Tuesday, March 01, 2011

*The Question Of The Stillborn German Revolution Of 1923-Part Four-"THE GERMAN REVOLUTION IN THE LENINIST PERIOD"-Jean Van Heijenoort (1944)

Markin comment:

The Bolshevik-led revolution in Russia in October 1917 was consciously predicated by the leadership (Lenin, Trotsky, etc., some others pushing forward, some being dragged along in the fight) on the premise that the Russian revolution would not, could not, stand alone for long either against the backlash onslaught of world imperialism, or on a more positive note, once the tasks of socialist construction reached a certain point. The purpose of the Communist International, founded in 1919 in the heat of the Russian civil war, by the Bolsheviks and their international supporters was the organizational expression of that above-mentioned premise. To work through and learn the lessons of the Bolshevik experience and to go all out to defeat world imperialism and create a new social order. I might add that political, social, and military conditions in war-weary World War I Europe in 1918 and 1919 made those premises something more than far-fetched utopian hopes. And central to those hopes were events in Germany.

If the original premise of Marxism (espoused specifically by both Marx and Engels in their respective political lifetimes) that the revolution would break out in an advanced capitalist European country then Germany, with its high level of capitalist development and socialist traditions and organizations, was the logical place to assume such an event would occur. And that premise, despite the betrayals of the German social democratic leadership in the war period, animated Lenin and Trotsky in their planning for the extension of socialist revolution westward. The rise of a “peace” socialist wing (the Independent Socialists) during the late phases of the war, the events around the smashing of the German monarchy and the creation of a socialist-led bourgeois republic in the wake of military defeat, the ill-starred Spartacist uprising, the working class response to the later Kapp Putsch, the also-ill-starred March Action of 1921, and the possibilities of a revolution in 1923 in reaction to the French exactions in the Ruhr and other events that year all made for a period of realistic revolutionary upheaval that was fertile ground for revolutionaries. And revolutionary hopes.

As we are painfully, no, very painfully, aware no revolution occurred in that period and that hard fact had profound repercussions on the then isolated Russian experiment. That hard fact has also left a somewhat unresolved question among communist militants, thoughtful communist militants anyway, about the prospects then. The question boils down to, as foreshadowed in the headline to this entry, whether there was any basis for the notion that a revolution could have occurred in Germany in 1923. We know what happened because it didn’t, but there are sometimes valuable conditionals pose in absorbing the lessons of history, our communist history. The yes or no of a German revolution is one such question. I have given my opinion previously-if there was no chance of revolution in Germany in 1923, win or lose, then the whole notion of proletarian revolution was just a utopian dream of a bunch of European outcast radicals. The corollary to that proposition is that, in the year 2010, the socialist cooperative notion that we fight for, other than as an abstract intellectual idea, is utopian, and that we are the mad grandchildren (and great-grandchildren) of those mad Europeans. That idea, with world imperialism wreaking havoc and breathing down our backs relentlessly in all quarters makes that corollary ill-founded. So let’s take another look at Germany 1923 from the several perspectives I have gathered in today’s postings.
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From Issue no 2, of the Marxist Discussion journal What Next? By kind permission of the editor Bob Pitt, 24 Georgiana St, London, NW1 0EA, email wh@tnext.freeserve.co.uk, who introduces the article.

THE GERMAN REVOLUTION
IN THE LENINIST PERIOD
Jean Van Heijenoort

This article, published under the pseudonym Marc Loris in the March 1943 of Fourth International, is a reply to Walter Held’s analysis of the failure of the German revolution which we reprinted in What Next? No.1. Born in 1912, Jean Van Heijenoort joined the Trotskyist movement in France. He served as Trotsky’s secretary for several years in the 1930s and at the time this article appeared was based in New York where he held the post of secretary of the Fourth International. After the end of the Second World War, Van Heijenoort was to renounce Trotskyism, abandon political activity and pursue an academic career as a mathematician. He died in 1985.

It is not without some embarrassment that I undertake a criticism of our comrade Walter Held’s article Why the German Revolution Failed. The terrible conditions of the reactionary period which we are going through prevent Held himself from participating in the discussion. [1] In spite of Held’s enforced silence, however, I feel forced to criticise his article, because it contains a number of errors on questions of prime importance for the revolutionary education of proletarian militants. For the very reason that his article contains excellent truths, very useful to recall, it is so much the more necessary to criticise it: nothing, indeed, is more dangerous than an error which takes refuge behind a great truth.

Held strongly emphasises, and rightly so, that without a tested party with a firm leadership it is impossible to lead a proletarian revolution to a successful conclusion. This great truth was certainly demonstrated positively in October 1917, in Russia, and negatively in Germany in 1918-19. Held, however, gives to this truth an abstract character.

Apropos of the various events of 1919-23 in Germany or Italy, Held incessantly uses the same expressions: ‘the conception [of the party] was not adequate from the very beginning’, ‘the attempt to [build a party] was too late’, ‘such an attempt [to build a party] was doomed to failure because there was a vacuum’, etc. Held thus turns in a vicious circle: the party cannot be formed because it does not yet exist. But there was a time when the one real party that he recognises, the party of the October Revolution, also did not exist. How did Lenin and his co-workers pass from the non-existence to the existence of a fully-formed and tested party? Held is under the illusion that he has analysed this important question and that he applies what he has thus learned to the events of 1917-23. In reality, however, he simply reiterates, over and over again, that such a party was not created in Germany. As he must get out of this vicious circle one way or another he ends up by breaking through it haphazardly and arbitrarily. As the non-existence of the party is his sole explanation for everything, so he fetishises one incident in the party’s history into the sole explanation for its non-existence. He stumbles, in the history of the German movement, upon the Levi case, and is obliged to exaggerate and distort it in order to construct out of it a cause for the defeat of the revolutionary wave of 1917-23, and thereby for the degeneration of the Communist International and the Soviet state. Held has thus been led to a veritable revision of the history of the Comintern and the origins of our movement.

To clarify all the points raised by Held would mean to write a history of the Communist International. I will limit myself here to trying to correct his evaluation of a number of important facts. I will try to show how he was led to such inexact evaluations through a false method. It is to be hoped that this discussion will inspire many young members of our party to become much more familiar with the rich history of the first years of the Communist International.

The Second World War once more brings forward to our generation, under broadly analogous conditions, the tasks which were not resolved at the end of the First World War. The history of the Leninist period of the Communist International is of more burning significance today than ever before.

Paul Levi
In order to explain his criticism of the leadership of the German and Russian Communist parties, Held bestows the greatest eulogies on the pamphlet that Paul Levi wrote after the March Action of 1921 in Germany. He writes: ‘Immediately after the close of the event, he [Levi] published a brilliantly written pamphlet, Unser Weg: wider den Putschismus (Our Road: Against Putschism). Outside of Rosa Luxemburg’s Spartacus Programme, this is one of the most noteworthy contributions to be found in the whole history of the German Communist Party.’ Held does not dwell long on the circumstances of the publication of this pamphlet. Only indirectly does it appear in his article that Levi’s criticism of the leadership of which he was a member was made outside the party.

After the defeat of the March Action in Central Germany, the Communist Party underwent the most severe blows. In addition to the military and police repression there was the activity of armed reactionary bands such as the Orgesch. The courts unhesitatingly handed out long sentences to the Communist workers. Leaders were hunted down and arrested. One of them, Sylt, was killed ‘while attempting to escape’. The bourgeois and Social-Democratic press was waging a violent campaign against the Communists, accusing them of sabotage, arson and murder. The entire bourgeois rabble and its Social-Democratic lackeys were crying incessantly about ‘the putsch’. It was under these conditions that Paul Levi, on 3 April 1921, sent his pamphlet to press without the knowledge, much less the consent, of the party. [2] Naturally, Levi understood the term ‘putsch’ differently from the anti-Communist hounds, who so described any revolutionary action. Later we shall discuss whether Levi was justified in calling the March Action a ‘putsch’ in the Marxist sense of the word. But if we admit for the moment that he was entirely right on the political plane, the irresponsible manner in which he presented his critique could not and did not fail to furnish a weapon against the party.

The pamphlet was distinguished above all by its complete lack of solidarity with the party. It threw the grossest insults publicly at the party leaders. It used unsparingly the cheapest demagogy. The following is one example among many others: ’You orphans and widows of the fallen proletarians! Do not hate capitalism; do not hate the Social-Democratic lackeys and hangmen, do not hate the Independent Socialist rascals who have stabbed the fighters in the back. Do hate the leaders of the Communist Party! And you workers who, maltreated in the jails, still raise high your bloody heads, convinced that you have fallen into the hands of the enemy in a gallant right for the interests of the proletariat – you are mistaken. You have no right to be proud of your wounds, you are victims of new Ludendorffs who cynically and, frivolously sent you to your death!’ [3]

The leaders of the party are thus compared publicly, by a member of the leadership, to Ludendorff. Any honest member of the party could do no more than remain impervious to Levi’s arguments. By his irresponsible conduct Levi discredited his political critique of the leadership’s errors, and thus helped the leadership to avoid its political responsibility. As Lenin noted: ‘Levi behaved like an “anarchist intellectual” (if I am not mistaken, the German term is Edelanarchist), instead of behaving like an organised member of the proletarian Communist International. Levi committed a breach of discipline. By this series of incredibly stupid blunders Levi made it difficult to concentrate attention on the essence of the matter.’ [4]

Held passes very lightly over this whole problem of Levi’s conduct. Dealing with the criticisms of Levi that Lenin made in his conversations with Clara Zetkin, Held writes that, according to Lenin, ‘Levi’s critique lacked the feeling of solidarity with the party, and had embittered the comrades by its tone, rather than by its content.’ [5] And Held comments: ‘This argument sounds surprising, coming from a politician who had always used the sharpest tone in his polemics, and had ridiculed every criticism of sharp tone as evidence of political weakness.’ Thus Held reduces the whole question to ‘tone’, without quoting Lenin’s further declaration to Zetkin: ’[Levi] tore the party to pieces. He did not criticise, but was one-sided, exaggerated, even malicious; he gave nothing to which the Party could usefully turn. He lacks the spirit of solidarity with the party.’

Indeed, Lenin knew how to employ 1he sharpest tone in his polemics. But one must note that either this ‘tone’ was directed against the enemies of the party, and not against his own party or, in polemicising against another party member, even where he used a sharp tone, Lenin always made clear that they both stood together within the borders of the same party. Levi did not understand how to discern these borders. He publicly ‘tore’ his own party ‘to pieces’.

Having reduced the affair to a question of tone, Held evidently cannot comprehend the attitude of Lenin and Trotsky. He writes: ‘It remains difficult to understand how Lenin and Trotsky could follow the Third World Congress in placing the form above the content’ [of Levi’s criticism]. But the question was by no means one of ’tone’ or ‘form’; the principles of democratic centralism, the very conception of a party, were at stake. By passing so lightly over this whole aspect of the problem, Held betrays a real blindness to organisational problems.

Under the given conditions the first duty of the German party was to cut immediately all ties with Levi, independently of any further political discussion. To act otherwise would have been to erase all party boundaries; indeed, for the party it would have been suicide. On April 29, 1921, the Executive Committee of the Communist International adopted a resolution approving Levi’s expulsion: ‘Having read Paul Levi’s pamphlet Unser Weg wider den Putschismus, the ECCI ratifies the decision to expel Paul Levi from the United Communist Party of Germany and, consequently, from the Third International. Even if Paul Levi were nine-tenths right in his view of the March offensive, he would still be liable to expulsion from the party because of his unprecedented violation of discipline and because, by his action, in the given circumstances, he dealt the party a blow in the back.’ [6] Today, with the entire experience of the last 22 years that separates us from this declaration, I do not see a single word which could be changed.

Certainly Levi’s conduct hardly tallies with the flattering picture which Held paints of him. Let us try to construct a more balanced portrait. Levi was a lawyer, the son of a rich banker. He came into contact with the Social-Democratic movement before 1914 in the course of defending party members in court. However, he did not become really integrated in the labour movement. During the war he became an internationalist in his views, but did not join in the underground work of the Spartacists. The war over, it was above all his abilities as writer and orator, in view of the lack of cadres, that carried him to the first rank. Those who worked at his side from 1919 to 1921 report that in the difficult periods he sometimes spoke of retiring into private life, that he was not made for the struggle, etc. Zetkin, while defending Levi to Lenin, nevertheless said: ‘After the murder of Rosa [Luxemburg], Karl [Liebknecht] and Leo [Jogiches] he had to take over the leadership; he has regretted it often enough.’ [7]

He never gave up, it is said, collecting antiques. The dilettante and the aesthete were always present in him. Lenin told Zetkin that already during the war he ‘was aware of a certain coldness in his [Levi’s] attitude to the workers’. Something of a ‘please keep your distance’. [8] Extremely interesting for the light it throws on Levi’s personality is the letter which he addressed to Lenin on 29 March 1921. [9] In this letter he was already condemning the March Action, just ended, as a ‘fatal putsch’, and explained what his conduct was going to be: ‘I will also now go no further than to write something like a pamphlet in which I will set down my conceptions; I will neither bring the case before the authorities who are now considering meeting in Germany, nor before the International Executive Committee. The comrades who bear the responsibility should not feel hindered by me.’ [10]

These lines might have been written by anyone but a revolutionist. Intellectual smugness, lack of solidarity with his organisation, condescension and even a certain contempt, and some fatalism – all these can be seen in his words. But even more is involved. This letter was written four days before he sent his pamphlet to press! Either he was guilty of duplicity in reassuring Lenin or, more likely, he reveals here his personal and political instability.

The March Action
We, must now ask ourselves: Was Levi’s estimate of the March Action entirely right politically? In his pamphlet he denounced the party’s adventurism, and qualified the March Action as a ‘putsch’; it was even for him ‘the biggest Bakuninist putsch in all history.’ Held, without saying so specifically, seems to adopt Levi’s version completely. He speaks of ‘putschist riots’ and of ’putschists’. [11] He gives a highly coloured description of the March Action with the help of tragicomic episodes borrowed from Levi’s pamphlet. He neglects, however, to place it exactly in the trajectory of the German revolution.

This tacit adoption of Levi’s appraisal, and this absence of precise political analysis are all the more astonishing since Lenin and Trotsky were far from agreeing with Levi even on the political plane. Held, who could not fail to know the documents, did not undertake to discuss this point. He did not even note it. Lenin wrote: ’Of course, Levi was not right in asserting that this action was a “putsch”; this assertion of Paul Levi is nonsense.’ [12]

The most complete and precise political analysis of the March Action is found in one of Trotsky’s speeches before a membership meeting of the Moscow section of the Russian Communist Party at the end of July 1921, immediately after the Third Congress of the Comintern:

’What was the content of the March events? The proletarians of Central Germany, the workers in the mining regions, represented in recent times, even during the war, one of the most retarded sections of the German working class. In their majority they followed not the Social Democrats but the patriotic, bourgeois and clerical cliques, remained devoted to the Emperor, and so on and so forth. Their living and working conditions were exceptionally harsh. In relation to the workers of Berlin they occupied the same place, as say, did the backward Ural provinces in our country in relation to the Petersburg workers. During a revolutionary epoch it happens not infrequently that a most oppressed and backward section of the working class, awakened for the first time by the thunder of events, swings into the struggle with the greatest energy and evinces a readiness to fight under any and all conditions, far from always taking into consideration the circumstances and the chances of victory, that is, the requirements of revolutionary strategy. For example, at a time when the workers of Berlin or Saxony had become, after the experience of 1919-20, far more cautious – which has its minuses and its pluses too – the workers of Central Germany continued to engage in stormy actions, strikes and demonstrations, carting out their foremen on wheelbarrows, holding meetings during working hours, and so on. Naturally, this is incompatible with the sacred tasks of Ebert’s Republic. It is hardly surprising that this conservative police Republic, in the person of its police agent, the Social Democrat Horsing, should have decided to do a little “purging” there, i.e., drive out the most revolutionary elements, arrest several Communists, etc.

‘Precisely during this period (the middle of March), the Central Committee of the German Communist Party arrived firmly at the idea that there was need of conducting a more actively revolutionary policy. The German Party, you will recall, had been created a short while before by the merger of the old Spartacus League and the majority of the Independent Party and thereby became confronted in practice with the question of mass actions. The idea that it was necessary to pass over to a more active policy was absolutely correct. But how did this express itself in practice? When the Social-Democratic policeman Horsing issued his order, demanding of the workers what Kerensky’s government had more than once vainly demanded in our country, namely: that no meetings be held during working hours, that factory property be treated as a sacred trust, etc. – at this moment the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued a call for a general strike in order to aid the workers of Central Germany. A general strike is not something to which the working class responds easily, at the party’s very first call -especially if the workers have recently suffered a number of defeats, and, all the less so in a country where alongside the Communist Party there exist two mass Social-Democratic parties and where the trade-union apparatus is opposed to us. Yet, if we examine the issues of Rote Fahne, central publication of the Communist. Party, throughout this period, day by day, we will see that the call for the general strike came completely unprepared. During the period of revolution there were not a few bloodlettings in Germany and the police offensive against Central Germany could not in and of itself have immediately raised the entire working class to its feet. Every serious mass action must obviously be preceded by large-scale energetic agitation, centring around action slogans, all hitting on one and the same point. Such agitation can lead to more decisive calls for action only if it reveals, after probing, that the masses have already been touched to the quick and are ready to march forward on the path of revolutionary action. This is the ABC of revolutionary strategy, but precisely this ABC was completely violated during the March events. Before the police battalions had even succeeded in reaching the factories and mines of Central Germany, a general strike did actually break out there. I already said that in Central Germany there existed the readiness to engage in immediate struggle, and the call of the Central Committee met with an immediate response. But an entirely different situation prevailed in the rest of the country. There was nothing either in the international or the domestic situation of Germany to justify such a sudden transition to activity. The masses simply failed to understand the summons.

’Nevertheless, certain very influential theoreticians of the German Communist Party instead of acknowledging that this summons was a mistake, proceeded to explain it away by propounding a theory that in a revolutionary epoch we are obliged to conduct exclusively an aggressive policy, that is, the policy of revolutionary offensive. The March action is thus served up to the masses in the guise of an offensive. You can now evaluate the situation as a whole. The offensive was in reality launched by the Social-Democratic policeman Horsing. This should have been utilised in order to unite all the workers for defence, for self-protection, even if, to begin with, a very modest resistance. Had the soil proved favourable, had the agitation met with a favourable response, it would then have been possible to pass over to the general strike. If the events continue to unfold further, if the masses rise, if the ties among the workers grow stronger, if their temper lifts, while indecision and demoralisation seize the camp of the foe – then comes the time for issuing the slogan to pass over to the offensive. But should the soil prove unfavourable, should the conditions and the moods of the masses fail to correspond with the more resolute slogans, then it is necessary to sound a retreat, and to fall back to previously prepared positions in as orderly a manner as possible. Therewith we have gained this, that we proved our ability to probe the working masses, we strengthened their internal ties and, what is most important, we have raised the party’s authority for giving wise leadership under all circumstances.

’But what does the leading body of the German Party do? It gives the appearance of pouncing upon the very first pretext: and even before this pretext has become known to workers or assimilated by them, the Central Committee hurls the slogan of the general strike. And before the party had a chance to rally the workers of Berlin, Dresden and Munich to the aid of the workers of Central Germany – and this could perhaps have been accomplished in the space of a few days, provided there was no leaping over the events, and the masses were led forward systematically and firmly – before the party succeeded in accomplishing this work, it is proclaimed that our action is an offensive. This was already tantamount to ruining everything and paralysing the movement in advance. It is quite self-evident that at this stage the offensive came exclusively from the enemy side. It was necessary to utilise the moral element of defence, it was necessary to summon the proletariat of the whole country to hasten to the aid of the workers of Central Germany. In the initial stages this support might have assumed varied forms, until the party found itself in a position to issue a generalised slogan of action. The task of agitation consisted in raising the masses to their feet, focusing their attention upon the events in Central Germany, smashing politically the resistance of the labour bureaucracy and thus assuring a genuinely general character of the strike action as a possible base for the further development of the revolutionary struggle. But what happened instead? The revolutionary and dynamic minority of the proletariat found itself counter-posed in action to the majority of the proletariat, before this majority had a chance to grasp the meaning of events. When the party ran up against the passivity and dilatoriness of the working class, the impatient Communist elements sought here and there to drive the majority of the workers into the streets, no longer by means of agitation, but by mechanical measures. If the majority of workers favour a strike, they can of course always compel the minority by forcibly shutting down the factories and thus achieving the general strike in action. This has happened more than once, it will happen in the future and only simpletons can raise objections to it. But when the crushing majority of the working class has no clear conception of the movement, or is unsympathetic to it, or does not believe it can succeed, but a minority rushes ahead and seeks to drive workers to strike by mechanical measures, then such an impatient minority can, in the person of the party, come into a hostile clash with the working class and break its own neck.’ [13]

As we see, Trotsky does not speak, and could not speak of a ‘putsch.’ [14] Classic examples of the putsch are: the attempted insurrection of Blanqui in Paris on 14 August 1870, the insurrection of 1 December 1924 organised by the Estonian Communist Party in Reval or, on a reactionary plane, Hitler’s attempt at Munich on 8 November 1923. The March Action is far from this type. It embraced hundreds of thousands of workers. The slogan of political power never went beyond a propagandist character, and played only an episodic role. The question of the arming of the workers was connected with the struggle against the fascist bands and not to a direct struggle for power. [15] Thus, the call for a general strike at Mansfeld declared: ‘The workers should secure arms where they can, and smash the Orgesch [armed reactionaries] wherever possible.’

The character of the movement in Central Germany in its early stages is typified by a resolution adopted by the several thousand workers of the Leunawerke factory on March 21: ‘An action committee was elected which was put in charge of drawing up the following demands and taking the necessary measures to realise them. The following demands were formulated: 1. Immediate withdrawal of the armed police and of the military occupation forces from Central Germany. 2. Disarming of the Orgesch and its accomplices. 3. Arming of the workers for defence against counterrevolutionary coups. 4. If the factories are occupied [by the armed forces] all work is to be stopped immediately.’ [16]

On 24 March, the Central Committee of the party threw itself into the adventure of the general strike, which was a complete failure. The March Action is an example of a partial struggle where a minority is ready to go much further than the class as a whole. Such a situation always raises very difficult tactical problems for the revolutionary party. It is very possible that even with the most prudent policy an experienced party might not have been able to come out of that situation without having received serious blows. The Bolshevik Party was not able to avoid them in July 1917 and, as Trotsky notes, the March Action is related much more to a situation of this type than to a putsch. [17]

The Third World Congress
On the political plane, Levi was of course much closer to the truth than the majority of the German party leadership. Nevertheless, our examination of the question of the ‘putsch’ enables us to evaluate Held’s criticism of the Third Congress of the Communist International. To Held, who adopted Levi’s theory of the ’putsch’, any mention of the fact that the German Communist Party in spite of everything had participated in a great proletarian struggle is a ‘concession to the general rhetoric of the Congress’. As neither Lenin nor Trotsky refrained from often mentioning this important fact, Held saw in this a part of the ‘compromise’ that Lenin refers to with the majority of the German delegation. The remainder of the compromise, according to him, is the attitude of the Congress toward Levi. Held writes that the main theses on tactics adopted by the Congress ‘anathematised the critics of the ultra-leftists’. On this point, however, the theses stated,

’In making a thorough examination of the possibilities of struggle, the VKPI) must carefully note the circumstances and opinions which indicate difficulties, and subject the reasons advanced against an action to searching inquiry, but once action has been decided on by the party authorities all comrades must obey the decisions of the party and carry the action through. Criticism of the action should begin only after the action itself is ended, it should be made only in party organisations and bodies, and must take account of the situation of the party in relation to the class enemy. Since Levi disregarded these obvious requirements of party discipline and the conditions of party criticism, the congress confirms his expulsion from the party and considers it impermissible for any member of the Communist International to collaborate with him.’ [18]

This is the ‘anathema’ of which Held speaks. In reality, the resolution simply recalls the most elementary principles of revolutionary discipline. But we have already seen that Held has a real blindness toward the demands of democratic centralism. For him, the decision of the Third Congress is bureaucratism. Even worse, it is bureaucratism that caused the bankruptcy of the International and the degeneration of the Soviet state. Held writes: ‘The delegates must have gained the impression that it would always be better to make mistakes following orders of the Comintern than to act correctly while violating discipline. In this way the foundation stone was laid for the development which was to change the Communist International in the course of a few years into a society of Mamelukes, in slavish dependency upon the ruling faction in Moscow, and finally into the mere instrument of Stalin’s opportunist nationalistic foreign policy.’ And at the end of the article he mentions, among the causes of the failure of Lenin and Trotsky: ‘the treatment of it [the German March Action] by the Third World Congress, where form was placed above content, and a bureaucratic conception of discipline was sanctioned.’

Held’s somewhat vulgar contrast between ‘to make mistakes following the order of the Comintern’, and ‘to act correctly while violating discipline’ is not correct, for there were not, as we shall see, any ‘orders of the Comintern’ in the March Action. With this criticism, which is certainly the weakest point of his article, Held comes dangerously close to the petty-bourgeois critics of Bolshevism, who also discovered that the ‘foundation stone’ of Stalinism was laid by the Bolsheviks themselves. For them this stone is the discipline of the party, the prohibition of factions in the Bolshevik Party, or the repression of Kronstadt. For Held it is the ‘bureaucratic conception of discipline’ of the International. We will return later to this method of interpretation. Let us now cite still more facts to elucidate the problem of Paul Levi.

Did Lenin and Trotsky give Levi’s head to the leadership of the German party as their part of the ‘compromise’ which Lenin mentioned at the Congress? Not at all. Lenin’s attitude toward Levi is well known through his conversations with Clara Zetkin, as well as through his speeches at the Congress: ‘Levi committed a serious breach of discipline, he attacked the party in an irresponsible and disloyal manner, and the Congress could not retract his expulsion; however, Levi has great abilities, and if he disciplines himself, and wishes to collaborate, Lenin would intervene in a few months for his reinstatement.’ Trotsky’s position was essentially the same:

’The decision concerning Levi adopted by the Congress at Moscow is perfectly clear and requires no extended commentaries. By the decision of the Congress, Levi was placed outside the Communist International. This decision was not at all adopted against the wishes of the Russian delegation, but on the contrary with its rather conspicuous participation, inasmuch as it was none other than the Russian delegation that drafted the resolution on tactics. The Russian delegation acted, as usual, under the direction of our party’s Central Committee. And as a member of the Central Committee and member of the Russian delegation, I voted for the, resolution confirming Levi’s expulsion from the International. Together with our Central Committee I could see no other course. By virtue of his egocentric attitude, Levi had invested his struggle against the crude theoretical and practical mistakes connected with the March events with a character so pernicious that nothing was left for the slanderers among the Independents to do except to support him and chime in with him. Levi opposed himself not only to the March mistakes but also to the German party and the workers who had committed these mistakes ...

‘I do not mean to say by this that I considered Levi irretrievably lost to the Communist International as far back as the Congress. I was too little acquainted with him to draw any categorical conclusions one way or the other. I did, however, entertain the hope that a cruel lesson wouldn’t pass for nought and Levi would sooner or later find his way back to the party ... But when I learned – and this happened two or three weeks after the Congress – that Levi instead of patiently climbing up the embankment began noisily proclaiming that the track of the party and the entire International must be switched over to the precise place where he, Paul Levi, had tumbled, and that therewith Levi began building a whole “party” on the basis of this egocentric philosophy of history, I was obliged to say to myself that the Communist movement had no other recourse – deplorable as it may be – except to definitely place a cross over Levi.’

Zetkin herself, Levi’s close political companion, had to state to the Congress: ‘My personal opinion is that Paul Levi himself will say the last word about this, when he, as I hope, in spite of everything, will work and fight with us again in the future as a Communist on a principled basis and on the line of the Communist Party.’ Indeed Levi said the last word. He soon attacked the October Revolution, and took refuge in the Social Democracy, so that Lenin was able to write a few months later: ‘Levi and Serrati are not characteristic in themselves; they are characteristic of the modern type of the extreme left wing of petty-bourgeois democracy, of the camp of the “other side”, the camp of the international capitalists, the camp that is against us.’ [19]

Then exactly what was the ‘compromise’ of which Lenin spoke at the Congress? The compromise had very precise limits: Lenin and Trotsky so formulated the resolution on tactics [20], written largely by Lenin, that the German delegates could join in a common vote on it. Had they desired, Lenin and Trotsky could have worded it in a way that would have made it impossible for the Germans to vote for it, thus necessitating a separate vote on the tactic of the March Action. One can recognise that there was a question whether to have a common resolution with the Germans, and that it could be answered by yes or no without unleashing by that the degeneration of the International and the USSR. The possibility of a separate vote was mentioned by Trotsky, who added that the Russian delegation would probably be in the minority, for the Germans had the support of the Austrian and Italian delegations, the majority of the Hungarian delegation, etc. Naturally, it was not the fear of being in the minority which held back Lenin and Trotsky from demanding a separate vote, although this fact was not without importance.

The main reason for their attitude was the immaturity of the German leadership. The German party, and moreover the whole International except the Russian party, was still in the process of formation. It must be added that the struggle against centrism in the International was far from being ended. It well seems that for all these reasons Lenin and Trotsky were right, after their sharp political attack on the March Action, in seeking a common vote. However, in a certain sense the question on this particular point remains open. But this by no means signifies that one could, like Held, derive such disproportionate consequences from such a narrowly-limited ’compromise’.

To appraise Held’s criticism of the Third Congress, we must examine one further point: the responsibility of the International in the March events. Held attributes the direct responsibility for the March Action to the Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. He writes: ‘Lenin and Trotsky shook their heads at all this folly. They were unaware that the March Action was contrived by the Secretariat of the ECCI.’ And further: ‘Since Lenin and Trotsky based the necessity for the introduction of the New Economic Policy on the failure of the international revolution to materialise, Zinoviev and his associates in the Secretariat thought they could provide a speedy remedy. This was precisely their chief motive for unleashing the infantile March Action.’

For an accusation of such gravity, we must demand serious proof from Held. Held explains lengthily that, in view of their opposition to the New Economic Policy, Zinoviev and Bukharin could not but have desired the March Action. That is possible, but even if it were certain, it would be no proof that they ‘contrived’ and ‘unleashed’ the March Action, i.e., an accusation of direct responsibility. Held was only repeating one of Levi’s accusations, which he too had advanced without proof. In reality, it seems demonstrable, at least indirectly, that such responsibility did not exist. Indeed, the Third Congress was the scene of the most violent discussions; letters and telegrams until then unknown were pulled out of pockets; the leaders of the German party were under fire from Lenin and Trotsky and even from Zinoviev, who was then under pressure from Lenin. If there actually had been some telegram or order, written or verbal, from Moscow about the unleashing of the March Action, it is extremely unlikely that such a bomb would not have burst at the Congress, or even before it. Shortly after the Congress Trotsky had occasion to write on this subject: ‘the German bourgeois and Social-Democratic newspapers, and in their wake the press throughout the world began howling that the March uprising had been provoked by orders from Moscow; that the Soviet power, in difficult straits at that time (peasant mutinies, Kronstadt, etc.), had issued, to save itself, you see, an order to stage uprisings regardless of the situation in every given country. It is impossible to invent anything sillier than this!’ [21]

Further along, Held explains, on the basis of Radek’s later revelations that, in the period immediately preceding the March Action, ‘Zinovlev and Bukharin had continued their machinations against Levi’s policies and, as a result, the March Action had taken place!’ Here Held abandons his main thesis, that of direct responsibility, devoid of proof, as we have seen, for a new thesis of indirect responsibility, difficult to define with precision: Zinoviev and Bukharin had favoured the leadership which had set out on the adventure of March 1921. In this diluted sense responsibility can be extended indefinitely.

Lenin and Trotsky may in this sense he held responsible for not having more closely controlled the work of the Secretariat. And historically there is some truth in this: Lenin and Trotsky were occupied with the building of the Soviet state, they were not always able to prevent Zinoviev and Bukharin from making errors. This general responsibility Trotsky willingly recognised when he wrote: ‘If we were to blame for the March mistakes – insofar as it is possible to speak here of blame – then it was only in the sense that the International as a whole, including our own party, has up to now failed to carry on enough educational work in the sphere of revolutionary tactics, and for this reason failed to eliminate the possibility of such mistaken actions and methods. But to dream of completely eliminating mistakes would be the height of innocence.’ [22]

In this realm it is necessary above all not to lose a sense of proportion. In the concrete case of the German leadership, if one wishes to go to the point of explaining why Levi did not have enough authority to prevent the March Action, one must look – as much as to Zinoviev’s machinations – to the personal traits of Levi himself.

Held’s Method
Summarising his criticism of the Third Congress, Held writes: ‘the Third World Congress already contained the diseased germs which were a few years later to precipitate the degeneration of the Communist International and, along with it, the Soviet state.’ We have already seen how unjustifiable are the historical points of Held’s criticism. We must now dwell upon his method. With his ‘germ’ theory, Held follows a method long practised by the critics of Bolshevism. Trotsky had occasion to reveal the emptiness of this explanation in his pamphlet Stalinism and Bolshevism, in which he showed, specifically, how Souvarine ‘seeks the inner flaws of Bolshevism’ to ‘explain all subsequent historical mishaps.’ [23]

Why was Held carried along this beaten track of the causal continuity of Bolshevism and Stalinism? He recognised, with good reason, the absolute necessity of the party for the success of the revolution. But this in no ways means that the subjective factor – the party – is all-powerful. It operates in a given milieu. If in a historical analysis this factor is artificially separated from the milieu, its development, and its transformations are then assumed to be found within itself, that is to say, it must contain its whole future within itself. This leads to explanation by ’germs’. Held’s way of explaining thus unfolds from an abstract and super-historic interpretation of the role of the party. In a word, Held errs in an excess of subjectivism.

We are forced to the same conclusion when we examine Held’s attitude toward two very important problems, the founding of the Third International, and that of the Fourth International. For Held, one of the reasons for the defeat of the world revolution after the First World War is ‘the all-too-late unmasking of Kautskyism [and] the consequently delayed founding of the Communist International!’ That Lenin held, until 1914, illusions about the character of the German Social Democracy is a well known fact. We should not, however, exaggerate the depth of these illusions. Through them, Held tries to detect a delay in the founding of the Third International, and so he places himself on the ground, unstable enough, of historical hypothesis. Let us try to follow him.

We must first ask ourselves the question: if Lenin had not had these illusions about Kautsky, should he have proceeded with the founding of the Third International in 1903, in 1910 or in 1914? (For this question to make sense, we must suppose that the revolutionary consciousness of the masses would not have been very different from what it was in reality. For if we were to assume that not only Lenin but also large layers of the proletariat had lost confidence in the German Social Democracy, the founding of the Third International would have been possible and necessary well before 1914. But psychologically this is a pious wish, and logically a tautology: if the movement had been in an advanced stage, it would have formed an advanced organisation.) Let us suppose that Lenin alone, or one of the small groups around him, had been fully conscious before 1914 of the role of Kautsky. Should Lenin then have made a split on an international scale? This question raises a large number of hypotheses, but even in this extremely abstract and artificial form, I am ready to answer no.

Held writes: ‘With so much bitterness did Lenin turn against Kautsky, when he realised his mistake in 1914, that his opinion of Kautsky had been mistaken. From this point on, Lenin propagandises unhesitatingly for the foundation of a Third International!’ Thus Held connects the recognition of the necessity of a new International with Lenin’s loss of illusions about Kautsky. But – separating the subjective factor its milieu – Held does not mention the fundamental fact behind this: the war, i.e., the entry into a new historical epoch, which brought changes in the consciousness of the masses

However, these questions on the founding of the Third International become a little more concrete if we consider the creation of the Fourth International. Until 1933, that is, after the Communist International had committed even more dreadful crimes against the international proletariat than had the Social Democracy before 1914, the Left Opposition considered itself a faction of the Comintern. And this after the whole historical experience of the betrayals and splits of the war and its aftermath. The Left Opposition waited to proclaim the necessity of a new International until the Comintern had its own ‘August 4th’ – until the shameful capitulation of the German Communist Party before Hitler in March 1933. Was this because Trotsky had illusions about Stalin as Lenin had about Kautsky? Obviously not. And it is here that we see the emptiness of Held’s appraisal of the founding of the Third International.

But perhaps Held, after all, does not agree with the politics of the Left Opposition? Indeed, this soon becomes apparent. Like many others he opens fire against the policy of the Left Opposition in the USSR. ‘If Trotsky had publicly stepped forward in the spring of 1923’, everything would have been better. This question has been discussed so many times that I do not feel much can be added here. The only new note which Held has introduced is a letter from Engels to Bebel on the end of the First International. Alas, Held does not say a word about the differences between the two epochs. The comparison thus holds a purely literary, and I must say, superficial, character. But it is important to note that this conception of Held’s again reveals in him a certain intellectual subjectivism.

Held poses the following question: ‘Why had not Lenin and Trotsky succeeded in building a serious Marxist International during the period from 1917 to 1923?’ One can only reply that as yet the old society proved too resistant, this resistance having several aspects, such as reformism, the slowness and the difficulty of the formation of revolutionary cadres, etc. Held wants to go further, to find a cause for the defeat of the International in the International itself.

These problems of historical causality can easily turn into casuistry, if one does not state precisely what one is speaking about. In clear terms the question is this: Was there, in the Leninist period of the Communist International, a specific error perpetrated without which there would have been a good probability that the degeneration would not have been produced? Held cites the Levi affair. Until now, it was the method of the petty-bourgeois critics of all shades – the ultra-lefts like Gorter, the anarchists, Souvarine, etc., etc. – to place the cause of the defeat of Bolshevism in Bolshevism itself. We willingly relinquish to them this barren method.

EDITORIAL NOTES
1. Attempting to reach the USA from Sweden overland across the USSR in 1941, Held had disappeared. We now know that he had been arrested en route and executed.

2. Levi initially tried to get his pamphlet issued by the KPD but got no response. He then published the pamphlet himself.

3. Van Heijenoort cites as a source Karl Radek’s article The Levi Case, in Die Kommunistische Internationale, No.17, 1921. In a footnote he adds that the quotation is ‘from the first edition of Levi’s pamphlet. In the second edition of Levi’s pamphlet, which is now the easiest to come by, this sentence has been somewhat altered’. In fact the quoted passage appears in neither edition of Levi’s pamphlet – the words are those put into Levi’s mouth by Radek. A translation of Radek’s article can be found in H. Gruber, ed., International Communism in the Era of Lenin, 1967, pp.341-6.

4. Lenin, Collected Works, vol.32, p.517.

5. C. Zetkin, Erinnerungen an Lenin, 1957, p.38.

6. J. Degras, ed., The Communist International 1919-1943, Documents, vol.1, 1956, pp.219-20.

7. Zetkin, p.39.

8. ibid., p.38.

9. The letter was in fact dated 27 March 1921.

10. This was another ‘quotation’ invented by Radek.

11. P. Levi, Zwischen Spartakus und Sozialdemokratie, 1969, p.43.

12. Lenin, Collected Works, vol.32, p.516. Here the translation is: ‘... essentially much of Levi’s criticism of the March action in Germany in 1921 was correct (not, of course, when he said that the uprising was a “putsch”; that assertion of his was absurd).’

13. Trotsky, The First Five Years of the Communist International, vol.2, 1974, pp. 19-22.

14. However, Trotsky did later refer to the March Action as an example of ‘putschism’. See Trotsky, The Third International After Lenin, 1970, pp.89, 98.

15. This isn't really true. For the insurrectionist rhetoric adopted by the KPD during the March Action, see B. Fowkes, Communism in Germany Under the Weimar Republic, 1984, p.66.

16. Degras, p.252.

17. Trotsky, First Five Years ..., pp.84-87.

18. Protokoll des III. Kongresses, p.698.

19. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 32, p.211. Serrati, who along with Levi had opposed the January 1921 split in the Italian Socialist Party, did in fact subsequently join the Communist Party of Italy.

20. Protokoll des III. Kongresses, p.644.

21. Trotsky, First Five Years, p.18.

22. ibid., pp.18-19.

23. Trotsky, Writings of Leon Trotsky 1936-37, p.425.

*The Question Of The Stillborn German Revolution Of 1923-Part Three- "WHY THE GERMAN REVOLUTION FAILED"-by Walter Held (1942)

Markin comment:

The Bolshevik-led revolution in Russia in October 1917 was consciously predicated by the leadership (Lenin, Trotsky, etc., some others pushing forward, some being dragged along in the fight) on the premise that the Russian revolution would not, could not, stand alone for long either against the backlash onslaught of world imperialism, or on a more positive note, once the tasks of socialist construction reached a certain point. The purpose of the Communist International, founded in 1919 in the heat of the Russian civil war, by the Bolsheviks and their international supporters was the organizational expression of that above-mentioned premise. To work through and learn the lessons of the Bolshevik experience and to go all out to defeat world imperialism and create a new social order. I might add that political, social, and military conditions in war-weary World War I Europe in 1918 and 1919 made those premises something more than far-fetched utopian hopes. And central to those hopes were events in Germany.

If the original premise of Marxism (espoused specifically by both Marx and Engels in their respective political lifetimes) that the revolution would break out in an advanced capitalist European country then Germany, with its high level of capitalist development and socialist traditions and organizations, was the logical place to assume such an event would occur. And that premise, despite the betrayals of the German social democratic leadership in the war period, animated Lenin and Trotsky in their planning for the extension of socialist revolution westward. The rise of a “peace” socialist wing (the Independent Socialists) during the late phases of the war, the events around the smashing of the German monarchy and the creation of a socialist-led bourgeois republic in the wake of military defeat, the ill-starred Spartacist uprising, the working class response to the later Kopp Putsch, the also-ill-starred March Action of 1921, and the possibilities of a revolution in 1923 in reaction to the French exactions in the Ruhr and other events that year all made for a period of realistic revolutionary upheaval that was fertile ground for revolutionaries. And revolutionary hopes.

As we are painfully, no, very painfully, aware no revolution occurred in that period and that hard fact had profound repercussions on the then isolated Russian experiment. That hard fact has also left a somewhat unresolved question among communist militants, thoughtful communist militants anyway, about the prospects then. The question boils down to, as foreshadowed in the headline to this entry, whether there was any basis for the notion that a revolution could have occurred in Germany in 1923. We know what happened because it didn’t, but there are sometimes valuable conditionals pose in absorbing the lessons of history, our communist history. The yes or no of a German revolution is one such question. I have given my opinion previously-if there was no chance of revolution in Germany in 1923, win or lose, then the whole notion of proletarian revolution was just a utopian dream of a bunch of European outcast radicals. The corollary to that proposition is that, in the year 2010, the socialist cooperative notion that we fight for, other than as an abstract intellectual idea, is utopian, and that we are the mad grandchildren (and great-grandchildren) of those mad Europeans. That idea, with world imperialism wreaking havoc and breathing down our backs relentlessly in all quarters makes that corollary ill-founded. So let’s take another look at Germany 1923 from the several perspectives I have gathered in today’s postings.
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WHY THE GERMAN REVOLUTION FAILED
by Walter Held
Introduction by Bob Pitt

This article is published with the aim of stimulating discussion about the history of the early Communist International and the lessons it holds for revolutionaries today. The article originally appeared in the December 1942 and January 1943 issues of Fourth International, the theoretical journal of the US Socialist Workers Party, and its ‘revisionist’ thesis proved extremely contentious. Under the pseudonym of Marc Loris, the International’s secretary Jean Van Heijenoort contributed a lengthy critique of Held’s article to the February 1943 issue of the journal (The German Revolution in the Leninist Period). Taking particular exception to the article’s evaluation of the expelled German Communist leader Paul Levi Van Heijenoort accused Held of ‘coming dangerously close to the petty-bourgeois critics of Bolshevism, who also discovered that the “foundation stone” of Stalinism was laid by the Bolsheviks themselves’.

Walter Held was horn in Remscheid in 1910 as Heinz Epe. He joined the Communist youth organisation while a student and later became a member of the German Communist Party, before being expelled in 1931 as a Trotskyist. Because of his prominence in the German Left Opposition, Held was forced to leave the country after Hitler came to power, and during the following years he played a leading role in the world Trotskyist movement. Among his best known theoretical contributions is The Evolution of the Comintern, a document presented to the international Trotskyist conference (the ‘Geneva’ conference) of 1936. From 1934 Held was based in Norway, where he worked closely with Trotsky during the latter’s period of exile there. Following the Nazi occupation in 1940, Held sought refuge in Sweden. In early 1941 he attempted to reach the United States via the Soviet Union, hoping that in the confusion of wartime he would be able to get through undetected. He was identified en route, taken off the train by police at Saratov and disappeared. By the time this article was published in Fourth International, it is almost certain that Held had already been executed. He would have been barely 32 years old.

In view of the controversial character of the article, it seemed appropriate to provide references to the works quoted by Held so that readers can cheek the sources for themselves. In some cases I have changed the translations that appeared in the original article in order to bring them into line with the available English versions. Elsewhere, I have used new translations from the original German. Held himself sometimes mixed up direct quotations with paraphrases, and I have tried to separate these without significantly altering the original text. Explanatory notes have also been added.


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The history of the Russian Bolshevik Party, the October Revolution, the first years of the Soviet Republic and the Red Army is the history of a grandiose political success unparalleled in revolutionary history. Lenin and Trotsky, nevertheless, were deprived of success in the field which, in the last analysis, is the most decisive, that of international revolution. The defeat of the revolution engendered the triumph of the counterrevolution and the fantastic rise of Adolf Hitler and German Nazism, unprecedented in modern history.

From the very beginning Lenin and Trotsky were thoroughly convinced that the result of their experiment depended entirely on the fate of the international revolution. Trotsky had stressed that idea since his formulation of the theory of the permanent revolution in 1905. Lenin emphasised with equal vigour the dependence of the Russian revolution on the revolutionary upsurge envisaged by the international movement. At the Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party in March 1918, Lenin expounded his unalterable conviction: ‘It is an absolute truth that without a German revolution we are doomed – perhaps not in Petrograd, not in Moscow, but in Vladivostock, in more remote places to which perhaps we shall have to retreat ... At all events, under all conceivable circumstances, if the German revolution does not come, we are doomed’. Speaking in a similar vein one month later, at a session of the Moscow Soviet, Lenin declared: ‘Our backwardness has put us in the forefront, and we shall perish unless we are capable of holding out until we receive powerful support from workers who have risen in revolt in other countries’. Similarly Lenin posed the problem in his Open Letter to the American Workers in August 1918: ‘We are now, as it were, in a besieged fortress, waiting for the other detachments of the world socialist revolution to come to our relief.’ Zinoviev, translating Lenin’s ideas along agitational and propagandistic lines, as was his customary function, bombastically proclaimed in the Manifesto of the Communist International on 1 May 1919: ‘Before a year has passed, the whole of Europe will be Soviet’. Although the high hopes of a rapid victory of the world revolution failed to materialise, Lenin did not alter his principled position. In 1920 Lenin stated in his somewhat frank and therefore unmistakable manner: ‘It would be absolutely ridiculous, fantastic and utopian to hope that we can achieve complete economic independence’. A quotation of March 1923 from the final period of his theoretical contributions suffices to confirm that for Lenin the basic problem had remained unchanged until the end of his life: ‘We are confronted with the question – shall we be able to hold on with our small and very small peasant production, and in our present state of ruin, until the West-European capitalist countries consummate their development towards socialism?’ Whatever artifices Stalin and his unholy henchmen may have employed to attribute to Lenin the idea of ‘socialism in one country’ it remains their own, The Stalin school of revisionism had its inception in 1924 after the death of Lenin as a consequence of the defeat of the revolution and became itself the cause of a long series of further disasters.

We may proceed from the following basis: when Lenin and Trotsky and their co-workers had the courage to introduce the proletarian dictatorship and socialist economy into backward Russia, completely devastated by the war, they did so with complete confidence in the successful outbreak of socialist revolutions in the more advanced countries. The years 1918- 19 seemed to have confirmed these hopes. The political crises which overwhelmed Germany, Austro-Hungary and Italy were no less significant than that of Russia in February 1917. The old political regimes collapsed, the traditional royal families of the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs were blown away, strikes and uprisings flared up and millions of political slaves arose. Nevertheless the revolution was nowhere able to reach the same heights as in Russia in October 1917; the movement was checked halfway, retreated and finally ended in the despotic barbarism of fascism. Since this occurred everywhere, there must be an underlying cause for this development. It would appear to follow logically that Lenin and Trotsky had erred. Did they deceive themselves when they felt the pulse of ageing capitalism and declared its death had arrived?

The answer is definitely NO. The Marxist analysis of the objective development of world capitalism had been brilliantly confirmed. The great capitalist countries had emerged from the stage of progressive development of their economy into an epoch of self-annihilation where wars and crises succeeded one another. What Marx, had foreseen had occurred: the concentration of the means of production and monopoly had reached the point where they were irreconcilable with their capitalist form. At this stage, according to Marxist prophecy, the proletariat should destroy the capitalist framework and proclaim the birth of a new society. But only in Russia was this prophecy fulfilled; in all other countries the proletariat revealed itself unable to sever the umbilical cord which bound it to the bourgeoisie. What was the reason?

Lenin himself offered the key to the answer. By 1902 he had already written of the need for a strictly disciplined organisation of professional revolutionaries: ‘without the “dozen” tried and talented leaders ... professionally trained, schooled by experience ... no class in modern society can wage a determined struggle’. He outlined the task of the organisation: it must lead the struggle at every stage, ‘from upholding the honour, the prestige, and the continuity of the Party in periods of acute revolutionary “depression” to preparing for, appointing the time for, and carrying out the nation-wide armed uprising’. No successful revolution without such a party: this is the basic idea of all Leninist writings of the years 1902-4, the years marking the foundation of the Leninist party.

No Leninist Parties in Western Europe
No such orthodox Marxist party existed at the end of the last World War, either in Germany or in any other Western European country. The Social Democracy, originally passive toward the problem of revolution, had gone over into the camp of the class enemy in 1914. An opposition arose, indeed – the Spartakusbund – but this group was small in number and organisationally weak. Its leaders, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, had been in prison for the greater part of the war and, moreover, did not share Lenin’s conception of the tasks of the party. In 1903-4 Rosa Luxemburg had sharply polemicised against Lenin’s alleged ultra-centralism and bureaucracy. Agitation and propaganda, these were for Luxemburg and Liebknecht the foremost functions of the party. On the other hand, the conscious initiative of the party leadership in the formulation of strategy and tactics played a subordinate role: the revolutionary uprising ought to arise out of the spontaneous actions of the masses, and the party was to serve merely as an assistant. Rosa Luxemburg had never altered her position on this basic question. Such was the situation of German radicalism. The small opposition groups in other countries, Italy, France, England, were even further removed from Lenin’s conception.

Now the question arises: if Lenin considered the existence of a Bolshevik party the indispensable prerequisite for revolution and, moreover, held the Russian revolution to be lost without the international revolution, why didn't he from the very beginning of his activity devote all his energy to the creation of such an international revolutionary party? A study of Lenin’s writings before 1914 provides the answer. Lenin esteemed the German Social Democracy as highly as he did the other left-wing groups. In it he saw the direct heritage of Marx and Engels. Lenin, like the other Russian Marxists, considered Karl Kautsky, editor of its weekly theoretical organ, an indisputable authority. Through Lenin’s interpretation, Kautsky’s academically correct generalisations received the practical application and sharpness which Kautsky, the professor, could hardly conceive. With so much greater bitterness did Lenin turn against Kautsky when he realised in 1914 that his opinion of Kautsky had been mistaken. From this point on, Lenin propagandised unhesitatingly for the formation of the Third International without, however, achieving any great practical results in creating it during the war. The majority of the Zimmerwald Conference opposed the proclamation of a new International and the manifesto of the small left wing Leninist groups was not even once mentioned in the publications of the Spartakusbund. Thus, no one was in a better position than Lenin to realise that the subjective factors for successful revolutions in the West were lacking.

We know that Trotsky’s position before 1917 was similar to that of Rosa Luxemburg for, as he himself expressed it, he had held to a certain social-revolutionary fatalism. The February revolution had drawn him to Lenin, while none of the old supporters of Lenin had Trotsky’s ability to translate Lenin’s conception into reality. In Russia, where the actual problem confronted them, Lenin and Trotsky ridiculed the superstitious belief in the spontaneous victory of the revolution, and considered success or defeat dependent on their own actions. The problem presented itself differently to the consciousness of the masses. The apparent ease of the victory of the October uprising naturally evoked great hopes among the Russian workers for an immediate victory of the revolution in Europe, without concerning themselves with the great philosophical problems of the subjective conditions of this revolution. It was quite evident that even Lenin and Trotsky, to say nothing of the Zinovievs and Bukharins, allowed themselves for a time to be swept along on this wave of optimism.

This is especially evident in the period immediately following the revolution in Germany in November 1918. The radicalised German workers were unable to follow the complicated events of the Russian revolution between February and October 1917 because of war conditions. The Soviet Republic appeared to them as an accomplished fact which they had to emulate as soon as possible. The Russians did nothing to make the invaluable experience of Bolshevik politics available to them. The task of international revolutionary propaganda was taken over by Zinoviev. He had only one year previously opposed the carefully prepared October insurrection, labelled it as irresponsible adventurism and insisted that it proceed through the legal channels of the Constituent Assembly. Therefore, the proletarian revolution in Germany appeared to him to be the simplest matter in the world and the National Assembly there as a simple problem. ‘Throw out the traitors, Ebert and Scheidemann!’ Such was the proclamation he sent from Moscow to the German proletariat. ‘Call for the Soviet Republic with Liebknecht at its head!’ It would have been more worthwhile had his advice read: ‘Don’t allow yourself to be provoked to rash deeds. Explain patiently to the masses the betrayal of the Social Democracy. First build and stabilise your own party. Your hour will come’. Whether this advice would have helped is another question. There could be no talk then of the Western European revolutionists leaning on Moscow. The Communist International was only now to be founded. From prison, Rosa Luxemburg published a sharp critique of Bolshevik politics. The Spartakusbund marched to its own destruction on its own initiative. In the period when the radicalisation of the German masses was still in its initial stage, the Spartakus leaders responded to the reactionary Ebert administration with the January 1919 uprising, which was totally unprepared for and amateurishly executed.

This event constituted a catastrophe for the German movement and consequently for the development of the international revolution. The young German revolutionary party (Communist Party of Germany – KPD) was literally decapitated; the movement incurred a blow from which it never fully recovered. The meaning and scope of this disaster was at first not fully recognised in Moscow. The voices of optimism persisted and indeed received fresh stimuli as a result of the proclamation of Soviet Republics in Budapest and Munich.

In Budapest the regime of Count Károlyi had voluntarily surrendered its power to the left Social Democracy of Béla Kun, which led Lenin to make the hopeful observation that other countries would achieve socialism ‘by a different, more humane road’. Nevertheless it turned out that the importance of a well-disciplined party with experienced leaders trained in Marxism was even more evident on the day after the seizure of power than on the evening before. The regime of Béla Kun committed error after error, united with opportunists, neglected the organisation of the masses into soviets and the building of an army, forgot revolutionary measures for the benefit of the poor peasants and farm workers, and lost its all too easily acquired power after a few months. The Munich Soviet Republic was only a farce whose tragic demise served but to accentuate the catastrophe of the January days in Berlin.

Paul Levi, a disciple of Rosa Luxemburg whom Lenin had become acquainted with in Switzerland during the war, was the first German to understand the real requirements of the situation. Following the deaths of Luxemburg, Liebknecht, and Jogiches, Levi, in spite of his youth, was chosen to head the newly established party and found it in a state of unprecedented ideological chaos. Numerous utopian radical elements, lacking theoretical knowledge and political experience, had linked themselves to the Spartakusbund during the first days of the revolution. Some of them considered armed uprising as the panacea and every other form of political activity as sheer betrayal. Others desired to create their private little ‘pure revolutionary’ world removed from reality, rather than altering the existing world through revolutionary means. Levi was thoroughly convinced that the elimination of these elements was the first requirement for the building of a serious party, and in the fall of 1919 he accomplished this split regardless of the fact that this measure reduced the membership of the party in Berlin from several thousand to a few hundred.

Lenin supported Levi’s course of action and provided it with a theoretical justification in his pamphlet against the utopian radicals, ‘Left Wing’ Communism: An Infantile Disorder, written during April-May 1920. By this time Lenin had abandoned all hopes for a rapid and easy victory of the revolution in the West. Nevertheless he had no basic revision to make. The validity of his position in 1902, as set forth in his What Is To Be Done?, was doubly confirmed by experience, positively in Russia, negatively in the West. Therefore it seemed to him at this time that the attention of the revolutionaries of Western Europe must be directed toward the ideological and factional conflicts which were involved in the building of the Bolshevik Party. For, wrote Lenin: ‘Only the history of Bolshevism during the entire period of its existence can satisfactorily explain why it has been able to build up and maintain, under the most difficult conditions, the iron discipline needed for the victory of the proletariat’ He also directed attention to the cautious tactics which the Bolsheviks undertook in the first period of the February revolution. ‘We did not call for the overthrow of the government but explained that it was impossible to overthrow it without first changing the composition and the temper of the Soviets ... Without such thorough, circumspect and long preparations, we could not have achieved victory in October 1917, or consolidated that victory’. Golden words these, which, however, came too late and fell upon infertile ground.

The Founding of the Comintern
The Communist International was founded in the spring of 1919. The Founding Congress was hardly impressive. Only a few delegates of non-Russian parties succeeded in crossing the civil war fronts and reaching Moscow. Outstanding or important leaders were not among those present. Lenin and Trotsky saw themselves surrounded by such persons as the Finns, Kuusinen and Sirola, who had displayed their mediocrity shortly before in the Finnish Civil War; by the Austrian Steinhardt whose enthusiasm greatly surpassed his political abilities; by the Frenchman Jacques Sadoul, a captain in the French army and member of its mission in Russia who had gone over to the Bolsheviks; by the American John Reed, a brilliant writer and journalist whose political experience, nevertheless, was limited; and by the German Hugo Eberlein. The latter, then only slightly known, but later one of the most corrupt elements of the Communist International, had received a mandate from his party to vote against the founding of the Communist International on the ground that the time for it was not yet at hand. In arriving at this conclusion, the young German party was echoing the opinion voiced by Rosa Luxemburg shortly before her death. Here again she demonstrated her fatal tendency of bridling the horse by the tail. While she deemed the founding of the new International premature, she did concede that the Berlin workers had been adventurist in undertaking an armed uprising without having created a party. Lenin and Trotsky had no desire to force upon the German party the founding of the International and declared themselves ready to arrive at a compromise. However, with the arrival of new delegates, who had undertaken the journey to Moscow under the most difficult circumstances, a wave of enthusiasm for the immediate founding spread throughout the Congress, and Eberlein allowed himself to be persuaded to withhold his vote. Thus was the Communist International founded. Zinoviev was elected president and Moscow designated as its centre, where a certain number of representatives of other parties would reside permanently. It was further decided on an annual congress which was to have supreme authority in all political and organisational questions.

It is obvious that Moscow was expected to render the new movement every conceivable assistance from the very beginning. Shortly before he was murdered, Trotsky in one of his last writings recalled that the Council of People’s Commissars issued the following decree on 26 December 1917 bearing his own and Lenin’s signatures:

’Taking into consideration the fact that the Soviet power bases itself on principles of international solidarity of the proletariat and on the brotherhood of the toilers of all countries; that the struggle against war and imperialism can lead toward complete victory only if waged on an international scale, the Council of People’s Commissars considers it necessary to offer assistance by all possible means, including money, to the left international wing of the labour movement of all countries every possible assistance, regardless of whether these countries are at war or in an alliance with Russia or are neutral. For this reason the Council of People’s Commissars decides to grant two million roubles for the needs of the revolutionary international movement and to put it at the disposal of the foreign representatives of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs’.

Twenty-three years later Trotsky adds: ‘Not even today am I inclined to withdraw my signature from this decree. It was a question of giving open aid to revolutionary movements in other countries under the control of workers’ organisations. The parties receiving aid enjoyed complete freedom of criticism of the Soviet government. At the congresses of the Communist International a passionate ideological struggle always used to take place, and on more than one occasion Lenin and I remained in the minority’.

Only hypocrites and philistines could be opposed in principle to material assistance by an internationalist party to its co-thinkers in other countries. Even the First International at the time of Marx and Engels was proud of its international strike fund. The Second International and the International Federation of Trade Unions perpetuated these traditions. To say nothing of what goes on in the camp of the bourgeoisie which expresses its moral indignation over the international solidarity of the proletariat. It is well known that German Nazi imperialism directs its political parties and groups all over the world. Democratic imperialism is no different in this respect. When the British government of Churchill and Lloyd George subsidised Denikin, Kolchak and Wrangel with many million pounds sterling they remained faithful to the traditions of William Pitt who financed royalist ambitions against the French revolution. Once the Bolsheviks had embarked upon a life and death struggle with world capitalism they were forced to wage battle with those methods prescribed by capitalist conditions.

Nevertheless, this aid from Moscow had its disadvantages. Had there existed only well-organised parties with experience and independent-minded leaders such as Lenin in the other countries, the hazards connected with Russian aid would have been minimised and the advantages that much greater. However, this was not the case. The money only served the function of masking the small and ideologically unstable groups with a facade of influence and strength which in reality they did not possess. Thus this aid from Moscow very soon tended to make the party apparatus independent of the membership. With the degeneration of the Russian revolution the Moscow subsidies were transformed into devices of coercion and corruption.

That the Communist International was nevertheless no artificial creation of Moscow, but was rather a response to a general political need, was demonstrated in the first years of its existence. In Germany, Italy, France, Scandinavia, yes even in ultra-conservative England, great masses were turning away from the brutal counter-revolutionary or ideologically flimsy policies of the Social Democracy and were gazing hopefully towards the East. What was more perplexing was the fact that a considerable section of the old Social Democratic leaders declared themselves ready to affiliate with the Comintern. Thus the Germans, Crispien and Dittmann, who adopted a semiopportunist and weak pacifist position during the war; the Frenchmen, Cachin and Frossard, who had been 100 per cent social-patriotic and had worked with Mussolini; the Czech, Smeral, who had until then been an agent of the Hapsburg monarchy; and finally even Ramsay MacDonald, then the religious pacifist leader of the Independent Labour Party, and future Prime Minister of the British Empire, all politely inquired about the prerequisites for entry into the new International.

Lenin and Trotsky were greatly disturbed by these approaches. It was not their purpose to create a new edition of the Second International in whose ranks each could follow his own inclinations. Therefore, at the Second Congress convoked in the summer of 1920, they presented 21 conditions for acceptance into the Communist International. These required the recognition of the essential principles of the Bolshevik politics, the soviet system and the dictatorship of the proletariat, the break from ministerial socialism and social patriotism. Social Democrats and liberals of all shades have attributed the roots of the evils and the basic reason for all the misery of the post-war workers’ movement to these Moscow theses. Trotsky countered such complaints with the droll paradox: ‘Yes, it is possible that these theses were not formulated sharply enough’. In reality these theses did not accomplish their function as serving as a vaccine against the opportunistic degeneration of the International. Their purpose was achieved only insofar as the open opportunists declined to accept the 21 conditions and were thus excluded. Among the signatories were people like the previously mentioned Cachin and Smeral, who were indifferent to the theory and comforted themselves with the philistine wisdom that it wouldn’t be easily enforced. Even among the sincere signers, there was hardly one who understood how to translate the algebra of the 21 points into the arithmetic of everyday politics. Neither money nor strict regulations could remedy the evil from which Western European radicalism was suffering: the lack of ten experienced, outstanding leaders who were in a position to conduct consistent politics in the revolutionary Marxist manner. Only through patient educational work and careful selection could such a leadership be developed.

Paul Levi, who was one of the first to become aware of the consequences of this situation, received the high honour of the chairmanship of the Second Congress. Lenin’s brochure against ultra-left infantilism was being printed at the time. The German Communist Party had committed a grave blunder in March 1920, in connection with the putsch by Kapp and his reactionary clique of generals and fascists. In the absence of Levi, who was serving time in prison, the Zentrale (Central Committee) had answered the putsch with the declaration that this struggle between monarchist reaction and the republic was of no concern to workers since they were both enemies of labour. Levi had protested most vehemently against this position from prison, and had called for energetic participation in the struggle against Kapp. His position was adopted within a few days, and the leaders of the Russian party were outspoken in their recognition of the fact that Levi had saved the honour of his party. Levi seemed to have every reason to be happy. But, as the proverb goes, into every life some rain must fall, and the Second World Congress did not delay in adding a drop of poison to his cup of happiness. Since the main debates centred chiefly around the 21 points, the delegates directed all their polemics against the right and thus found themselves voicing the same opinions as the radical utopians of the left. Zinoviev and Bukharin, as well as those like Béla Kun and Rákosi who thanks to their brief stellar roles became members of the Executive Committee of the new International, opposed Levi’s expulsion of the gallant ultra-lefts. The expulsion was not reversed but the expelled, who had formed a ‘Communist Workers Party’ (KAPD), were recognised as a ‘sympathetic section’ of the new International. The existence of two sections, an ‘official’ and a ‘sympathetic’, could only provoke confusion in the ranks of German labour. With this decision, a course was embarked upon which was to develop dangerously for the fate of the new party and the International.

At the end of 1920 the young Communist Party of Germany was suddenly transformed into an influential party with recognised leaders, a sizeable representation in the Reichstag, numerous publications, a considerable following in the factories and a mass membership. The Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD), which had split from the Social Democracy in 1917 and had become swollen into a mass party during the revolution, had undergone another split at the Congress in Halle, the majority favouring affiliation to the Communist Party and the Communist International. Zinoviev himself appeared at the Halle Congress and had been victorious in his debate with Martov, Lenin’s old adversary. Zinoviev’s optimism reached new heights and was shared by his colleagues Bukharin, Béla Kun, Rákosi, etc. ‘Now that we have a real mass party in Germany, we must begin to do something about it’, they philosophised in the small bureau of the Comintern in Moscow. One after another, in Berlin, there appeared Béla Kun, Borodin (the very same Borodin who was to play an important and equally disastrous role five years later in China) and Rákosi, to whom important powers were delegated by the Presidium of the Comintern to watch over the politics of the German party. Through their machinations, Levi was persuaded to relinquish his position as chairman of the German party.` This gave free rein to the adventurists.

The ‘March Action’
In March 1921, when the Social Democratic police chief, Hörsing, ordered the police to march into the miners’ district of Central Germany, the new leadership of the Communist Party called for a general strike, for the arming of the workers and the overthrow of the government. For the masses of workers this pronunciamento came like a bolt out of the clear sky.

Under Levi’s leadership the party had until then pursued a policy of proletarian united fronts. And suddenly there was this regression to putschist infantilism. The irony in this call for a general strike was in calling it a day before Good Friday, when most factories were closed for four days. While most German workers were celebrating Easter, the leadership of the German Communist Party was conducting a revolution. It fraternised with the putschist ‘Communist Workers Party’ and howled louder than the latter. Like a modern Robin Hood, Max Hölz plundered the homes of capitalists and divided the booty among the poor. The year before, the Communist Party had excluded this freebooter from its ranks and now it was hailing him as a hero. Communist leaders committed even worse stupidities. In order to ‘electrify’ the masses, they incited attacks on their own party offices and publications by party members disguised as the ‘enemy’, in order to then ‘answer’ these actions by railway sabotage, dynamiting of courts, attacks on savings banks and the police – a tactic which Adolf Hitler emulated with far greater success in 1933. The March Action ended in a terrific fiasco; the young party, just starting to become a serious factor in the political life of Germany, was made to appear ridiculous.

In a confidential report, shortly before the March Action, Paul Levi had warned the party leadership against taking the path of adventurism. When the putschist riots began, he was in Vienna. He hurried back to Germany, where Clara Zetkin, an old working-class leader and a member of his faction, persuaded him from making public a manifesto against the action during the struggle. Instead, immediately following the close of the event, he published a brilliantly written pamphlet, Unser Weg: wider den Putchismus (Our Road: Against Putschism). Outside of Rosa Luxemburg’s Spartacus programme, this is one of the most noteworthy contributions to be found in the whole history of the German Communist Party. He wrote in the preface: I turn confidently to the members of the party with this description which must tear at the heart of everyone who helped to build what was here destroyed. These are bitter truths. But, ‘it is medicine, not poison which I dispense’ Nevertheless, Moscow rejected this remedy and officially recognized the putschist faction. A few months later, at the Third World Congress of the Comintern, Zinoviev declared: ‘When we first received information about the March Action, we all had the feeling that things had finally begun to move. At last the movement had started in Germany. At last a breath of fresh air’. Accordingly, a telegram was sent to the putschists: ‘You have acted correctly’, and Levi and his following were denounced as a ‘rightist menace’. So the heroes of the March Action felt justified in expelling the inconvenient Levi from the party.

Lenin and Trotsky shook their heads at all this folly. They were unaware that the March Action was contrived by the secretariat of the ECCI. Since they reckoned that the international revolutionary movement was in for a period of calm, their attention was directed to the introduction of the New Economic Policy in Russia. War Communism, with its system of compulsory requisitions, had alienated a large section of the peasantry from the Soviet state, and had led industrial production into a blind alley. As Kronstadt clearly demonstrated, even the workers found the privations too intolerable. As far back as 1920, Trotsky had recommended that the kulaks should be guaranteed a certain percentage of their crops and should he permitted free trade within a limited sphere. At first, Lenin opposed this. Finally, not fearing a step backward, he accepted Trotsky’s plan, in order to gain a more advantageous position for making further progress. To a certain extent private capital was again permitted for industry and the handicrafts. As a matter of fact, Lenin was even considering a plan of attracting foreign capital for the reconstruction of Russia’s industry by means of an extensive system of concessions, and Trotsky supported the idea. Just like every other bold turn of Lenin’s policy, this plan aroused opposition in his own ranks. ‘We must not allow the Soviet Republic to deteriorate into a shopkeepers’ state’, was a favourite argument of the Secretariat of the Comintern, among Zinoviev, Bukharin and Béla Kun. Since Lenin and Trotsky based the necessity for the introduction of the New Economic Policy on the failure of the international revolution to materialise, Zinoviev and his associates in the Secretariat thought they could provide a speedy remedy. This was precisely their chief motive for unleashing the infantile March Action.

The Third World Congress
The question of the March Action caused a sharp clash in the Russian party. Their judgement of the March Action brought Lenin and Trotsky into the extreme right wing of their own party. The Third World Congress of the Comintern was imminent. Only through great effort did the Russian party arrive at a general agreement. Unity was established on the basis of a compromise, a ‘compromise to the left’ as Trotsky described it at the congress, and by ‘left’ in this case he referred to the ultra-left, putschist tendency.

On the surface, the Third World Congress of the Comintern (22 June-12 July 1921) was an all-imposing spectacle. The influence of the Second International had been constantly diminishing in Europe, so that delegates of every colour and race, from almost every country in the world, were assembled in Moscow: a total of 602 delegates, representing 58 different countries. In Germany, Italy, France, Czechoslovakia and Scandinavia, the new International counted tens of thousands of members, and even in the East a mighty movement was beginning to arise. The brilliant climax of the congress was Trotsky’s analysis of the world political situation, which lasted several hours and which he presented on the very same day in Russian, French and German, an oratorical performance without precedent. Nevertheless, in spite of its outwardly brilliant and correct course, the Third World Congress already contained the diseased germs which were a few years later to precipitate the degeneration of the Communist International and, along with it, the Soviet state.

The ‘compromise to the left’ on the German question was approximately as follows: the March Action was an ‘advance’ insofar as the German party led large masses into the struggle; it was nevertheless a grave error insofar as the party forsook a defensive line in favour of an offensive one; Levi’s criticism, although generally correct, signified a breach of discipline and therefore his expulsion was justified.

That Trotsky was not altogether satisfied with this compromise was clearly evident both in his report and in participation in the debates. Thus he attempted as far as possible to weaken the position that the March Action was a step forward. ’When we say that the March Action was a step forward, we understand by this – at least I do (he thought it necessary to limit himself – W.H.) – the fact that the Communist Party ... stands ... as a united, independent, integrated and centralised party which has the possibility of independently intervening in the struggle of the proletariat’. After this concession to the general rhetoric of the congress, the speaker adopted an altogether different tone when he discussed the March adventure more concretely. ‘To defend the March Action ... will not succeed ... The party’s attempt to play a leading role in a great mass movement was not a fortunate one ... If we now say that we are throwing Paul Levi out of the window, and utter only confused phrases about the March Action being the first attempt, a step forward, in short if we cover up criticism with phrase-mongering, then we have not fulfilled our duty’.

However, when we look more closely, didn’t the criticisms of the Third World Congress consist of such phrase-mongering?. The theses of the Russian delegation declared that the March Action was a struggle which the German Party was provoked into by the government (what a way to describe it); as a step forward in contrast to the patient policies of Levi in the year 1920 (whereas it represented a worse regression to the stupidities of the first month of the year 1919); the theses limited themselves to condemning the so-called ‘theory of the offensive’ in accordance with which the party was obliged to assume the offensive under all circumstances regardless of whether it had the following of the masses or not. While they treated the putschists with velvet gloves, the theses anathematised the critics of the ultra-leftists. It is no wonder, then, that the leaders of the March Action had no misgivings about ‘adopting in principle the theses presented by the Russian delegates’ and only expressed objections to 'Trotsky’s interpretation of the theses’.

Perhaps the unhappiest role at the Congress was played by Karl Radek. The truth about the proceedings in the small bureau of the ECCI seeped out later when Zinoviev and Radek got into each other’s hair in the spring of 1924 and openly attacked each other in the press. In the course of these debates, Radek repeated what Levi had said three years previously: he accused Zinoviev of responsibility for the March Action. Levi’s suggestion (supported by Radek) of a united front tactic toward the Social Democracy, says Radek, was rejected by ‘a part of the influential leadership of the (Comintern) Executive’ in mid-February 1921 and ‘only the intervention of comrade Lenin made this impossible’. Nevertheless no official decision of the Executive Committee had been made. Zinoviev and Bukharin had continued their machinations against Levi’s policies and, as a result, the March Action had taken place. In his summary at the Fifth World Congress (1924), Zinoviev in his own way confirmed the correctness of Radek’s assertion and even boasted of having fought against Levi and having favoured the ultra-lefts since 1920.

Nevertheless, at the Third World Congress in 1922 when the March Action was being discussed and when the fate of the German movement depended upon the result of this debate, Radek maintained absolute silence about these internal doings in the Moscow Executive Committee and made his speech in the worst spirit of clique solidarity. Not only is the Executive absolutely innocent, but also in Germany the putschists were not so much to blame as their opponents. ‘We say to the German party: you have fought and you have made mistakes in the course of the battle. By the fact that you fought you showed that you are a good Communist Party’. Levi was already expelled at the time of the congress and therefore was not present. The most important of his supporters, like Hoffman, Brass, and Däumig, were prevented from making the trip to Moscow through all sorts of machinations. There were only a few rank-and-file members of the Levi opposition present, who were in a difficult position because of the numerous famous speakers and only timidly ventured to present their point of view. Thus it was very easy for the men on the Executive Committee to assume the position of prosecutors.

Prosecutor Radek is tolerant enough to grant the opposition extenuating circumstances. The International Executive is of course not to blame, but the leadership of the German party cannot be absolved of all mistakes. ‘It is clear that if the German comrades had not made mistakes and if there had arisen an opposition to the March Action, the opposition would be ripe for expulsion. The mistakes have necessitated a milder attitude towards this opposition because it is not clear whether they are all opportunists or just alarmists. That necessitates the concession to the rightists’. But the opposition should understand: ‘The Communist International will not forgive such things a second time’. Generally this is what is wrong with ideological compromises: they allow various interpretations and clarify nothing. What was a ’compromise to the left’ for Trotsky was a ‘compromise to the right’ for Radek and a majority of the participants at the Third World Congress.

Levi was nevertheless right when he maintained after the congress: ’Whoever advised the Communist Party to accept such a compromise, advised her to take poison ... For if the March Action was a step forward, there should be no hesitation about taking the next step. But if the March Action was a crime, then say so, so that everyone should know where they stand’. The compromise transformed the open crisis in the German party into a ‘hidden crisis’. Levi prophesied that the German Communist Party would never withstand this covert crisis. ‘Perhaps it will come to pass, and unless miracles happen it must come to pass, that the Communist Party will share the same fate as the Tarim River, that river of Central Asia which arises from the mountains with many waters ... but never reaches the sea. It disappears in the Siberian steppe as if it had never existed ... Then it will be necessary to start a great task from the very beginning, under new conditions but with the old beliefs’

Lenin’s Views of Levi
In his talks with Clara Zetkin during the Third World Congress, Lenin charged Levi’s criticisms with not differentiating between the defensive action of the struggling workers and the initiation of an offensive by an ill-advised party leadership. Levi’s critique lacked the feeling of solidarity with the party and it had embittered the comrades by its tone, rather than by its content. This argument sounds surprising, coming from a politician who had ridiculed every criticism of sharp tone as evidence of political weakness. Even if one grants that Lenin’s comments were correct and that Levi’s pamphlet against the March Action expressed ‘a strong tendency towards solitariness and self- satisfaction and not a little literary vanity’, it remains difficult to understand how Lenin and Trotsky could follow the Third World Congress in placing the form above the content. The political principles of Levi would ‘triumph brilliantly’ at the congress, exclaimed Lenin; nevertheless, ‘the congress will condemn Paul Levi and treat him harshly’. On the other hand, the congress was to nullify the famous leftist theory of the offensive at any price and condemn its tactics.

As far as the personalities are concerned, ‘we shall not deal roughly with the leftists, we shall even put a little balm on their wounds. They will soon be working energetically and happily’, and pursuing sound politics. Of course Lenin didn’t want to lose Paul Levi whose qualities he esteemed. I got to know him in Switzerland and had high hopes for him. He proved his worth in the times of worst persecution, he was courageous, intelligent and unselfish ... For Paul Levi the road back to us is open if only he does not block it himself ... We must not lose Paul Levi, for his sake and for ours. We are not over-blessed with talents and must conserve what we have.... If Levi submits to discipline and behaves well – he can, for example, contribute anonymously to the party press, write some good pamphlets, etc – then in three or four months I shall, in an open letter, demand his readmission.’ When Lenin spoke to Clara Zetkin in this manner it was naturally with the intention of having her use her influence with Levi. Such a relationship with the left on one side and Levi on the other seemed necessary to Lenin, in order to maintain the unity of the German party. He looked upon the March adventure as a result of ‘infantilism’ and deemed it necessary to adopt a ’fatherly leniency’ towards the leaders of the German party. Trotsky in 1928, in his sarcastic and penetrating pamphlet against the Comintern leaders, reports a conversation which he and Lenin had with Clara Zetkin some time after the March Action. Both agreed with Zetkin that great stupidities had been committed. But, reasoned Lenin, ’the youth will commit many stupidities, but they will nevertheless make a good revolution’. Clara Zetkin protested: ‘They will not even make a bad one’. Lenin and Trotsky looked at each other and, as the latter reports, they couldn’t hide their smiles. Nevertheless, in this case, history proved Clara Zetkin to be right; she was wrong in that she later combined with stupid fools in a bad revolution.

Lenin and Trotsky’s mistake was that they overlooked the fact that it was not the ‘young and inexperienced’ Germans but the political infant shoes of the mature adults like Zinoviev, Bukharin and Béla Kun which had led the way to the March adventure. The first duty of the Third World Congress should have been to publicly denounce and condemn the unfortunate intervention of the Executive Committee into the politics of the German party, to relieve the persons responsible of their functions and to subject the activity of the new committee to permanent democratic control. Then there would still have been time to correct the formal mistakes of Levi and his supporters. But as things developed all proportion was lost, and the delegates must have gained the impression that it would always be better to make mistakes following the orders of the Comintern than to act correctly while violating discipline. In this way the foundation stone was laid for the development which was to change the Communist International in the course of a few years into a society of Mamelukes, in slavish dependency upon the ruling faction in Moscow and finally into a mere instrument of Stalin’s opportunist, nationalist foreign policy.

What Happened to Levi
As far as Levi is concerned, it remains regrettable that he never accepted Lenin’s outstretched hand. It would surely have paid to attempt in this way to lead the movement back on the right road. That Lenin and Trotsky were free of cliquism was shown later in their absolute opposition to the bureaucratic tendencies in their own party. The fact that these tendencies had also found entry into the Executive Committee of the International could not have long remained hidden from them. That would have been the hour of Levi’s vindication. It was still worse that Levi did not possess enough patience, self-confidence and strength of character to continue his work with his own group. He and his small group of devoted supporters joined the Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) and a little later, together with the latter, rejoined the old Social Democracy. Of course, he never completely forgot his past. He didn't become a minister of the unholy Weimar Republic or even a mayor, but remained in critical opposition. As a lawyer, in a series of sensational cases, he revealed the reactionary and dishonest justice of the Welmar Republic. The foulness of German politics affected him so deeply that he committed suicide in 1930. He leaped from a window in a Berlin apartment building, thus recalling Trotsky’s remark at the Third World Congress about throwing Levi out of the window.

The attitude of the Third World Congress toward Levi seemed to he justified by his subsequent course. In his Notes of a Publicist, written in 1922 but published after his death, Lenin regrets not having treated Levi more harshly. The picture is one-sided, if one looks only at Levi’s later development and does not consider the party he left. In What Is To Be Done? the young Lenin had emphasised the great significance of the continuity of leadership and cadres in the building of a party. In his discussions with Clara Zetkin during the Third World Congress he directed her attention to this point. It is especially important that you retain in our ranks qualified comrades who have earned their spurs in the workers’ movement. I am thinking of comrades like Adolf Hoffman, Geyer, Däumig, Brass and others ... Comrades like (these) bring experience and considerable expertise to the party, and they are, above all, a living bond between you and the broad working masses, whose confidence they possess’. Lenin was also full of praise for the rank and file elements of the Levi opposition: ‘Splendid fellows, these German workers like Malzalin and his friends. I grant you that they probably wouldn’t be employed as fire-eaters in a radical circus. I don’t know whether they would be good as shock troops. But I am absolutely sure that people of this sort are the steadfast, well-organised, fighting columns of the revolutionary proletariat, and its foundation and support in the factories. We must gather to us such elements and activate them’.

Only a few months after the Third World Congress all those mentioned by Lenin, ‘the solid bond between the party and the masses’, had left the party in which they had lost confidence. The party fraction in the Reichstag had shrunk from 26 to 11. The continuity in the party leadership was lost and never regained. Although the permanent crisis of German economy and politics drove many new followers and voters to the party of the extreme left, a stable relation of trust between it and the masses was never again achieved. The leadership of the party was for a while in the hands of the quartet, Brandler, Thalheimer, Walcher and Frölich, who found their complement in the ‘opposition’ of Maslow-Ruth Fischer. Heinrich Brandler was a good factory or union official with organisational talent and a certain practical instinct, but had no basic theoretical education, no imagination and no gift of creative leadership. August Thalheimer, whom Lenin and Trotsky, God knows why, once endowed with the title of an educated theoretician, was really nothing but a dry eclectic, always ready to justify the opportunistic practices of his friend Brandler with the necessary theory. In the same manner, Jacob Walcher and Paul Frölich complemented each other. Since Walcher’s political horizon was more restricted than Brandler’s, he could allow his instinct freer reign. Frölich’s theoretical knowledge surpassed that of young Thalheimer although the latter was superior in literary ability. As far as the Maslow-Fischer combination was concerned, their political level was close to that of the hooligans of the extreme right, the rabble around Streicher and Strasser.

Lenin was very much distressed with the subsequent development of the German party. At the Fourth World Congress of the Comintern, which was nothing but a less spectacular repetition of the Third, he found the opportunity to continue his dialogue with Clara Zetkin. One evening after Ruth Fischer’s speech, Lenin poured out his heart to the old comrade. ‘Hm, hm, I can well understand how in your situation there is such a thing as a left opposition ... Things are progressing so slowly. World history doesn’t seem to be moving very rapidly; but the discontented workers think that your party leadership doesn’t wish it to move any faster. I understand all that. But what I cannot understand is such leaders of the left opposition as I have just listened to ... No, such an opposition, such a leadership does not impress me. However, I openly admit to you that your Central Committee impresses me just as little, for it doesn’t understand, it doesn't have the energy to clean out these petty demagogues. After all it should be an easy matter to deal with such people, to detach the revolutionary-minded workers from them and to politically educate the latter. Precisely because they are revolutionary-minded workers, whereas radicals of this type (Fischer and Maslow) are at bottom the worst sort of opportunists’. This characterisation was fully justified by the later activity of both, but nevertheless did not prevent their being at the top of the German party for some time. It is surprising that it didn’t occur to Lenin to connect this desperate situation in the German party with the course of the March Action and the treatment of it by the Third World Congress. After they got rid of the serious elements it was not surprising that the sterile bureaucrats and adventurist demagogues took control.

The Revolutionary Crisis of 1923
The year 1923 justified Lenin’s dark forebodings about the German movement. In that year Germany was confronted with a unique revolutionary situation. The German government answered the French occupation of the Ruhr with the call for ‘passive resistance’ and its accompanying inflation. Under the masquerade of patriotism there took place the most sinister robbery of the middle class and the proletariat by finance capital that has been known in the history of modern society. According to the calculations of the famous German economist, Professor Lederer, the net profit of German finance capital from this inflation was 78 billion gold marks, to which should be added the steep taxes.

While Stinnes, Thyssen, Krupp, Duisberg and Cuno, who was chosen by them as pilot at the head of the ship of state, plundered to their heart’s content, they cried, as is customary in such cases, ‘Hold that thief’, namely Poincaré. Or to be more exact, they had others do the crying for them. As a product of the collapsing bourgeois society, a new political tendency had developed, the fascists or Nazis, whose first members were recruited from the bankrupt petty bourgeoisie, unemployed officers and lumpen-proletariat, and whose demagogic ideology contained the reality of chauvinism and the destruction of democracy. The robber barons gave a small percentage of their gigantic booty to the Nazis whose revenge propaganda had provided a favourable sounding board for the action of French imperialism. The money given for Nazi propaganda was a sound investment and the effect was twofold: the fanatic hatred of France directed the attention of the people away from the machinations of the robber barons and the iron and steel princes, and at the same time the rise of the Nazis put the Social Democracy into such a state of fear of the ‘fascist danger’ that it swallowed the inflationary politics of Cuno as the lesser evil.

But the most hopeless floundering was in the ranks of the Communist Party. With its adventuristic soul it swam in the wake of the chauvinist Nazi propaganda; with its bureaucratic ‘ministerial’ soul it adapted itself to the sterile, negatively limited anti-fascism of the Social Democracy. There was hardly a phase of German politics into which the Communist Party did not project itself, even into that of the particularism of the provincial governments. Brandler and Co made Saxony and Thuringia the centre of their politics instead of Berlin. Confusion reached its height when, in Moscow, Radek glorified the anti-semitic soldier, Schlageter. ‘Schlageter, the courageous soldier of the counter-revolution, deserves to be honoured by us soldiers of the revolution’, declared Radek in an improvised speech at the extended plenum of the ECCI on the day after Schlageter was shot by the French troops of occupation. The speaker turned to the ‘German Workers Party’ (as the Nazis were then called) with the question. ‘Against whom do you want to fight, Entente capitalism or the Russian people? With whom do you want to unite, the Russian workers and peasants in our common struggle to throw off the burden of finance capital or with Entente capital to enslave the German and Russian people?’ Through Radek’s words the Communists declared themselves ready to be in league with the Nazis: ‘We shall do everything so that men like Schlageter, who were ready to encounter death for a common cause, shall not be wanderers into nothingness, but travellers towards a better future for all of humanity’. At this conference only one delegate, the German Bohemian, Neurath, protested against this nationalist-communist mischief. Otherwise Radek’s speech aroused frantic applause. In Germany it was the basis of a series of fraternal actions between the Communists and the Nazis. Communist firms published pamphlets in which Communist and Nazi statements appeared alongside each other. This ideological disintegration made rapid progress.

The 1923 Events in Russia
To be sure, neither Lenin nor Trotsky was present at this plenum of the ECCI. Lenin’s consciousness was already lost forever, although his body which carried his spirit continued to perform its functions. And Trotsky? Although it was not generally known, at this time he was already in deep conflict with the bureaucratic centre of his party: the General Secretary Stalin and his henchmen, Zinoviev and Kamenev. At the beginning of the year Trotsky and Lenin had come to an understanding about their common action against the underhanded bureaucratism in the party and the state. All of Lenin’s last articles and letters were directed against Stalin’s policies and methods. Lenin and Trotsky intended to strike the decisive blow against Stalin and his bureaucratic group at the coming Twelfth Congress of the Russian party. Shortly before the convening of the congress, Lenin had suffered his second stroke from which he was never to recover. In his last letter to the party, which was later known as his Last Testament, he demanded Stalin’s removal from the post of General Secretary; among his other demands were the expulsion of Ordzhonikidze, who had boxed the ears of a Georgian comrade in the course of a discussion, and the removal of Dzerzhiski from his responsible post as head of the Cheka. Although Lenin was out of action, nevertheless he had bequeathed to his co-worker Trotsky excellent and potent weapons in the form of these last articles and letters.

It is interesting to note how Trotsky himself evaluated the chances he had at that time in the struggle against the bureaucratic disintegrating tendencies. In his autobiography he wrote: ‘Our joint action against the Central Committee at the beginning of 1923 would without a shadow of doubt have brought us victory. And, what is more, I have no doubt that if I had come forward on the eve of the Twelfth Congress in the spirit of a “bloc of Lenin and Trotsky” against the Stalinist bureaucracy, I should have been victorious even if Lenin had taken no direct part in the struggle’. Lenin had expressly warned Trotsky against concessions to his opponents: ‘Stalin will make a rotten compromise and then deceive us’. In expectation of Lenin’s recovery, Trotsky had entered into a compromise. He summoned Kamenev, Stalin’s supporter at the time, and told him: ‘Remember, and tell others, that the last thing I want is to start a fight at the congress for any changes of organisation. I am for preserving the status quo ... I am against removing Stalin, and expelling Ordzhonikidze and displacing Dzerzhinsky ... But I do agree with Lenin in substance. I want a radical change in the policy on the national question, a discontinuance of persecutions of the Georgian opponents of Stalin, a discontinuance of the administrative oppression of the party’.

Kamenev and Stalin did exactly as Lenin had predicted: they accepted everything and did the opposite. It is certainly not very advisable to entrust bureaucrats with executing an anti-bureaucratic programme or, as the proverb goes, to make the goat the gardener. When Trotsky spoke of his possible victory at the Twelfth Congress, he added: ‘How solid the victory would have been is, of course, another question’. One can certainly agree with him here. In view of the backwardness of Russia and the failure of the world revolution to materialise, reaction was unavoidable in Russia. But if Trotsky had publicly stepped forward in the spring of 1923 the Thermidorean tendencies would have been forced out into open battle, the reaction would not have assumed this veiled character, the meaning of the events in Russia would have been better understood in Europe and the rest of the world, and perhaps it would have been possible to release the Communist International from the hands of the bureaucrats.

Fifty years before, in a letter to Bebel, Engels had defended his and Marx’s position on the split in the First International at the Hague Congress: ‘We knew very well that the bubble must burst. All the riff-raff attached themselves to (the International). The sectarians within it became arrogant and misused the International in the hope that they would be allowed to commit the greatest stupidities and vulgarities. We could not put up with that. Knowing very well that the bubble must burst some time it was for us not a matter of delaying the catastrophe but taking care that the International emerged from it pure and unadulterated ... And if we had come out in a conciliatory way at the Hague, if we had hushed up the breaking out of the split – what would have been the result? The sectarians ... would have had another year in which to perpetrate, in the name of the International, still greater stupidities and infamies; the workers of the most developed countries would have turned away in disgust; the bubble would not have burst but, pierced by pin-pricks, would have slowly collapsed ...’.

Trotsky and the German Crisis
The one opportunity to ‘make the bubble burst’ was missed by Trotsky in the spring of 1923. As a result, Stalin and his confederates secured the time and opportunity to commit the worst infamies in the name of the Russian party and the International. ‘the bubble did not burst but, pierced by pin-pricks, slowly collapsed’. The stench that it spread made the rise of a new movement impossible for a long time.

We are at a loss to understand why Trotsky stayed away from the plenum of the ECCI which acclaimed Radek’s speech on Schlageter. Perhaps, while waiting for Lenin’s recovery, he was exercising the utmost caution and, after his experience at the Twelfth Congress, did not feel inclined to take responsibility for decisions in the carrying out of which he had no part. His absence did not denote that he was indifferent to the German developments; on the contrary, he followed them with eager attention – and serious concern.

The objective conditions for a revolutionary solution of the German crisis were so favourable that the influence of the Communist Party grew tremendously in spite of its unstable politics. Widespread, all-embracing strikes broke out with no end in sight; the factory councils, the method of choosing workers’ representatives in the factories which was created by the November revolution and recognised by the Weimar government, won enormous importance among the rising masses as their organised leadership; in several industrial centres the workers organised themselves into militias (in units of a hundred each) and began to arm themselves. ‘We are dancing on a volcano and the revolution confronts us’, declared Stresemann, the leading bourgeois politician and later Reich Chancellor, at the beginning of July.

Under such circumstances everything depended upon the correct handling of the situation by the leadership of the German party, and Trotsky did not esteem this leadership any higher than Lenin had in his heart-to-heart talk with Clara Zetkin. At a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Russian party in September, Trotsky delivered a speech which, according to the official report, greatly enraged all the members of the Committee. He asserted that the leadership of the German Communist Party was no good, that the Central Committee of this party was imbued with the spirit of fatalism and ridden with incompetence. As a consequence, they were condemning the German revolution to failure. This speech, as the report adds, ‘had a depressing effect on all those present’. ‘In order to win, the German leadership must have a precisely thought out and careful plan for the revolutionary overthrow’, Trotsky reminded the German party leadership. ‘The Communist Party cannot seize power by utilising the revolutionary movement from the sidelines but only by means of a direct and immediate political, organisational and military-technical leadership of the revolutionary masses’, he explained in an article in which he attempted to come to the aid of the German party. Finally Trotsky demanded, as Lenin had done six years previously in connection with Russia, that a definite date should be decided upon for the uprising in Germany.

Zinoviev and the German party leaders wavered. There was no talk of serious preparation for the uprising. Moscow’s part was to offer to send some experienced Russians to Germany to help the leadership of the German party. There followed an unpleasant surprise for Stalin and his collaborators. Because they were not aware of the change of power in Russia the leadership of the German party requested Trotsky! The bureaucratic triumvirate (Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev) declared, however, that Trotsky could not be spared in Russia and sent a delegation with Radek at its head.

In the meantime the leadership of the German party had made further blunders against which Lenin and Trotsky had expressly warned them at the Fourth World Congress in 1922 – they entered the Social Democratic governments in Saxony and Thuringia. At a time when the doors to power in all Germany would have opened to the Communist Party, if they had only known how to use the key in their hands, Brandler and Thalheimer knocked at the servants’ entrance and begged for a few ministerial positions in the powerless provincial governments! In the face of so much helplessness, the bourgeoisie regained its self-confidence. Ebert and Stresemann sent the Reichswehr to Dresden (Saxony) and Weimar (Thuringia) to depose the governments there.

The leadership of the Communist Party had boasted for a long time that such action on the part of the government would be the signal for the uprising. What really happened, Radek told at a plenary session of the ECCI before the Fifth World Congress. ‘When the ECCI representatives reached Dresden the night after the Reichswehr occupied the town, comrade Brandler stated that he had given the order to retreat, and if the ECCI representatives thought it wrong, he would submit without dispute (the couriers had not yet been sent out). When the ECCI representatives, after acquainting themselves with the situation, decided that it would be impossible to start the struggle, they approved the decision’. It should be added that the delegation of the ECCI, before its departure from Moscow, had been given the contents of a letter by Stalin in which the latter, for the first time making his powerful position in the Russian party felt in the field of the International, declared that the German party must be held back, not encouraged. So Brandler seemed to be covered on all sides when he gave his order to retreat. Because of some error the local leadership in Hamburg was notified too late; here several hundred battled with the Hamburg police for several days. In the rest of Germany they capitulated without a struggle. The German bourgeoisie had withstood its most difficult political crisis. For the German Communist Party the year 1923 signified the extension of the mistakes of 1921. At that time they wanted to assume the ’offensive’ in spite of the situation; now in the midst of the most advantageous situation they found themselves unable to act. The result was a new severe crisis in the party, in the course of which, with Zinoviev’s help, Fischer-Maslow – christened by Lenin ‘petty demagogues’ – came to the head of the party for some time. They introduced a decade of the disintegration of the German workers’ movement which ended in the triumph of Hitler in 1933.

It is questionable whether the result would have been different if the German party had started the uprising on a fixed date in October 1923. Just as it was certain that Trotsky was correct in his evaluation of the political crisis in Germany, so it was also certain that his attempt to correct the policies of the German party was too late. The conception of the German party was not adequate from the very beginning. Its relations to the masses and to itself were not sufficiently analysed and its practical, concrete policies were incorrect in all decisive events, beginning with January 1919, likewise in the Kapp Putsch (1920), the March Action (1921) and so too in the year 1923. The mistake of 1923 did not begin with the failure to organise the uprising but with 11 January, the day of the occupation of the Ruhr by French troops. Thanks to its unstable national-Bolshevik policies, the party was so disoriented in October that an attempt at uprising could hardly count on a successful outcome. With the German collapse the dream of world revolution was buried for a long time. Herein lies also the cause of the world revolutionist, Trotsky’s, downfall in Russia.

The reader may ask why. we attach so much importance to the history of the German movement and so completely neglect the history of other sections of the Comintern. The answer is that during these years Germany was the weakest link in the chain of capitalist countries, so that social revolution was most imminent there. The German party became involved in actual mass action and far-reaching political events, and its policies were the centre of the debates of the first five world congresses of the Comintern. The events in the German party were reflected in the other parties through Moscow. So the fate of the German party decided the fate of the Comintern.

A somewhat independent but also extremely brief role was played by the Italian party. The Italian Socialist Party, with the exception of Mussolini’s small group, had maintained a pacifist-tinted anti-chauvinist position during the World War. It thus found itself at odds with the Second International; and the entire party, from the right-reformist Turati to the ultra-left anti-parliamentarian Bordiga, had joined the Third International. This heterogeneous party was held together by the skilled tactician Serrati, an Italian Bebel. The attempt of the Executive of the Comintern to split this party and change its left wing into a Bolshevik party had little success. Such an attempt was doomed to failure, because between the centrist Serrati and the ultra-leftists around Bordiga and Bombacci there was a vacuum. Here also were lacking theoretically schooled and practically talented Marxists of great stature. When the Moscow Executive, in its battle with Serrati, threw its support to Bordiga-Bombacci, it strengthened those same tendencies against which Lenin had written his Left Wing Communism and against which Levi had waged war in Germany. The split in the Italian Socialist Party accomplished by Zinoviev’s messenger Rákosi at the congress in Livorno in 1921 was actually the overture to the March events in Germany. Italian radicalism remained bound in the chains of anti-parliamentarism, the traditional evil of the workers’ movement of the Romance countries, and suffered a lamentable ending very shortly. In spite of its great numerical weight Italian socialism, because of lack of decisive, consistent revolutionary politics, succumbed helplessly to the reckless rise of Mussolini. Italy anticipated the fate of the rest of Europe. This was all the more inescapable because the lessons of the Italian defeat were as little understood in Europe as the lessons of the Russian victory of October.

In Leon Trotsky’s autobiography the Communist International is hardly mentioned. So much the more space does the chapter on the Comintern take up his collected works. He always attributed the decisive reason for the defeat of his tendency in Russia to the defeat of the German revolution. Trotsky’s writings explain brilliantly just how the failure of the Communist International favoured the rise of the reactionary Soviet bureaucracy, and how this bureaucracy in turn finally destroyed the International. However, the question still remains open: Why had not Lenin and Trotsky succeeded in building a serious Marxist International during the period from 1917 to 1923?

Our historical analysis offers us the following answer to this question: the deep-rooted social democratic, fatalistic conception of revolution in Western Europe; the all-too-late unmasking of Kautskyism as the most skilled theoretical representative of this fatalism; the consequently delayed founding of the Communist International which, as a result, in its first years of existence showed revolutionary impatience in expecting the young, immature parties to accomplish the revolution; and, finally, the German March Action and the treatment of it by the Third World Congress, where form was placed above content, and a bureaucratic conception of discipline was sanctioned whereby the faith of the best Western European workers’ elements in the new International was shattered and the groundwork was laid for the catastrophic defeat of 1923.

NOTES
1. Lenin, Collected Works, vol.27, p.98.

2. ibid., p.232.

3. ibid., vol.28, p.75.

4. J. Degras, ed., The Communist International 1919-1943: Documents, vol.1, 1971, p. 52.

5. Lenin, Collected Works, vol.31, p.493.

6. ibid., vol.33, p.499.

7. The quotations are from Lenin’s What Is To Be Done? See Collected Works, vol.5, pp.461, 515.

8. See Luxemburg’s article Organisational Questions of Russian Social Democracy, in Selected Political Writings, 1972, pp.283-306.

9. Trotsky, The Permanent Revolution, 1962, p.49

10. This appears to be a loose paraphrase of the Soviet appeal of 11 November 1918, To all German workers’, soldiers’ and sailors’ councils. The original reads: ‘so long as you tolerate a government consisting of princes, capitalists and Scheldemanns, then you do not really have power. The Scheidemanns will sell you out to capital ... build a workers’, soldiers’ and sailors’ government headed by Liebknecht.’ See J. Riddell, ed., The German Revolution and the Debate on Soviet Power, 1986, pp.58-60.

11. Luxemburg’s critique of the Bolsheviks was written in 1918, but she was dissuaded from publishing it at the time. Under the title The Russian Revolution it was eventually published in 1922 by Paul Levi, after his expulsion from the Communist International.

12. Lenin, Collected Works, vol.29, p.271.

13. Levi accomplished the expulsion of the ultra-left at the KPD’s Second Congress in October 1919. The party’s total membership fell from 107,000 to less than half that figure.

14. Although Lenin agreed with Levi’s criticisms of the German ultra-left, he did not support their expulsion from the KPD. Lenin’s own approach to the ultra-leftists who had been attracted to the Communist International was to try and convince them through argument that their political methods were mistaken.

15. Lenin, Collected Works, vol.31, p.24.

16. ibid., p.31.

17. The motion calling for the formation of a new International was submitted by delegates from Austria, Sweden, Hungary and the Balkans. But it is generally agreed that the intervention of the Austrian delegate Karl Steinhardt was decisive in persuading the congress to launch the Third International. According to Steinhardt’s own account, it was Lenin who arranged for the Austrian party’s resolution to be put to the congress.

18. Writings of Leon Trotsky 1939-40, 1973, p.372.

19. See Theses, Resolutions and Manifestos of the First Four Congresses of the Third International, 1980, pp.92-7.

20. Although Martov did speak at the October 1920 Halle Congress, Zinoviev’s main opponent in the debate over Comintern affiliation was in fact Rudolf Hilferding, leader of the USPI) right wing.

21. Levi came into conflict with the Comintern representatives Rakosi and Kabakchiev over their role in carrying out a split in the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) at its Livorno conference in January 1921, as a result of which only a small minority of the PSI membership had been won over to the new Communist Party. Levi resigned from the KPD leadership in February after the Zentralausschuss (Central Commission) voted by 28 to 23 to condemn his position. Four of his supporters also resigned from the Zentrale in solidarity with Levi – Clara Zetkin, Ernst Däumig, Adolf Hoffman and Otto Brass.

22. The details of these provocations, the main responsibility for which lay with Hugo Eberlein, were revealed in documents seized by the police from Clara Zetkin while she was travelling to Moscow to the Communist International’s Third World Congress. The documents were published by the SPD in its paper Vorwärts and subsequently by the KPD itself in the pamphlet Die Enthüllungen zu den Märzkämpfen.

23. KPI) membership fell from 350,000 on the eve of the March Action to 180,000 in the summer of 1921.

24. H. Gruber, ed., International Communism in the Era of Lenin, 1967, p.320. This contains about half the text of Unser Weg: wider den Putschismus, a full English translation of which has yet to be published.

25. Protokoll des III. Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale, 1921, pp.183-4.

26. This is a quote from the ECCI statement of 6 April 1921. See Degras, The Communist International, vol.1, p. 218.

The justification for Levi’s expulsion was that he had broken discipline by publishing his attack on the party in Unser Weg: wider den Putschismus. Levi’s exaggerated description of the March Action as ‘the greatest Bakuninist putsch in all history’ gave ammunition to his enemies in the party, who accused him of lining up with the bourgeoisie and the Social Democrats against the KPD.

28. Although Zinoviev furiously denied that the ECCI was implicated, it is well established that the Executive’s representative Bela Kun, who arrived in Germany in late February, was involved in the decision to launch the March Action. He was probably acting with at least the tacit agreement of the ‘small bureau’ of the ECCI, which included Zinoviev, Bukharin and Radek. Lenin was informed of the ECCI’s involvement by Levi in a letter of 27 March, and replied that he ‘readily believed’ that Bela Kun had ‘defended the silly tactics, which were too much to the left – to take immediate action to help the Russians’ (Collected Works, vol.45, p.124). The possibility that Zinoviev’s support for an offensive in Western Europe was motivated by opposition to the NEP is mentioned by Pierre Broué in his Revolution en Allemagne, 1917-23, 1971, p.447.

29. See Trotsky, The Stalin School of Falsification, 1974, pp.26-7. Lenin and Trotsky, who were opposed to the March Action and the ultra-left politics which had given rise to it, won a narrow majority for their line in the CPSU Politbureau, but the Russian delegation to the Third World Congress was split down the middle. Lenin and Trotsky had the backing of Kamenev, while Zinoviev, Bukharin and Radek were supporters of the March Action. A compromise appears to have been reached with the agreement of Radek but against the protests of Zinoviev.

30. Protokoll des III. Kongresses, p.637. Trotsky’s speech dealing with the March Action can also be found in The First Five Years of the Communist International, vol. 1, 1973, pp.321-33.

31. Protokoll des 111. Kongresses, p.640.

32. ibid., pp.643, 645-6.

33. The March Action was based on the theory that the party could galvanise the passive masses by launching a ‘revolutionary offensive’. This idea apparently originated with August Thalheimer, who first advocated it at the KPD’s Fifth Congress in November 1920.

34. For the section of the Theses on Tactics dealing with the March Action, see Theses Resolutions and Manifestos of the First Four Congresses of the Third International, pp.290-1. A separate resolution, The March Events and the Communist Party of Germany, did not exactly ‘anathematise’ the KPD opposition but did direct its main fire against them rather than against the ultra-left. The KPD leadership was asked to ‘take a tolerant attitude’ to the oppositionists who were themselves given strict instructions to dissolve their factional organisation, place their publications under party control and cease collaboration with the expelled Levi (ibid., p.229).

35. Protokoll des III. Kongresses, p.671. Five delegations supported this statement – among the signatories were August Thalheimer for the KPD and Bela Kun for the Hungarian section.

36. Protokoll: Fünfter Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale, 1924, p.. 165. Radek is referring to the Open Letter of January 1921, for which he and Levi were both responsible. In it the KPD made a proposal to all the German workers’ organisations,including the SPD, for joint action around common objectives. The letter was thus an early example of the united front tactic later adopted by the Comintern as a whole. At an ECCI meeting on 21 February 1921, Zinoviev, Bukharin and Béla Kun all opposed the Open Letter, and only as result of Lenin’s intervention were they dissuaded from issuing a statement condemning it. Instead the question was ‘left open for discussion’. See B. Fowkes, Communism in Germany under the Weimar Republic, 1984, p. 58.

37. Protokoll: Fiinfier Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale, p.468.

38. Protokoll des III. Kongresses, p.662.

39. This isn’t strictly true. Clara Zetkin was present at the Third Congress and vigorously defended Levi’s position. Other delegates who spoke in support of Levi and his political line were Heinrich Malzalin and Paul Neumann.

40. Protokoll des III. Kongresses, pp.665-6.

41. ibid., p. 662.

42. P. Levi, Der Parteitag der VKPD, Unser Weg (Sowjet), August 1921.

43. The quotations are from Clara Zetkin’s Erinnerungen an Lenin, 1957, pp. 28-51. The book was first published in 1924 and has appeared in various editions and translations as Reminiscences of Lenin. Lenin supported most of Levi’s criticisms of the KPD leadership’s role in the March Action, but he denied that it had been a putsch.

44. Trotsky recounts this exchange in Who is Leading the Comintern Today?, The Challenge of the Left Opposition 1928-29, 1981, p.188.

45. Levi formed a small organisation called the Kommunistischer Arbeitsgemeinschaft (KAG) after his expulsion from the Comintern. In 1922 the KAG fused with the rump of the USPD, which itself rejoined the SPD later that year. Levi was part of the left wing in the SPD, whose other leading figure was Kurt Rosenfeld. After Levi’s death a major section of this SPD left wing broke away to form the Sozialistischer Arbeiterpartei (SAP).

46. Whether Levi in fact committed suicide is uncertain. He was suffering from a fever and may have fallen from the window accidentally. It is even possible that he was murdered, for at the time of his death he was engaged in an investigation into the assassinations of Luxemburg and Liebknecht.

47. Lenin, Collected Works, vol.33, pp.208-9. Lenin made the same point in August 1921 in his letter to the KPD’s Jena Congress (ibid., vol.32, p.518).

48. C. Zetkin, Erinnerungen an Lenin, 1957, pp.50-1.

49. ibid., pp.43-4,

50. Däumig and Geyer left the KPD with Levi. Hoffman, Brass and Mahlzahn broke with the party in support of Ernst Friesland, who was expelled in December 1921 for opposing ECCI interference in the German party. The Friesland group joined Levi’s KAG. The speech Held quotes was in fact made by Radek.

51. Zetkin, Erinnerungen, pp.55-6.

52. Radek’s speech was published as Leo Schlageter – the Wanderer into the Void, in Labour Monthly September 1923.

53. Trotsky, My Life, 1975, pp.501, 504, 505-6

54. ibid., p.501.

55. Marx-Engels, Selected Correspondence, 1975, p.267.

56. The report is quoted by Trotsky in The Third International After Lenin, 1970, p.94.

57. Can a Counterrevolution or a Revolution be Made on Schedule?, in The First Five Years of the Communist International, vol.2, p.349.

58. In fairness to the KPD leadership, it should be pointed out that their entry into the governments of Saxony and Thuringia was part of the preparations for the seizure of power, and was carried out under instructions from the Comintern.

59. at the Russian party’s Thirteenth Congress in January 1924.

60. Degras, The Communist International, vol. 2 p. 71. The ECCI delegates were Radek and Pyatakov.

61. For Stalin’s letter see The Third International After Lenin, pp.319-20, and The Stalin School of Falsification, p.154. The letter was addressed to Zinoviev and Bukharin and appears to have been written shortly before the KPD’s ‘Anti-Fascist Day’ on 29 July.

62. Here Held repeats Trotsky’s analysis of the 1923 events. Contrary to anti-Trotskyist mythology, Trotsky’s view was not that the KPD had been wrong to call off the planned uprising in October 1923 but rather that the party’s mistaken policies during the earlier part of the year had made the retreat necessary. See The Challenge of the Left Opposition 1923-25, 1975, pp.94-5, 170-1. Trotsky repeated this point in discussion with SAP leader Jakob Walcher in 1933 – see Revolutionary History, vol.5 no.2, 1994, p.99.

*The Question Of The Stillborn German Revolution Of 1923-Part Two- German Communist Party Leader August Thalheimer- 1923: A Missed Opportunity? The German October Legend And The Real History Of 1923 (1931)

Click on the headline to link to an online copy of 1923: A Missed Opportunity? The German October Legend and the Real History of 1923 by August Thalheimer. Here again it was too long to place in this space.

Markin comment:The Bolshevik-led revolution in Russia in October 1917 was consciously predicated by the leadership (Lenin, Trotsky, etc., some others pushing forward, some being dragged along in the fight) on the premise that the Russian revolution would not, could not, stand alone for long either against the backlash onslaught of world imperialism, or on a more positive note, once the tasks of socialist construction reached a certain point. The purpose of the Communist International, founded in 1919 in the heat of the Russian civil war, by the Bolsheviks and their international supporters was the organizational expression of that above-mentioned premise. To work through and learn the lessons of the Bolshevik experience and to go all out to defeat world imperialism and create a new social order. I might add that political, social, and military conditions in war-weary World War I Europe in 1918 and 1919 made those premises something more than far-fetched utopian hopes. And central to those hopes were events in Germany.

If the original premise of Marxism (espoused specifically by both Marx and Engels in their respective political lifetimes) that the revolution would break out in an advanced capitalist European country then Germany, with its high level of capitalist development and socialist traditions and organizations, was the logical place to assume such an event would occur. And that premise, despite the betrayals of the German social democratic leadership in the war period, animated Lenin and Trotsky in their planning for the extension of socialist revolution westward. The rise of a “peace” socialist wing (the Independent Socialists) during the late phases of the war, the events around the smashing of the German monarchy and the creation of a socialist-led bourgeois republic in the wake of military defeat, the ill-starred Spartacist uprising, the working class response to the later Kapp Putsch, the also-ill-starred March Action of 1921, and the possibilities of a revolution in 1923 in reaction to the French exactions in the Ruhr and other events that year all made for a period of realistic revolutionary upheaval that was fertile ground for revolutionaries. And revolutionary hopes.

As we are painfully, no, very painfully, aware no revolution occurred in that period and that hard fact had profound repercussions on the then isolated Russian experiment. That hard fact has also left a somewhat unresolved question among communist militants, thoughtful communist militants anyway, about the prospects then. The question boils down to, as foreshadowed in the headline to this entry, whether there was any basis for the notion that a revolution could have occurred in Germany in 1923. We know what happened because it didn’t, but there are sometimes valuable conditionals pose in absorbing the lessons of history, our communist history. The yes or no of a German revolution is one such question. I have given my opinion previously-if there was no chance of revolution in Germany in 1923, win or lose, then the whole notion of proletarian revolution was just a utopian dream of a bunch of European outcast radicals. The corollary to that proposition is that, in the year 2010, the socialist cooperative notion that we fight for, other than as an abstract intellectual idea, is utopian, and that we are the mad grandchildren (and great-grandchildren) of those mad Europeans. That idea, with world imperialism wreaking havoc and breathing down our backs relentlessly in all quarters makes that corollary ill-founded. So let’s take another look at Germany 1923 from the several perspectives I have gathered in today’s postings.