CP was the reactionary factor. Apart from the war industry, all expropriated enterprises were handed back to their previous owners. The POUM’s offices were closed, its officials arrested Andrés Nin, the head and heart of the POUM, was shot. Shock troops were sent against the anarchists, in order to smash any resistance. At the time, Bilbao was already threatened, and every man was needed at the front.

Hans was involved in the Lérida street-fighting. They were some of the worst days of my life: to fight against our own side, to have to defend what the revolution had accomplished since July 1936, and perhaps lose everything in this senseless clash. The POUM, as the weakest party, was the obvious sacrificial lamb. All its members – including ourselves – were described as Franco’s agents, as traitors to the working class. The same had occurred in Germany before the Nazi take-over: the Stalinists had called the Social Democrats ‘social-fascists’. Everything that went on in Spain was logical. The CP sought after ‘Trotskyists’ and shot them. Of course, they came out on top in the street-fighting and on the ‘ideological front’. ‘If this and that is not done, we will lose the war.‘ And who wanted that?

Though we knew in our innermost thoughts that the war was already lost. For ten months a real socialism had existed, a system worth fighting for. Then the arrests of the POUM members and anarchists started. The Stalinists hated nothing so much as the socialist opposition. Their greatest fury was directed at the supposed or genuine Trotskyists.

Hans had to return to Lérida at the end of May I wanted to stay in Barcelona for another fourteen days, and take an intermediate medical exam. He was arrested on a bus with a number of others – mostly foreigners. Among them was Else, Gerhard’s wife. He was also in Barcelona, and we regarded ourselves as a ‘Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Verhaftung’ [a play on GmbH – Company with Limited Liability – which prefixed with ‘ver’ becomes ‘arrests‘]. Katia Landau, who had come from Vienna with her husband Kurt, had been arrested together with her. [2] Kurt had previously been a private secretary to Trotsky. The CP sought after him. He had enough political experience to know that he would not get out of Spain alive. The anarchists hid him for weeks. Then he changed his accommodation. I brought food and news. He kept stressing something again and again: whom the labour movement has once taken hold of, never gets away again, whether he remains active or not. Two days after my last visit Kurt vanished forever. Then the Stalinists settled their account. After the end of the civil war nobody could prove anything against them.

I tried to alarm the consulates about the arrested foreigners. Most of them were ready to help, made visits and representations, and succeeded in getting those with valid passports deported to France. The British consul was the only exception: ‘Whoever is still in Barcelona is there at his own peril. Anyone with sense has gone long ago.’ I was not so easy to get rid of, but asked softly and modestly, who paid him and for what? Then he went red in the face and shouted: ‘You Communist, get out of here.’

In the meantime, Barcelona was bombarded from the sea. That was a new experience. It is curious how one can get used to air raids, but get horribly scared when the shooting is lateral and the front walls of the houses vanish.

In August 1937, it was my turn. I was arrested with six Spanish comrades in the home of Andres Nin, where I went to fetch a blanket for Hans.

The first two months I was incommunicado. That is not as bad as it sounds. I would have received no visitors in any case – all my friends were in jail, except Gerhard. I only know that it was a military prison. I was interrogated a few times by a German Stalinist. He screamed that I was an agent of Franco and a German fascist spy. It paid not to reply: I had not known any important POUM officials – once I had sat for three hours on a bus with George Orwell, that was all. Only my connection to Landau could have been dangerous, but they knew nothing about it. At my interrogation, the Stalinist said that a bullet would be too good for me, ammunition was scarce!

Then I was moved to the official women’s prison, which was managed by a POUM comrade. She was the wife of Andrade, a top official. In a country where the women have very few rights, they keep their own name; therefore, nobody knew who she was. She could not grant us any relief, but as political prisoners we were not required to work and through her got to know what was going on outside. We were thirty ‘politicals’, living in a large hall with a magnificent view. Apart from an unpolitical German, whose husband was an anarchist, and a just as unpolitical French woman, we consisted of Spanish POUM or anarchist comrades. The prison held around six hundred women; the so-called criminals were originally nuns, or wives of small racketeers and war-profiteers.

Every morning we used the showers – never meeting any of the others. I heard that they thought we must have been horribly mucky, because we used so much water. In any case, they exchanged soap for bread. Not that we had plenty – I think it was 300 grams per day, two plates of rice or pea soup, and two cups of a brown, hot fluid. We were very hungry, but the civilian population had to work with the same ration.

The nuns were all middle-aged. Sister Teresa remains in my memory because of her great kindness, She looked after the scantily-supplied chemist’s shop. Never was she impatient or did she say a bad word. One would have thought that we socialists would have incarnated the devil on earth to her – on the contrary, she mothered us all and always knew best. I have often thought of her and would like to know how she ended her days.

MY friend was Maria-Teresa Sarda, who had been imprisoned as a POUM member together with her mother. She gave me Spanish lessons and I avenged myself with historical materialism. We attempted to learn an international shorthand, but it was a total failure. For two hours every day we ran round the long dining table and did gymnastics. Our stomachs had shrunk, so that after the first really hungry months we managed on our rations. In any case, it was easier to be hungry than to be without soap. Moreover, we had lice. Very rarely one of the Spanish comrades received a parcel. Everything was shared out. We had a doctor among us, a German, allegedly ‘political’, older than us. One day she received a parcel and vanished with it; nothing was said, but we never spoke to her again, she was excluded by everyone. She had broken a fundamental rule and had to pay for it.

A certain scene remains in my memory: the wives of about ten men – said to be fascists – had gone to the men’s prison early around 5 o’clock to say their goodbyes to them before they were to be shot. After an hour they came back, emitting heart-rending screams, tearing at their hair, tearing their clothes – it was terrible to have to hear it, and we all suffered with them. There was no talking and all activities stopped. Then came the afternoon: around 4 o’clock the same women entered with flowers in their hair. They had castanets in their hands and danced and sang. The dances were joyful. They had earlier manifested their sorrow – and now life carried on. This psychology will for ever remain incomprehensible to us.

Hans was released three weeks after my arrest and returned to France with his customary ‘visa sans arrêt’. In the summer of 1937, on the last day of the validity of his passport, he went back to Holland. Without a visa for a final destination one was not permitted to stay in France. My passport had run out. Whoever had arrested us had taken all our papers, which I, of course, have never seen again. The foreigners with valid passports were slowly released; only the German and Italian emigrants remained. The uncertainty over the length of the sentence was the most worrying. Wholly disregarding the gradual advance of Franco’s troops, something we of course never mentioned.

I loved Spain, the country, the people, the climate, the food, even the always recurring manana, with which they put off all decisions. But from the beginning of 1938 we all knew that Franco’s victory was only a question of time.

One day I was called into the office. An official from the British consulate was there with a parcel wrapped in newspaper. I had to swear to my identity. I took the parcel in my left hand, but he made it clear that it had to be the right hand. So I swore that I indeed was who I was. It was only later that I found out that I had sworn on the bible. He then went with me into the city to get me photographed. No word about what for, why, when, etc. Three impatient weeks elapsed; meanwhile, it was August 1938. Then an old motor car drove up: the consular official. He brought a British travel document, valid for three months. I had to pack my things in all haste – there was not much. I left my Spanish money in the prison; the peseta was not exchanged. A few quick tears were shed – and the thirteen months ended as they had begun, without transition.

At that time there were hardly any foreigners left in Barcelona. The British destroyer Imperial sailed between Barcelona, Valencia and Marseilles, and had evacuated all the British. If one more passenger had now been reported, this had to be an important person. So the crew were drawn up in lines under the leadership of the captain, and I boarded the ship in a thin skirt leather jacket and espadrillas. I was given the cabin of the second in command. After the meal – with knife and fork, after such a long time – I asked to speak to the captain and explained the mistake. He laughed, found it all very funny, and said that if I wanted I could remain aboard and sail round the Mediterranean with them. I politely declined and after seventeen hours I left the ship at Marseilles without a penny and sought out the British consulate.

Who could describe my dread as I was confronted with the horror from Barcelona? He glanced at me and said: ‘We already know each other’. And then began a cannonade of insults against all Communists and riffraff such as I. As it had become too dangerous to be in Barcelona, he had removed himself to the safety of Marseilles. I wanted only money enough to telegraph to Amsterdam and somewhere to stay overnight. I promised to pay the money back the next day – he was convinced that he would never see it again. But the money arrived, I repaid it and travelled to Paris.

September 1938 – Munich – the war had been averted once more, the French mobilisation was cancelled. Women cried tears of relief in the streets.

I was received with open arms by the German comrades, especially by Brandler and Thalheimer, for whom I was to give a detailed report. It was, of course, a bit disappointing – after all, I had spent the previous thirteen months in prison.

I could not go to Hans in Holland; the Dutch put Spanish volunteers immediately over the German border.

As soon as the first relief at being in a land at peace was over, I had the feeling that I should go back to Spain; I longed to be there, perhaps I could still help ... It was completely irrational, idiotic.

I have described the external events of this catastrophe, which the Spanish civil war and revolution was. But what I cannot describe is what the attraction of Spain consists of, the noise, the smell, the clear atmosphere of Barcelona in the early morning, and especially the sight of the milicianos and the comrades, which I could still describe now in the smallest detail. Spain had destroyed our marriage – we could not find any country where we could be together before World War II; afterwards it was too late. Nevertheless, I would not have missed the experience for the world.

Editorial Notes
1. The Soviet Union did, of course, send arms to Spain (although Stalin shipped the country’s gold reserves back to Moscow in payment). However, the arm were withheld from the anarchist and POUM militias at the Aragon front.

2. Katia Landau published an account of the repression of the left in Spain in her pamphlet Le Stalinisme en Espagne, Paris 1938, a translation of which appears in Revolutionary History, Vol.1 No.2, 1988.

Thursday, April 28, 2011

*From The Archives Of The “Revolutionary History” Journal-Unpublished Articles Of Interest-Leaving Leninism-Paul Levi

Markin comment:

This is an excellent documentary source for today’s militants to “discovery” the work of our forbears, whether we agree with their programs or not. Mainly not, but that does not negate the value of such work done under the pressure of revolutionary times. Hopefully we will do better when our time comes.
********
The following piece was translated by Mike Jones from the weekly published by Paul Levi, Sozialistische Politik und Wirtschaft, of 8 July 1927, republished in Zwischen Spartakus und Sozialdemokratie, a collection of articles, speeches and letters by Paul Levi, edited by Charlotte Beradt, published by EVA, Frankfurt a.M. 1969, pp.148-150.

Leaving Leninism-Paul Levi

“The present oppressive bureaucratic regime in the party reflects the pressure of the other classes against the proletariat.”

Trotsky said these words – unfortunately not until May 1927. It was already time to speak out during 1921: perhaps the cannons in Kronstadt during the March of 1921 had already thundered the same language which Stalin now speaks and the language-teacher had indeed been Trotsky. But today it is not at all a question of how far the Russian Opposition helped create the erroneous policy of the party, which was the issue which caused it to go into opposition, how much it had itself created the preconditions for what is occurring today and under which it is suffering today. One must be content with determining the nature of the tragedy now unfolding in Russia and what it signifies.

We have already often pointed this out: the interests of the proletariat and the land-owning peasantry are opposed to each other. The Bolsheviks made two errors. The first: with their peasant policy of 1918 whereby the land-hungry peasants and agricultural labourers were elevated into land-owning peasants they have created the causes for the sharpening of the contradictions so manifest today in Russia. It is very probable that in 1918 the Bolsheviks had no other choice but to give the peasants the land. If they had not accommodated them it is likely that the movement would have removed them: the least that would have occurred would be that the peasants would have taken the land anyway. But if giving away the land was an error – in any case from a theoretical point of view – from the standpoint of Socialism, a second error was added to it, a greater one. If the giving away of the land was theoretically a mistake, although unavoidable in practise, then the party should recognise it when setting out its aims. Instead of doing that they made a theory from their errors: the theory of a solidarity of interest between the workers and the peasants. That was already the case under Lenin. But his descendants made a canonical law out of the theory.

Yet it was nevertheless obvious, both for Marxists as well as for the historically aware, what this solidarity was worth. If there had been any solidarity of interests between landed peasants and propertyless industrial workers then the European history of the last three centuries would be incomprehensible. The Bolsheviks believed themselves capable of skipping over this disharmony between the both classes, to be able to master it, because they brought the both of them, so to speak, into one retort. These retorts were called the soviets: within which the opponents were united, just as for the believing catholic the spirit and the body are united in the host he has swallowed. Now these errors are totally incomprehensible for politicians educated in the school of Karl Marx: there are absolutely no state forms which can cancel out the existing class contradictions; since the form of the state is indeed the expression and the result of the class contradictions and not their cause. If there were state forms which could prove the cancelling out of those class contradictions: if there were, then it would be incomprehensible why one could not also accomplish such witchcraft with a coalition government. Yes, we confess: the pretence of a class solidarity where class contradictions exist – historically seen – then this delusion is much more acceptable in the form of the coalition government than in the form of the soviet government in the Russian model. When the illusion of class solidarity is destroyed in the coalition government and the contradictions become apparent again, then the coalition separates out into its constituent parts, and the parties which were previously paralysed in the coalition once again take up their natural functions. But in the soviet form in the Russian model, we see happening – precisely what we now see in Russia. Previously the contradictions had no form: they seek the form in the one existing party, separate the party into factions and then into fragments, result in those previously called friend and leader being called traitor and finally put the comrades under the gun of the comrades of yesterday. In the countries in which that error occurs in the form of the coalition government, its disintegration is already the solution of the crisis and the start of convalescence; in the regime of the soviets, the grave crisis is only beginning, in which although the illusions are destroyed, the independent functional forms of the different classes are still not found. That is the status in Russia. Since the worker is ground down by the peasant, so must Stalin and Bukharin grind down the Opposition.

While for the deeper observer the function of the party leadership and the opposition in Russia is in any case clear, for the Russian masses everything is still concealed events, perhaps mostly incomprehensibly in the discussion over China, for where that is concerned, and – we have to say this – the Russian opposition is not clear itself about the starting point of its opposition. Either not at all clear or it will not express it. Yet the root of the problem can be found in the above explanation. That ‘solidarity’ between worker and peasant is the real kernel of so-called Leninism; it is that which Leninism believed that it had developed beyond Marxism. In reality one can only grant Lenin one thing – which is indeed no small thing and which made him a great man: that he recognised the particular conditions of the seizure of power in Russia, that he indicated the creation of new forms of a state and raised the concept “Dictatorship of the Proletariat”, for once and if only for a short time, above and beyond a phrase, into reality. But the generalisation of all this beyond Russia and into a Leninism, the canonisation of tactical strokes in particular situations is just as much an error as the canonisation of tactical or strategical moves of a military commander. With the canonisation of the Schlieffen Strategy the Germans came unstuck in 1914, just as the Bolsheviks now with Lenin’s tactic from 1917. No: we speak out quite frankly: Lenin remains, but Leninism is the past. Where he believed he had developed Marx he has failed. We have to say: nowhere has the correctness of Marxism been more alarmingly proved than in the end Leninism is undergoing.



Erich Hausen (5.2.1900-19.12.73) Murkau/Oberlausitz (Silesia). Electrical Fitter. Called up WW1. War resister. Return January 1919 to Weisswasser/Lausitz. Joined USPD. Became USPD chairman then Secretary of USPD In the area. 1920 joined KPD with USPD-left. 1921 local editor of the KPD paper in Cottbus. Elected to party council at Jena Congress 1921. Member of Lausitz District Committee, from end of 1922 its secretary. Delegate to 8th Congress KPD in 1923, re-elected to party council. 7.12/23 imprisoned and sentenced to 3 years gaol for “preparation of high treason” (during the period of KPD illegality). 26.8.25 released and returned to Weisswasser. Unemployed a while, then secretary for Red Aid in Thuringia. 1926 secretary for KPD in Silesia. At the 1927 Essen Congress, as CC candidate, together with Heinrich Galm and Albert Bassüner, advanced the position of the Brandler group. On account of his protests over the Hamburg corruption (Wittorf case) removed from his functions in Silesia (Hausen demanded an open enquiry over the Wittorf Affair, and Thälmann’s role in it, before the working class, and advanced far-reaching demands for the reintroduction of the accountability of KPD functionaries: “election and recall by the rank-and-file”, “no removal without election”, etc.). Nov-Dec 1928, together with Galm, called to ECCI in Moscow, to enquire into their oppositional attitude. Both refused to capitulate (Hausen tells an interesting anecdote about attempts by various ECCI figures to persuade him to capitulate, or at least appear to do so, and Bela Kun told him that the CI leadership knew that Thälmann was a “dummkopf” and Neumann a “schweinhund”, but one had to close ranks in the CI, as the SU was passing through difficult times). Expelled KPD December 1928. Founded Gegen den Strom, 17.11.28. Leading KPO functionary and DMV activist. Led illegal KPO in Berlin for a while after Nazi take-over. Arrested but deported to France after 6 months because of his French passport. During the 1938-39 internal differences in the KPO he sided with the minority and broke with it. Interned in many camps until 1941 when he succeeded in entering USA. Lived in Swarthmore Pennsylvania as an electrical fitter till his death.

*From The Archives Of The “Revolutionary History” Journal-Unpublished Articles Of Interest-Walter Seeland and the German Brandlerites

Markin comment:

This is an excellent documentary source for today’s militants to “discovery” the work of our forbears, whether we agree with their programs or not. Mainly not, but that does not negate the value of such work done under the pressure of revolutionary times. Hopefully we will do better when our time comes.
********
Some information on the present Brandlerite tendency in Germany derived from their press and an obituary of one of their militants. It was contributed by Mike Jones.


The most recent issue of Arbeiterstimme (April 1993) has an obituary of a member of theirs, Walter Seeland, which tells of his tragic life of which the material below is a summary.

Walter Seeland

Born in Erfurt 30.8.14, his father Paul was a class conscious worker who went from the USPD to the KPD and then to the KPO. The family had close personal links with Alfred Schmidt who became the chief KPOer in Erfurt. Walter became a brickie and was active in the TU Youth section and active in the Friends of Nature Youth. He joined the KJO, the KPO youth, in 1930 and attended the Second National Conference of the KPO in Weimar as a youth representative. He became close to Paul Elflein, the Erfurt KPO chairman at the time and kept in contact until Elflein’s death in 1983.

He was denounced to the Gestapo in November 1933 and jailed, free after six weeks, but kept under observation and employed building barracks in Erfurt. When the war began he was called up and stationed in France but in 1941-1944 was sent to Russia where he was wounded four times and sent home on leave to recuperate. After Christmas 1944 he was sent to the western front and ended up as a POW in a US camp. In 1947 he returned to Erfurt, went to a Trade School to finish his education as a Trade Teacher and in 1948 married a nursery nurse, Ursel Seitz.

In December 1948 Walter and his comrades were sentenced to death for anti-Soviet activities and propaganda by the Soviet Military Tribunal in Weimar. The charges were in Russian and thus incomprehensible. It was, he said, a Punch and Judy show at which they just grinned. He was charged with anti-Soviet attitudes from 1938 – when he was thirteen! Later the death sentences were commuted for twenty-five years in the labour camp. They were sent to the notorious prison at Bautzen near Dresden and five of the nine, including Walter, contracted TB because of the inhuman conditions. After Stalin’s death he was released on 18.1.54 and Alfred Schmidt on 27.7.56. But “Ulbricht’s people” kept him under observation. Walter and Ursel decided to leave the DDR and go to Berlin and from thence to the BRD when she was well enough as she had been hospitalised when he had been jailed and so had been unable to help him when he was in Bautzen.

After the Stalin-Tito split a witch-hunt got under way in the SBZ against declared or potential opponents of Soviet policy. Walter was arrested together with Alfred Schmidt and seven other comrades. After 14 days isolation in the cellar of the Erfurt GPU building the first interrogation took place. Walter was asked about his father on a number of occasions who was known as a KPOer in Erfurt though apparently Walter’s own membership of the KPO was unknown them. They also asked about Alfred Schmidt who had been the leader of the local Food and Restaurant workers Union and both a KPD and SPD member in the past. Without explicitly saying so they were both charged with ‘Titoism’.

Though they got to the BRD, because of his TB, Walter could not get a job as a Trade Teacher and he was unemployed for a while and then did a variety of different jobs. They did not succeed in having a long life together as Ursel died in 1959 after a long stay in a clinic caused by the psychological effects of her sufferings. Walter settled and worked in Heidelberg and was active in IG Metall and, for tactical reasons, the SPD. He was in contact with the Arbeiterpolitik tendency but after the founding of the Arbeiterstimme group he joined that along with most of the older comrades. He belonged to that group for over two decades and always attended its national conferences.

Walter had been affected by his imprisonment in Bautzen and afterwards always had a feeling of being threatened and persecuted. When he spoke about it he did so with anger and incomprehension at its injustice. He used to describe the political leaders of the DDR as “Stalinist lumpens” who had profoundly discredited socialism. His angst was so deep that for a long time after the Wall had fallen he avoided visiting his beloved home town of Erfurt. A visit to Erfurt in the New Year resulted in a lung problem which led to pneumonia though this was apparently cleared up with antibiotics.

Mike Jones 1993


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Brandlerism today
There are two Brandlerite groups. What divides them is, first of all Russia together with generational and social distinctions. In the broadest terms the Arbeiterstimme is composed of the generation of ’48, Arbeiterpolitik of the generation of ’68. The older members have a more Brandler position on the ex-USSR, that is they are more pro-Soviet while the younger are almost semi-Shachtmanite. The Brandlerite base was skilled metal workers, often “Meisters”, in Berlin and Baden in small and medium size shops. Baden and Nuremburg are still the Arbeiterstimme centres while the others are in Bremen and Hamburg. The guru of Arbeiterpolitik is Theo Bergmann’s brother.

There are stories of their role in the Berlin uprising of 1953 but it is all hearsay. The GDR oppositionists were of course denounced as Trotskyite wreckers and Brandlerites but that means nothing. After the banning of the CP in the FDR the Brandlerites played a local role, particularly in the Baden area, of the left lower level bureaucrat oppositionists in the Metal Workers Union. In a sense they protected the Stalinists and may have had some division of labour, they were the TU officials, the Stalinists the stewards. As they died off and retired they were, by and large, replaced by Stalinists if by anyone – they failed to recruit anybody.

I am told that the paper in Hamburg consists of lots of reports of struggles and so on but it is difficult to discover where they stand on particular issues.

Tuesday, April 26, 2011

*From The Archives Of The “Revolutionary History” Journal-Strategy and Tactics of the Communist International: What are Transitional Slogans?-August Thalheimer

Click on the headline to link to an August Thalheimer-related post from the American Left History blog.

Markin comment:

This is an excellent documentary source for today’s militants to “discovery” the work of our forbears, whether we agree with their programs or not. Mainly not, but that does not negate the value of such work done under the pressure of revolutionary times. Hopefully we will do better when our time comes.
********
From What Next? No.13, 1999

Strategy and Tactics of the Communist International: What are Transitional Slogans?-August Thalheimer

This piece is a section of a much longer document written by Thalheimer in response to the programme drafted (mainly by Bukharin) for the Communist International’s Sixth Congress in 1928. The document was retrieved from the SED (East German Communist Party) archives and published in 1993 by Decaton, Mainz, as Programmatische Fragen: Kritik des Programmentwurfs der Komintern (VI. Weltkongreß), with a foreword by Theodor Bergmann. We are grateful to Mike Jones for providing a translation.

THIS PART seems to me to be the weakest in the whole draft. It is also the most important for those sections of the CI [Communist International] which still face the task of winning the majority of the working class for the principles and aims of Communism, thus to create the organisational and ideological preconditions for the struggle for the proletarian dictatorship.

This task still faces such important sections of the CI as the German, French, Italian, Polish, Czechoslovak, etc. I have mentioned here sections of the CI which are already mass parties. Some sections of the CI have not even reached this level yet. They are not yet mass parties, but rather small groups with small circles around them, whose activity is dominated by propaganda. Other sections may still be in the very early stage of circles. The borders here are of course not fixed, but fluid. However, it seems useful to us to make this classification.

In this part, the insufficient participation of the non-Russian sections in elaborating the draft is most perceptible. The tactical and strategical experiences of the individual sections are much richer, more multifarious, more specific, than it appears in this part. Of course, this part of the programme of the International cannot merely consist of a juxtaposition, nor a mere addition, to the experience of the individual sections. It should represent the general viewpoints which result from these tactical experiences. This also accords with the well-known decision of the Fourth Congress [of the CI], in which Lenin played a decisive role. Moreover, it also accords with the conception that I represented here. I would not have considered it worth mentioning if some comrades had not tried to distort the conceptions represented there by me (on behalf of, and in agreement with, the KPD [German Communist Party]). One has only to compare the texts of the reports, such as that of the resolution drawn up at the Fourth Congress, to completely clarify things. If necessary that can be checked later. I am not in possession of the texts in question at present

It would also surely have been beneficial for the elaboration of this part if the most important sections of the Comintern had complied with the instructions by the ECCI [Executive Committee of the CI] years ago: namely, to elaborate Action Programmes for their countries. As far as I know, an elaborated draft of a long-term Action Programme only exists on the part of the Italian section. In this regard, it indicates a maturity above the average of the other sections.

In our German section there is, as is known, a toing and froing in opinion on whether a long-term Action Programme is in accordance with the principles of the CI or not. The view was presented here that an Action Programme should only contain partial or day-to-day demands (minimum demands as they used to be called), which could be shifted out within 24 hours.

I regard this view as false. It is not in accord with the above-mentioned instruction from the Executive to the individual sections to elaborate their Action Programmes. It certainly did not intend a mere collation of partial and day-to-day demands. These might have to be changed a short notice, often from one day to the next. They shun a concrete fixation for longer periods. In addition, this view contradicts the fact of the Action Programme of the Italian section. It also contradicts the decisions of the Third Congress, in which Lenin played such a decisive role. And, finally, it contradicts the conception of the practice of Marx and Engels.

On the other hand, it accords with the Erfurt Programme. It is a relapse into an obsolete stage of the workers’ movement.

Now we come to the question of transitional slogans in general, and to the question whether transitional slogans may be propagated in non-acute revolutionary situations.

According to rumours of which I have become aware, some comrades have accused me of a frightful theoretical misunderstanding of the meaning of the transitional slogans of Marx and Engels. In the opinion of Marx and Engels they should only be propagated in an acute revolutionary situation, in the revolutionary overturn itself.

Furthermore: with transitional slogans in the sense of Marx and Engels are meant slogans that could only be realised after the conquest of power by the working class. The grave theoretical mistake here is wholly on the side of the comrades who mention the above described conception.

In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels speak of ‘despotic inroads on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production; by means of measures, therefore, which appear economically insufficient and untenable, but which, in the course of the movement outstrip themselves, necessitate further inroads upon the old social order, and are unavoidable as a means of entirely revolutionising the mode of production’. Which transition should these demands or measures effect? That from the capitalist to the socialist mode of production. Which force should effect this transition? The working class, which ‘raises itself to the position of ruling class’, which conquers ‘political power’, which has won ‘the battle of democracy’. The word democracy, used here by Marx and Engels without further definition, would appear to mean the workers’ and peasants’ democratic dictatorship. The revolutionary democracy of the Jacobins and not the parliamentary form. The proletarian dictatorship was defined in more detail by them to signify the smashing of the bourgeois stale machine only after the experience of the Commune.

Which demands or measures are posed here by Marx and Engels for fulfilment after the conquest of power?

The Communist Manifesto says in this regard:

’These measures will of course be different in different countries. Nevertheless, in the most advanced countries, the following will be pretty generally applicable

1.Abolition of property in land and application of all rents to public purposes.
2.A heavy progressive or graduated income tax.
3.Abolition of all rights of inheritance.
4.Confiscation of the property of all emigrants and rebels.
5.Centralisation of credit in the hands of the State, by means of a national bank with State capital and an exclusive monopoly.
6.Centralisation of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State.
7.Extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State; the bringing into cultivation of waste-lands, and the improvement of the soil generally in accordance with a common plan.
8.Equal liability of all to labour. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture.
9.Combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries; gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country by a more equable distribution of the population over the country.
10.Free education for an children in public schools. Abolition of children’s factory labour in its present form. Combination of education with industrial production, etc.’
As one can immediately see, here it is a question of exclusively transitional measures after the conquest of power by the working class. Hence, they are mostly maximum slogans (except for the ‘heavy progressive tax’, although it too has a revolutionary meaning here).

Transitional slogans in the sense of the tactical theory of the Third Congress of the CI are, by their nature, as by the period of their use, something else. They are slogans which in the course of the struggle for power, that is, in an acutely revolutionary situation, are take:n up and partially realised, even before the working class has established its state power, but where it is already capable, in a number of areas, if not yet in a centralised form, of weakening capitalist rule in the factories and the bourgeois state power, and of strengthening its own class power. The implementation of these measures against the resistance of the bourgeoisie, the attempt to extend them, unfolds the question of power in its full extent. The resistance of the bourgeoisie poses for the working class the alternative: either to wholly lose the partial gains again or to continue advancing further.

In Soviet Russia in 1917, the most important of these transitional slogans were workers’ control of production and the arming of the workers.

Upon the establishment of the proletarian state power these slogans are out of date, as the struggle advances. Control of the factories by the workers is superseded by complete expropriation of the capitalist factory manager and management of the factories by the organs of the workers’ state. Then workers’ control assumes new forms and becomes a subordinate issue. At the same time it becomes generalised. The aiming of the workers in the course of the struggle for power is replaced, after the seizure of power, by the state aiming of the workers and disarming of the bourgeoisie. The Red Army, etc., takes the place of the Red Guards, etc.

One has simply allowed oneself to be led astray by the common word ‘transitional’ in the expressions transitional measures in the sense of the Communist Manifesto and transitional slogans in the sense of the Third Congress. In the one and the other case it concerns in essence different transitions and therefore different periods of struggle. In the one case it means measures of the victorious proletarian revolution, in the other case slogans and actions of the working class struggling for power. If I envisage only the word ‘transition’, without considering from what to what is the transition, then the change of the socialist society into the communist is also a ‘transition’ with corresponding transitional measures, slogans and phenomena. In the first case it concerns the period of the proletarian dictatorship; in the second, the period of the conquest of power. But maximum slogans as well as transitional slogans are propaganda slogans, before they become slogans of action. And, indeed, in the propaganda, maximum and transitional slogans must be linked to each other, the maximum slogans must be derived from the transitional slogans.

Demands of the second character, that is in the sense of transitional slogans, are not contained in the Communist Manifesto, but in the 17 demands formulated by the Central Committee of the Communist League in March 1848, that is in the already begun revolution, and moreover in the well known Circular of the Central Committee of March 1850, hence after the defeat of the German revolution, in the midst of the high tide of the reaction, in the expectation of a new upturn of the revolution

This circular said that, of course, at the start of the movement, the workers could not yet propose any directly communist measures, but they could compel the Democrats to intervene in as many sides of the hitherto existing social order as possible, to disturb its regular functioning and to compromise themselves, as well as to concentrate as many productive forces, means of transport, railways, etc., as possible in the hands of the state.

In this case, Marx, or the Central Committee, have in mind the transition from the bourgeois to the proletarian revolution and, at the same time, the of the workers fighting for power.

It is obvious that the transitional slogans formulated here are not relevant for Germany today, where the bourgeois revolution lies behind us (even if it has still left a vast quantity of rubbish, like the separate states, the legal system amalgamated with elements left over from princely absolutism, etc.) and which faces the proletarian or socialist revolution as the next direct link.

Here the question for us was only one of characterising the general nature of ‘transitional slogans’ in the stage of the working class struggle for power, as opposed to transitional measures in the sense of the Communist Manifesto, which are, in truth, maximum demands. But the comrades who look here for an incomprehensible theoretical error of mine commit one themselves, as they confuse different things.

Firstly, transitional slogans and transitional measures in the sense of the Communist Manifesto, that is, maximum slogans. Secondly, transitional slogans that are effective, transform themselves into action, in an immediate revolutionary situation, that is, in the course of the working-class struggle for power. Transitional slogans in our sense were posed and propagated by Marx and Engels only at the emergence of the revolutionary situation, at the outbreak of the revolution, then (1850) also in a time of profound reaction, the ebb of the revolution.

The situation will be fully clarified if one considers the situation in which the 1850 circular of the Central Committee was drafted. It was a period ‘between two revolutions’. The revolution had, for the time being, been defeated. Reaction ruled. Marx and Engels expected a new revolutionary upswing in connection with a new economic crisis, but this new revolutionary upturn had not yet arrived. The members of the Communist League are, of course, not meant to put the transitional slogans from the circular m their pockets until the appearance of the new revolutionary outbreak, but they should already now, before the outbreak, propagate them within the working class. The circular serves not only to develop the perspectives of the new revolutionary struggles for the members, to show them the basic lines of strategy and tactics, but also to nourish the present propaganda of the Communists in the working class. Through this propaganda the Communists shall prepare the working class for the coming revolutionary struggles. To start with propaganda for the struggle for power when it has already begun is typical chvostism (tail-endism). This was typical of the liquidatory Mensheviks and Trotsky in the years of reaction in Russia after 1907. The liquidators wanted those key slogans to be posed which presupposed a Tsarist regime with liberal additions. As the most important one they raised the freedom of combination. In opposition to them Lenin represented the viewpoint that a second revolution would be necessary, and that accordingly one should raise the unabridged revolutionary slogans: the well-known three whales – democratic republic, eight-hour day, landlord’s land to the peasants. The Leninist slogans were presented in the big mass strikes of 1912.

I assumed that these simple things would be well known. That was evidently a mistake.

Now we go to the twentieth century

Lenin deals with the question of transitional demands in his text on the Infantile Disorders of Leftism, where he speaks of the still not fully Communist slogans or measures which are necessary to draw the majority of the proletariat and working people close to the (already convinced) revolutionary vanguard. That was written in 1920. Lenin was careful and prudent enough not to put any time limit on when the majority of the working class and working people had or ought to be drawn around the vanguard. In any case, it is clear that for Lenin the transitional slogans ought to be propagated at a time when the Communist Party has not yet won the majority of the working class and the working people, in a generally revolutionary but not yet acutely revolutionary situation.

The issue will become clearer when we consider the Third Congress of the CI.

Let us look at Radek’s report on tactics. Of course, what Radek expressed here was not his personal view, but that of the leading Russian comrades, above all that of Lenin

On transitional slogans, the following general viewpoints were developed:

The minimum demands in the programme of pre-war Social Democracy were a system of demands which should improve the situation of the working class on the basis of capitalism, which should arm the working class against the depressing tendencies of capitalism. Rosa Luxemburg once characterised the real function of the Social Democratic (minimum) programme, in a polemic with Sombart, in such a way that she declared: ‘Really we only struggle for the commodity labour power to be sold at its real price, so that the worker receives the wage which allows him to reproduce his own labour power.’

The Social Democratic minimum programme remained economically within the framework of the capitalist economic form, practically within the framework of the bourgeois-democratic state, the ‘well known democratic litany’, as Marx put it in his remarks on the Gotha Programme. The objective precondition for it was that the Social Democracy still envisaged ‘a long period of existence of capitalist society’.

The minimum programme of the pre-war Social Democracy posed demands ‘which were attainable within capitalist society, and which functioned in a revolutionary way, since capitalist society time and again, opposed these attainable and, for the working class, necessary demands’.

Here one should have added that the revolutionary effect of the political minimum demands, for example, in the Erfurt Programme, was connected to the fact that here, in the political area, the bourgeois revolution had been stuck in mid-course. In Bismarck-Hohenzollern Germany, the bourgeois-parliamentary republic slogan must, naturally, have a revolutionary effect. As is known, it was not contained in the Erfurt Programme, allegedly purely for police reasons. In reality, there was more to it, as was demonstrated by the opposition to the proposal by Rosa Luxemburg to propagate the republic (1910), and later (1918) by the Social Democratic attempts, even in the last hours, to save the monarchy. At the foundation congress of the KPD (Spartakusbund), in late December 1918, Rosa Luxemburg declared: ‘For us now there is no minimum programme, no maximum programme; socialism is one and the same, that is the minimum we have to achieve today.’

In the Spartacus programme, this minimum and maximum was posed as: ‘all power to the worker councils, arming of the proletariat, cancellation of state debts, seizing possession of the factories’, etc.

‘In which situation’, commented Radek, ‘did this programme arise? The workers’ councils were the highest power in Germany. Formally, the working class had the power in its hands. And the task of the Spartacus League consisted in just saying to these workers’ councils what the power of the working class consists of, and nothing more.’

‘It is clear’, continued Radek, ‘that now we do not find ourselves in this situation. The bourgeoisie has the power. The first working-class assault in the epoch of demobilisation was repelled. The proletarian revolution is now only growing.’

What is the consequence?

‘Primarily, it is this: one must try to lead all struggle over wage rises, over working hours, against unemployment towards the intermediate aim of control over production, not towards the system of production, control effected by the government, by passing a law, which the proletariat has then to respect, that the worker does not steal, and the capitalist has to watch that the worker works. Control over production means education in proletarian struggle, all factory organisations to be subject to elections, their local and district-wide connection on the basis of industrial groups in the proletarian struggle.’

Radek named ‘the arming of the proletariat, the disarming of the bourgeoisie’ as the second slogan.

And he draws the following general conclusion:

’One could mention even more slogans of that type. I will not do so. They grow out of the practical struggle. What we say to you, give to you as a general slogan, as a general orientation is, not to counterpose yourselves to the proletariat in all the struggles Which the masses undertake, but to sharpen, to extend the struggles of the masses for their practical necessities, and to teach them to have greater necessities: the necessity to conquer power.’

I mention one more passage from the report:

‘The preparatory work is not in opposition to the epoch of agitation ... struggle is revolutionary agitation, struggle is revolutionary propaganda, struggle is illegal organisations, the military training of the proletariat, party school, demonstration, uprising, is struggle.’

The Third Congress Theses on Tactics sum up the ideas in the report then as follows:

’The action tasks which will soon confront the VKPD [United Communist Party of Germany – the name initially adopted by the KPD after the fusion of the KPD (Spartakusbund) with the left of the Independent Social Democratic Party], because of the breakdown of the German economy and the capitalist threat to the living standards of the working masses, can only be accomplished if the party, instead of opposing the tasks of organisation and agitation to those of action, of the deed, keeps constantly on the alert the spirit of militancy in its organisations, makes its agitation really popular in character, and builds its organisations in such a way that through its ties with the masses, it develops the ability to weigh up situations most carefiffly, to determine the moment for fighting, and to prepare thoroughly for the fight.’ (Thesen und Resolutionen des 3. Weltkongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale, Hamburg 1921, part 4, pp.43-44.)

’The Communist Parties do not put forward any minimum programme to strengthen and improve the tottering structure of capitalism The destruction of that structure remains their guiding aim and their immediate mission. But to carry out this mission the Communist Parties must put forward demands whose fulfilment is an immediate and urgent working-class need, and they must fight for these demands in mass struggle, regardless of whether or not they are compatible with the profit economy of the capitalist class or not.

’It is not the viability and competitive capacity of capitalist industry, nor the profitability of capitalist finance to which Communist Parties should pay regard, but the limits of want which the proletariat cannot and should not endure any longer. If the demands correspond to the vital need of broad proletarian masses, if these masses feel that they cannot exist unless these demands are met, then the struggles for these demands will become the starting points of the struggle for power In place of the minimum programme of the reformists and centrists, the Communist International puts the struggle for the concrete needs of the proletariat, for a system of demands which in their totality disintegrate the power of the bourgeoisie, organise the proletariat, represent stages in the struggle for the proletarian dictatorship, and each of which expresses in itself the need of the broadest masses, even if the masses themselves are not yet consciously in favour of the proletarian dictatorship.’ (Thesen und Resolutionen, part 5, pp.46-7.)

‘1. ... To the extent that the struggles for partial demands, and the particular struggles of particular groups of workers develop into the general struggle of the working class against capitalism, the Communist Party must also intensify and generalise its slogans, up to the slogan of the direct defeat of the enemy In formulating their partial demands, the Communist Parties have to consider that these demands – anchored in the needs of the broadest masses – not only lead the masses in the struggle, but by their very nature also are organising demands. Every practical slogan which derives from the economic needs of the working masses must be channelled into the struggle for the control of production, not as a plan for the bureaucratic organisation of the national economy under the capitalist regime, but as the struggle against capitalism, through the factory councils and revolutionary trade unions.’ (Ibid., pp.47-8.)

Between the beginning of the struggle for power by the working class and the classes allied to it, the outbreak of the acute revolutionary period and its provisional closure at the conquest of power by the establishment of the council-power (provisional closure, since after the establishment of the council-power, the struggle continues for its maintenance), lies the period of the struggle for power itself. Many comrades ‘forget’ that. In Russia in 1917, the struggle of the working class for power lasted from March to October – eight months. Its starting point was the ‘dual-government’, the coexistence of the bourgeois-democratic state power (Kerensky government) and the workers’, peasants’ and soldiers’ councils, the latter of which realised in an original form the workers’ and peasants’ democratic dictatorship. Its end-point was the establishment of the soviet power in October, the destruction and removal of the bourgeois-democratic state power and state machine.

The main contents of the resolution are as follows:

(1) The rise of the councils of workers’, peasants’ and soldiers’ deputies as organs of struggle of the revolutionary classes, their struggle with the organs of bourgeois democracy and finally their victory over them, which transforms the councils into the organs of the proletarian state power.

(2) The aiming and the armed struggles of the workers, peasants and soldiers, the undermining and destruction of the Tsarist army, finally the armed uprising, the victory of the armed workers, peasants and the creation of the Red Guards and the Red Army.

(3) The sporadic workers’ control of production, where the employers are still formally owners of the factories, but the control and, in part, management is subordinate to the factory councils. The end-point is, with the conquest of power, the seizure of the big enterprises by the council-state, their management by the organs of the workers’ state, simultaneously, systematic extension of workers’ control which, however, now assumes a wholly different character, where the employer is now replaced as owner and manager by the workers’ state. Workers’ control is integrated by, and subordinate to, the council-state leadership, generalised and transformed.

(4) The local, spontaneous and direct occupation of the land of the big landlords by the peasants. The end-point here is: the decree nationalising the land, the general confiscation of large-scale landed property by the state.

These eight months also constitute the transition or the change from the bourgeois-democratic into the proletarian-socialist revolution.

There is no doubt that Marx and Engels had in mind not only transitional measures after the conquest of power, after the establishment of the workers’ and peasants’ democratic dictatorship (as stated in the Communist Manifesto), but also transitional slogans for the preceding period, for the conquest of power itself (Engels 1847, the 17 demands of March 1848, the Central Committee circular of 1850).

This was a transition from the bourgeois-democratic to the proletarian-socialist revolution also under the conditions prevailing at the time in Germany. In present-day Germany, which has left the completed bourgeois-democratic revolution behind, the section of the struggle of the workers, and of those classes allied to and led by them, for state power cannot any longer, of course, be a transition from the bourgeois democratic to the proletarian-socialist revolution. In Germany, the different stages of the bourgeois and proletarian revolution, which were compressed into the space of time from 1905/06 to 1917 in Russia, that is12 years, are separated by over 70 years (the bourgeois revolution in Germany began in 1848, and is concluded in 1919; simultaneously, the proletarian revolution began in 1918).

One thing is certain, the struggle of the working class and its allies for power, in Germany and also in other counties with similar economic and administrative preconditions, will last for a determined period, not just a fleeting moment As its main contents one can already today indicate an outline as follows:

1) The formation of workers’ (small peasants’ and possibly soldiers’) councils as organs of struggle, their struggle against the organs of the bourgeois state power.

2) The arming and armed struggles of the workers, the undermining and finally the smashing of the bourgeois military and police power, and other military forces of the bourgeoisie.

3) The conquest of new positions of power by the workers against the employers in the factories, the control and partial management of individual factories by the workers; in probability, also already the partial expulsion or flight of capitalist employers from ‘their’ enterprises.

4) Probably also the local occupation of large scale landed property, big farm land, by farm labourers, rural semi-proletarians, dwarf- and small-holders and lower layers of the middle peasantry.

What kind of slogans?

If we take as an example the slogan of the local occupation of large-scale landed property and the land of large farmers by farm labourers, rural casual labourers, dwarf- and small-holders and part of the middle peasantry. Is that a partial slogan? Surely not. It is more. It already breaks the framework of the bourgeois order. Is it a maximum slogan? Not yet. It is less. A maximum slogan is the expropriation of the big landlords (and big farmers) and the appropriation of the land by the council state.

What we have here is a type of transitional slogan. There will be quite a few of them. Some can be foreseen, others cannot.

A second example – the slogan of the councils. They will arise in acute revolutionary situations. For a longer or shorter period they become organs of struggle of the working class and its allies, rather than organs of power. The maximum slogan is that of council power: ‘All power to the councils!’ But what is the ‘Workers’ and Peasants’ Government!’ slogan? It is surely not a bourgeois-democratic slogan. It already breaks the framework of the bourgeois state. Hence it is not a partial, reform or minimum slogan. It is a revolutionary slogan. Is it already a maximum slogan, the ready-made council-power, its ’synonym or pseudonym’? Two names or slogans for the same thing are superfluous. It is again a transitional slogan for the struggle for power: the council-power of the council state in its not yet perfect or finished, but still incomplete and transitory, form. (For example, in Russia, from 7 November up to the breaking-up of the alliance with the Left SRs in the soviets.)

This is also a type of transitional slogan, and as a condition a transitional one or a transitional measure in the here-mentioned sense.

Moreover, one must see that this period of struggle must be prepared agitationally, propagandistically, organisationally, that is, that the transitional slogans must be propagated before the struggle for power has begun, until and so that they become slogans of action in the struggle for powert

When and which specific transitional slogans are agitated for and propagated before the immediate struggle for power, depends on the concrete conditions, but must be investigated in each single case. In other words, that is the task of leading the masses to the struggle for power.

This task, which Lenin saw as the main task of the Communist Party in the most important countries in 1920, at a time when capitalism was much more convulsed than today, seemed attainable in a relatively short time. Today the objective circumstances indicate that it will necessitate a longer time.

But the essence of this task remains the same today as it did then.

To want to overlook or forget or argue away this task is to commit a great theoretical as well as a practical error. It means ignoring the subjective conditions necessary for the realisation of the transitional slogans. It means to forget the role of the Communist Party as the leader of the working class, which has to show it the next step. It means to limit oneself to ‘tail-ending’, to remaining behind the movement of the masses. It is Kautsky’s famous strategy of attrition.

The general result is this:

1) A limiting to a minimum programme, like that of the pre-war Social Democracy, which holds itself within the framework of the capitalist order and the bourgeois-democratic state, is not permissible in a time when capitalism finds itself in a revolutionary crisis and where the bourgeois-democratic state already exists in fact in the country in question.

2) Just as impermissible is limiting oneself to maximum slogans, in a time when capitalism finds itself indeed in revolutionary crisis, but the working class is not immediately fighting for power and the bourgeoisie has again consolidated itself in power for a longer of a shorter time.

3) In a period like that the task is, apart from propagating maximum slogans: agitation, propaganda and organisation of struggles around partial demands and transitional slogans.

The posing of the one or the other must conform to the concrete circumstances of the struggle.

Where do we find ourselves now? Not in the first period of struggle of the still unshaken capitalism. The draft programme is absolutely correct to speak of the general crisis of capitalism, which denotes the whole actual period of struggle. Even if the particular postiwar crisis has been overcome, the general crisis of capitalism has in any case remained. This crisis is already proved by the fact that the Soviet Union, an oasis with a dominating socialist economic form, exists and grows in the middle of the capitalist world.

Is world capitalism in 1928 different from that of 1921, that of the Third Congress? Certainly. Capitalism has, in the meantime, consolidated itself more firmly (but so have the Soviet Union and the Communist International).

But is the situation different in its fundamental characteristics, which determine the posing and propagating of transitional slogans? No!

Hence what follows?

Two things:

1) The continuing general crisis of capitalism proves today as in 1921 the necessity of posing and propagating transitional slogans.

2) The overcoming of the particular post-war crisis of capitalism, the ‘relative stabilisation of capitalism’, the development of contradictions, crises, conflicts on new bases, stipulates that the transitional slogans are adapted to a new situation, given new contents and forms, that their utilisation will have different forms, etc. It is not simply a question of repeating the old formulas and forms.

I content myself here with this general result. To deal with one of these transitional slogans, such as that of control of production, its actual possible content in a country like Germany or Italy, its form of propagation adapted to the situation, the organisational utilisation, etc., would go too far here.

The programme must give clear information over the question: what are transitional slogans, under what conditions should they be propagated, when do they become slogans of action, etc.

The questions are thrown up in the movement; they must be clearly and precisely replied to, in a general form, in the program.

*From The Archives Of The “Revolutionary History” Journal-The German Left and Bolshevism by Walter Held

Click on the headline to link to an American Left History post related to this entry.

Markin comment:

This is an excellent documentary source for today’s militants to “discovery” the work of our forbears, whether we agree with their programs or not. Mainly not, but that does not negate the value of such work done under the pressure of revolutionary times. Hopefully we will do better when our time comes.

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From Issue no.6, 1997 of the Marxist Discussion journal What Next? By kind permission of the editor Bob Pitt, 24 Georgiana St, London, NW1 0EA, email wh@tnext.freeserve.co.uk, who introduces the article..

The German Left and Bolshevism by Walter Held

Like the previous piece, this article first appeared in the February 1939 issue of the New International. It is a reply to Max Shachtman’s article, Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, which was reprinted in What Next? No.4. In contrast to the ‘revisionist’ approach to the history of the early Communist International which Held would adopt in his later article Why the German Revolution Failed (reprinted in the first issue of this journal), he presents here a fiercely orthodox defence of Leninism against Luxemburgism. In doing so, he raises a number of issues – the relationship between spontaneity and Marxism, and the appropriate form of revolutionary political organisation, for example – which will hopefully be the subject of further discussion.

INTELLECTUAL life in the Soviet Union throughout the rule of the epigones has consisted exclusively of the struggle against ‘Trotskyism’, to the point where it finally perished on this diet and all that is wafted to us today from Stalin’s realm is the icy air of the grave. The struggle against Trotsky, which was conducted under the sign of canonising Lenin and Bolshevism as Stalin understood them, also collided with the disturbing shade of Rosa Luxemburg. And upon the ukase of the ruffian and illiterate to whom not very deferential history, by one of its odd dialectical capers, confided the heritage of one of the most gifted scientific minds of all times, a pack of yelping curs flung themselves upon the corpse of the great revolutionist that was thrown before them. At that time it was the self-evident duty of every Marxian publicist who takes his task seriously, to come forward in defence of the memory of the great proletarian leader and to underscore as they deserved to be her progressive sides, her immortal merits. In contrast to Stalin’s kept young rogues, Rosa Luxemburg had to an outstanding degree those qualities which distinguish a true revolutionary leader: scientific seriousness in the treatment of every question, unselfish absorption in the cause, self-discipline and exemplary courage.

If, however, the question is once more put today of the content of the differences between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg – and it must be put again, in so far as this question relates to the solution of present tasks – we cannot content ourselves with a simple obeisance to the memory of Rosa Luxemburg. Besides, it would mean today to profane instead of honour Rosa’s memory if we were to allow the discussion on this theme to be influenced in the slightest by the Stalinist publications. Shafts from this side cannot touch Rosa Luxemburg. As an ideological current Stalinism is dead. It does not stand before history as accuser, but as accused.

On the other hand, there are today numerous currents which counter-pose to the Bolshevik conception, so to speak, a Luxemburgian conception. These gentleman see in Stalin’s total police dictatorship and the Moscow Trials the direct result of Lenin’s ‘centralism’ and deduce that Rosa Luxemburg has remained correct in her polemic against Lenin’s alleged overestimation of centralised leadership. This at first blush fascinating argument overlooks, nevertheless, the fact that if Lenin is to be made responsible for Stalin, it is no less justified to load Rosa Luxemburg with the responsibility for the rule ... of Hitler. And actually there is in both assertions a kernel, only a kernel, of truth, but it is just this kernel that must be discovered.

Comrade Max Shachtman, in an exceptionally interesting article on this theme (Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, New International, May 1938), endeavoured to explain the differences between Lenin and Luxernburg by the historic diversity of Russian and German conditions. Now such an investigation of the objective background of the divergences is naturally entirely necessary for an understanding of them. But the investigation cannot stop there; otherwise we run the risk of falling into Austro-Marxism, that is, a Marxism which confines itself to demonstrating, with the aid of the Marxian method (a caricature of the Marxian method), that everything happened as it had to happen, and which thus eliminates from history the responsibility of the subjective factor. In reality, however, we all know that the revolutionary labour movement up to now foundered not on the objective situation as such but on its subjective subjugation. Then if we are to overcome the crisis of the labour movement, we must pitilessly lay bare the ultimate causes of this subjective failure and make the balance sheet of this dearly paid-for historical experience part of the inalienable theoretical capital of the Fourth International.

International significance of Lenin
In defence of Luxemburg’s ‘anti-Bolshevism’ comrade Shachtman correctly points out that even Lenin erred in his estimation of the factions of the German social democracy. Lenin’s great mistake consisted in this, that he applied his organisational, literary, strategical and tactical plan only to Russia, and pursued it to its final consequences only within the Russian movement, that, indeed, he regarded Bolshevism as the representation of the tendency of Bebel and Kautsky on Russian soil. So great was Lenin’s confidence in Kautsky that he paid no attention to the difference that arose in 1910 between Kautsky and the German left, and thus missed a highly favourable opportunity to create a firm support for Bolshevism in Germany, to extend the Bolshevik plan internationally. And in the last analysis, this mistake, this failure, this exclusively national application of the essentially international Bolshevik plan, is the deepest reason for the isolation of the Russian Revolution and, therefore, for the Stalinist Thermidor and impending fall of the Soviet Union. Or in other words: the gifted Leninist works What Is To Be Done? and One Step Forward, Two Steps Back of the first years of this century are in no wise of specifically Russian – as comrade Shachtman seems to assume -but of international significance. The ideas developed in these books on the relationship of spontaneity to conscious plan, on the role, organisational structure and tasks of the revolutionary party and their relationship to the proletariat and the other classes of society, the relationship of Marxian science and the labour movement – all these ideas have nothing specifically Russian in them,

In his work which appeared three years after the victory of the October Revolution, ‘Left Wing’ Communism – an Infantile Disorder, Lenin then tried to make the Bolshevik conception of 1903 accessible and understandable to the West European workers. The question why this attempt failed should be treated anew in connection with the hapless March adventure of the German Communist Party, and we reserve this for a later article. Here it is a question only of the following: whoever studies attentively ‘Left Wing’ Communism and compares it with the early writings of Lenin, will find again the same ideas and the same conception, even if in highly popularised form. That, however, would refute the view that Lenin did not consider his ideas of 1903 as ‘export commodities’. In 1903, Lenin did not think of any exporting only because he imagined lie was importing into ‘backward’ Russia the ideas of Bebel and Kautsky which had long ago become avowed truisms in ‘progressive’ Germany, in order to have them prevail over the revisionist, opportunistic and centrist currents of Martinov and Martov; whereas in reality it should have been a question of counter-posing the Bolshevik conception, the programme of What Is To Be Done?, to the whole theory and practice of the Second International, the Bernsteinian as well as the Kautskyian and Luxemburglan tendencies.

It would, however, be wrong to ignore the enormous qualitative difference in the historical mistakes of Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. While Lenin succeeded in creating the first truly Marxian party, which led the Russian proletariat to the summits of power and thereby gave the world proletariat a tremendous impulsion and a vast mass of new points of view, experiences and lessons; while Lenin’s conception of 1903 found its highest confirmation in the planfully directed October uprising; Rosa’s conception suffered a terrible shipwreck in January 1919, and the German left presented us, besides a series of remarkable characters and martyrs to the cause, only the bitter lesson of a new defeat.

At bottom, the disastrous mistake of Rosa Luxemburg was concentrated in the question of the role of the party, in the definition of the social democracy as ‘the self-movement of the working class’, which she counter-posed to the brilliant Leninist definition of ‘the revolutionary social democrats as Jacobins bound up with the working class’. ‘The social democracy as the self-movement of the working class’ can never be anything but trade unionism transferred to the political sphere. Such a social democracy will never shake bourgeois society to its foundations. It will either run its head vainly against the solid walls of the bourgeois state or voluntarily submit to the latter as it stands. The proletarian class as a whole is, under the conditions of capitalism, not in a position to raise itself to such a level of consciousness as to be able to confront the bourgeoisie in a superior manner in all fields, to destroy bourgeois authority and to replace it with proletarian authority. Capitalism would not be suppression, exploitation and slavery if that were not the case. That is just why the problem is to create out of the specialists closely bound up with the working class a firmly disciplined organisation which, with the aid of Marxian armour, destroys bourgeois authority first in theory and then in practical reality, and leads the ’self-movement’ of the working class beyond the limits set for it-

Two Mistakes

Now Rosa Luxemburg had the advantage over Lenin of observing the German party at closer range. That is why she recognised its conservative character as early as 1904. She sees that the party is stuck in the mud of tradition, refuses to raise up new problems, limps behind the masses. And what conclusions does she draw from this? ‘The conscious initiative of the party leadership in the shaping of tactics plays only a slight role.’ ‘The fighting tactic of the social democracy is the result of a continuous series of great creative acts of the experimental, often elementary class struggle.’ ‘The unconscious precedes the conscious, the logic of the objective historical process precedes the subjective logic of its bearers.’ ‘The only subject upon whom the role of guide now devolves is the mass of the working class.’ In short, in her despair over the conservative inertia of the social democratic apparatus in Germany, Rosa Luxemburg created what Lenin characterised with full justice as the ‘not-to-be-taken-seriously nonsense of organisation and tactics as a process’, although, to be sure, he overlooked the fact, as we have already emphasised, that Rosa was completely in the right in her characterisation of the German party. But even here Rosa committed the grosser mistake. She separated form from content, she combated centralism as such, instead of counterposing the centralism of the revolutionary Marxists to that of the opportunists. In this way, Rosa, in spite of the fact that she agreed with Bolshevism in most political questions at the international congresses, was driven to the same position to which Menshevism fled in the face of Lenin’s intransigence. And history prepared the same fate for both of them, deciding each time in its own manner for centralism; while the Bolsheviks drive the Mensheviks out of the soviets, Noske succeeds in flinging Spartacus out of the chamber of the German revolution and shutting the door behind it.

The lack of final consistency accompanied Rosa throughout her political life, whereas Lenin, precisely because of the relentlessness with which he carried out a once recognised necessity, was in a position to accomplish his historic mission.

In her work written in 1899, Social Reform or Social Revolution, which will forever remain a pearl in Marxian polemical literature, Rosa Luxemburg rightfully demanded the expulsion of the Bemsteinians from the party. In the second edition of this work, which appeared in 1908, she omitted all the corresponding passages. Bemsteinism had eaten its way into the flesh of the German party like a fungus; the flesh was decomposing. But what new consequence did Rosa draw? None at all. She threatened the petrified leadership: the masses will teach you new mores! But if the masses will correct the mistakes of the party out of their own initiative, why then the demand for Bernstein’s expulsion in 1899? In 1910, Rosa saw through the pedantic officialdom of Kautsky and attacked him sharply in a series of articles. Yet again she does not draw the final consequence of her judgement. Although she stops her Sunday visits to Kautsky and thus gives new evidence of her spotless and exemplary character, she is nevertheless lacking politically in the same measure of resoluteness. If the party was ravaged by Bernsteinism and even the ‘Marxian centre’ of the Neue Zeit had come to a standstill in the routine of the ‘tactic that stood the test for forty years’, then it was absolutely necessary to unfurl the Marxian banner anew and in the eyes of all, with the formal question whether to constitute a new party immediately or to remain for a while inside the social democracy as a firmly-disciplined faction, playing a minor role. In any case, however, it was necessary to come out against the reformism and centrism of the social democracy in every single question and permanently, to drive it out of reality instead of letting oneself be driven out by it. The German left never raised the question clearly, much less did it have a firm plan for resolving it.

Luxemburg’s Allusions

It is known that Lenin first regarded as a Hohenzollern forgery the number of the Vorwärts which bought the report of the vote of the German social democracy in the Reichstag. This is not to be wondered at and is in accord with his previous attitude, i.e., with his illusions relative to Kautsky and the German centre. But Rosa, who had seen through the opportunistic character of the German party ten years earlier, who experienced the worst disillusionment above all at the Jena congress of 1913 – what was her attitude? She gave way to convulsive sobbing in the Vorwärts editorial board, thought she was going mad, yes, even the thought of suicide came to her mind. Again a reaction which wrings from us the greatest human sympathy and respect for this singular woman, but which nevertheless also clearly discloses the main political weakness of the German lefts. She had seen through the Bernsteinians and the Scheidemanns, the Legiens and even the Kautskys and Hilferdings, and in spite of it she was steeped in illusions about the social democracy, in spite of it she believed that this Bemstein-Kautsky social democracy would pass a great historical test. In reality, if the German left had drawn the final consequence from its criticism of the official social-democracy – and whoever does not draw the final consequence in politics, lands unfailingly under the wheels – it would have been prepared for the Fourth of August, foretold it and warned against it. It is clear that in this case the catastrophe of the Fourth of August would not have taken on anything like its scope, the reorganisation of the vanguard would have proceeded much more easily and the revolutionary maturing accelerated much differently, and the German revolution in general would have taken a different course. Thus even Liebknecht allowed himself to be taken by surprise by the decision of the Reichstag fraction and it took months for the tiny handful to assemble again: Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring, Clara Zetkin, Karl Liebknecht, Leo Jogisches, Paul Levi. The profounder reason for the illusions of the German left with regard to the whole social democracy was founded, in turn, in its main error, in the disastrous ignoring of the reciprocal relation between party and masses. Rosa Luxemburg and her friends consoled themselves with this, that in the great historical crisis the masses would correct the party and sweep it along, Now they had to witness the fact that there was nothing for the masses to do in this situation except to follow – even perhaps while gritting their teeth – the instructions of the party.

Yet, while Lenin immediately draws the last consequence from the Fourth of August with his customary keenness – ‘The Second International Is dead, long live the Third!’ – and now seeks to develop, also in the International, all the elements to a Bolshevik conception of things (see, for example, his criticism of the Junius brochure), the German left continues to remain steeped in its fundamental mistake. The same erroneous conceptions on the role of the party which Rosa Luxemburg defended in 1904, recur in an article she published on 31 March 1917 in the Duisburg organ of the USPD, Der Kampf. ‘The Spartacus League tendency’, it says, ‘does not counter-pose to the Independent social democracy another programme and a fundamentally quite different tactic, which supply at every moment and as a permanent structure the basis of a separate party existence [that’s just what the problem was! W.H.], rather it is only [!] another historical tendency of the whole movement of the proletariat, from which follows, to be sure, a different attitude in almost every question of tactics and organisation. The opinion, however, that from this follows the necessity or even only the objective possibility of now jamming the workers into different, carefully separated party cages corresponding to the two tendencies of the opposition, is based upon a conventicle-conception of the party.’

From the ‘not-to-be-taken-seriously’ nonsense of the organisation as a process runs a straight line to this no less curious philosophy of an organisation which, although it does not counterpose to the opportunistic tendency any independent programme and any fundamentally quite different tactic, nevertheless does embody ‘another historical tendency’. With such light ideological baggage did Spartacus march in the German revolution. The catastrophic effect was not to be averted.

The German Catastrophe

Came November 9, the ’spontaneous people’s revolution’, which the SPI) resisted to the very last minute, but for which neither the Independent SPD nor Spartacus had taken the initiative. The November revolution in Germany could overturn the solid structure of capitalism just as little as could the February revolution in Russia; in both cases they were only able to eliminate the monarchistic embellishment. The real work first began after November. It is of course to the honour of Spartacus that it recognised this and refused to be party to the general round of fraternisation which always followed every popular uprising organised ‘from below’ and victorious at the first shot and into which such ‘Bolsheviks’ as Stalin also fell in February 1917. Still, Spartacus committed the reverse mistake and adopted an ultimatist attitude towards the masses. The same Rosa Luxemburg who in her criticism of the Russian revolution had reproached the Bolsheviks for the lack of democracy and the suppression of the soviet minority, refused to be elected onto the Executive Council of the Berlin Workers’ and Soldiers’ Councils together with the social democrats of the Ebert tendency. The masses did not accept this ultimatum of the Spartacus League, and the result was an Executive Council without Spartacus. The further result was that Spartacus did not get the slightest influence upon the elections to the first German Council Congress and remained without representation in it. Liebknecht had to confine himself to impotent attempts to conquer the congress ‘from without’. These events ought now to have sufficed to show Spartacus what its task was: namely, Lenin’s programme of April 1917. Patiently explain, restrain the small revolutionary minority from ill-considered steps, penetrate into the mass organisations and all the classes of the population, expose and polemically annihilate the reformists and centrists, in order, finally, at the historically ripe moment, to proceed to the insurrection.

The founding conference of the Communist Party, which finally takes place at the end of December 1918, decides however to drive the line of abstentionism to the point of absurdity, to boycott the elections to the National Assembly; there is even a discussion on withdrawing from the mass trade unions, And Rosa, who had just accused the Bolsheviks because they renounced the institution of the National Assembly after the victory, that is, possessing power they exercised the dictatorship – Rosa suffered the misfortune of becoming the prisoner of a party which renounces the National Assembly before the victory, and which, as a small minority, undertakes the hopeless task of imposing its ultimatum on the vast majority. Although she herself spoke for participation in the elections and lamented the ‘immaturity’ of the congress, she did not recognise that her own disorganising organisational principles had suffered shipwreck here, that in her own way she had created a Utopian-radical instead of a Marxian party. No surgeon can operate with a dull knife, no Marxist can act with an undisciplined, Utopian party. And still Rosa does not dare to carry out the break with this Utopian element, she herself becomes the victim of the organisational fetishism with which she wrongly reproached Lenin, and she goes to the operating table of history with a dull instrument. Possibly it is only because she has still not yet grasped the fact that the success or failure of the revolution depends upon her own self, upon her own policy. And thus we also find once more in the Spartacus programme, adopted, characteristically, unanimously by the same congress which decided on abstention from the elections, the old mistakes. Just read the following passage: ‘In tenacious struggle with capital, breast to breast in every factory, by direct pressure of the masses, by strikes, by creating their permanent organs of representation, the workers can achieve control over production and finally the actual direction.’ ‘The Spartacus League is not a party which seeks to reach dominion over the working masses or through the working masses. The Spartacus League is only [!] the most conscious part of the proletariat, which, at every step of the whole broad mass of the working class, points out its historical tasks.’ It follows clearly that Rosa Luxemburg had an entirely inadequate picture of the course of the proletarian revolution, She conceived of the proletarian revolution as a sort of new November revolution, as a chain of strikes and uprisings which finally merge into a general strike or even a popular uprising. With her the role of the party was confined to summoning the masses to action, until fully the power will fall into the lap of the party as a ripe fruit, something like the social democracy reaped the fruits of the first revolution. She did not recognise that it is the task of the party to assemble the masses and to discipline them like troops for a battle, and that the leadership of the party, like a gifted field commander or general staff, must have the strategic plan of battle in its head and convert it into a reality.

It was the ignoring of this task of the party that led Spartacus to the worst mistake that a revolutionary party can ever commit, namely, to play with the insurrection. For the Spartacus insurrection of January 1919 was nothing but a completely planless, quite inconceivably naive playing with the fire of insurrection. The narrow-minded counter-revolutionists, Hohenzollern sergeant-majors, stupid fanatics of Order and bloodhounds of the bourgeoisie, Noske and Ebert, set a trap for Spartacus and Spartacus fell into the trap with covered eyes. And thus did also Liebknecht, Luxemburg and Jogisches suffer the typical fate of all German revolutionists, which the exceptionally talented poet Oska Panizza, who later went mad, epitomised in the unsentimental phrase: ‘Until now the Germans have unfortunately known only the passive form of beheading ... being beheaded.’ While, on the contrary, the Russians under the leadership of the Bolsheviks proceeded to the realisation of the prediction made as far back as 1896 by the same Panizza: ‘Russia, that lurking brain, will some day burst out frightfully and the people of the Bakunins and Dostoievskys will gain its freedom by a fallen head.’ Between beheading and being beheaded, however, between active and passive, between Lenin and Luxemburg, there is no compromise.