NEW
WARS / OLD WARS –
What Could Possibly Go Wrong?
I subscribe to a
service of the US State Department which emails statements and reports regarding
US relations in the Middle East. On Tuesday I got six notices in quick
succession entitled U.S.
Security Cooperation With Oman, U.S.
Security Cooperation With the United Arab Emirates, …Saudi
Arabia, …Bahrain, …Kuwait, …Qatar,
detailing arms sales, basing rights, joint military exercises and training
worth many tens of $billions. Question: Which one of these countries is ruled
by an intolerant, autocratic regime? Answer: all of the above.
SYRIA’S
CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES: How Does It Work and How are Factions
Reacting?
At
midnight on February 27, the guns fell silent in Syria—at least temporarily.
With numerous allegations of breaches beginning to surface, Syria’s ceasefire is already on shaky ground. This cessation
of hostilities, as it is formally called, followed two weeks of intensive
negotiations between the United States and Russia. Just before the clock struck
twelve, their efforts reached fruition when the UN Security Council unanimously
approved resolution 2268, endorsing a
Russian-American agreement from February 22 and demanding that Syrian and
international actors comply… Groups listed as terrorists by the UN Security
Council were automatically excluded. They include the self-proclaimed Islamic
State, the al-Qaeda-aligned Nusra Front, and a few other small organizations and
individuals on the jihadi fringes of Syria’s Sunni insurgency… War against the
Islamic State is not necessarily disruptive for the rest of Syria, as its
territory is fairly well delineated from other factions and it has no allies who
could take offense. The Nusra Front, however, is another matter entirely. It is
deeply embedded within the Sunni Islamist landscape, particularly in
northern Syria. Russian, Syrian, and American airstrikes that target the group
often end up hitting other factions as well, not to mention civilians. These
attacks always meet with howls of protest from the broader opposition, often
including factions backed by the United States. More
Building
on the Syrian Truce
The
best feasible outcomes for Syria in the foreseeable future, alongside continued
armed opposition to extremist groups and especially ISIS, would have the nature
of a frozen conflict. Frozen conflicts are unsatisfying and offensive to the
principles of national unity and territorial integrity, but they sometimes are
better than the available alternatives. They can lead to enough long-term
stability to get a conflict out of the headlines and off policy-makers' front
burner… The main underlying principle in addressing the Syrian problem and
trying to nurse a fragile truce into being something a little less fragile is
that it is the war itself, far more than any particular internal political
outcome or distribution of power, that has made Syria a problem for
international security, with threats of spreading regional instability and
far-flung violent extremism. More
GARETH
PORTER: 'Plan B' and the Bankruptcy of US Syria Policy
US
Secretary of State John Kerry provoked widespread speculation when he referred
in testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee last
week to “significant discussions” within US President
Barack Obama’s administration about a “Plan B” in Syria. The speculation was
further stoked by a “senior official” who told CBS News that options under consideration included
“‘military-like’ measures that would make it harder for the regime and its
allies to continue their assault on civilians and US-backed rebels.” …”. In
other words, the administration’s national security policymakers believe
something more should be done in Syria, but they are not at all clear what could
be done now. The official said three options were under discussion, none of
which is even close to being realistic in the present situation: an increase in
US Special Forces on the ground, an increase in arms assistance to fighters
opposing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and a no-fly zone.
More
US
Protecting al-Qaeda
In
UN
Security Council Resolution 2254, in which it was articulated that member
states be committed to the “sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial
integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic,” while calling on them to suppress ISIS,
al-Nusra, and “all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities
associated with Al Qaeda or ISIL”, it was also agreed upon that the Security
Council “expresses its support for a nationwide ceasefire in Syria.” …Yet when
push came to shove the main stumbling-block in the way of the CoH
[Cessation-of-Hostilities] was the oppositions demand that any truce be “conditional on the al Qaeda-linked Nusra Front no longer being
targeted.” Sources close to the talks would tell Reuters that this
insistence was the main “elephant in the room” preventing a settlement… “The
West does not actually hand the weapons to al-Qaeda, let alone ISIS,” he said,
“but the system that they have constructed leads precisely to that end. The
weapons conduit that the West directly has been giving to groups such as the
Syrian Free Army (FSA), have been understood to be a sort of ‘Wal Mart’ from
which the more radical groups would be able to take their weapons and pursue the
jihad.” More
Turkey,
Kurds, and the US
There
is no question that tensions between Turkey and the
US have increased substantially as a result of differences over to what degree
the US is supporting the Syrian Kurdish nationalist Democratic Union Party (PYD) and
its armed affiliate, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), which are the
strongest political and most effective forces fighting the Islamic State (IS)
and some of its affiliated groups in Syria. The PYD/YPG are also the strongest
entities among the 14 competing Kurdish nationalist organizations in Syria… When
Turkey and the US came to an agreement in July 2014 that allowed the US and NATO
air forces to use the ?ncirlik Air Base, enabling these forces to more
effectively attack IS, it seemed to patch up differences between Ankara and
Washington regarding Turkey’s low-profile strategy against IS. But as it turned
out, Ankara interpreted the agreement as a license to attack PKK bases in
northern Iraq as well as within Turkey. More
US
Counterterror Strategy in Yemen Has Crashed and Burned
As
they faced off with al-Qaeda in Yemen, US Presidents George W.
Bush and Barack Obama publicly praised the commitment of their
counterparts, Yemeni Presidents Ali Abdullah Saleh and Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi,
to combat terrorism. But in reality Yemen’s government appears to have privately
colluded with Islamist militants, allowing major prison breaks of al-Qaeda
operatives in both 2006 and 2014… The US used airstrikes to attack al-Qaeda in
Yemen without deploying significant ground forces. Some al-Qaeda operatives have
been killed under the program, but targeted killings ultimately generated huge
resentment and fed support for anti-Western militants. Local media have described drone attacks as massacres, and jihadi online fora
have been filled with pictures of victims’ bodies. Al-Qaeda leaders have grieved with victims’ families and accused the US of waging war against all Muslims.
More
What
the New York Times won’t tell you about the American adventure in
Ukraine
Ukraine
has gone from political crisis to armed conflict to humanitarian crisis with no
break in the regress since the American-cultivated coup in February 2014. But
for many months now we have had before us a textbook example of what I call the
Power of Leaving Out. The most daring attempt at “regime change” since righteous
Clintonians invented this self-deceiving euphemism in the 1990s has come to
six-figure casualties, mass deprivation, a divided nation and a wrecked
economy. If you abide within the policy cliques or the corporate-owned media, it
is best to go quiet as long as you can in the face of such eventualities. The
short of it, readers, is that all three chickens now take up their roosts at
once: The Poroshenko government is on the brink of collapse, neo-Nazi extremists
have forced it to renew hostilities in the east and there is no letup in the
blockade Kiev imposes on rebelling regions. The last differs from a punitive
starvation strategy only in degree. The very short of it is that the more or
less complete failure of Washington’s most adventurous assertion of power in the
post-Cold War period can no longer be papered over. More
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