Markin Comment:
March 18th is the anniversary of the Paris Commune. All
honor to the men and women who fought to the death to defend this first beacon
of working class revolution.
Remarks of a speaker at an event commemorating the heroic Paris Commune in March 2007:
I
would like make a few comments in honor of the heroic Communards.
When one studies the history of the Paris Commune of 1871 one learns something new from it even though from the perspective of revolutionary strategy the Communards made virtually every mistake in the book. However, one can learn its lessons and measure it against the experience acquired by later revolutionary struggles and above all by later revolutions, not only the successful Russian Revolution of October 1917 but the failed German, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Chinese and Spanish revolutions in the immediate aftermath of World War I. More contemporaneously we have the experiences of the partial victories of the later Chinese, Cuban and Vietnamese revolutions.
Notwithstanding the contradictory nature of these later experiences, as if to show that history is not always totally a history of horrors against the fate of the masses we honor the Paris Commune as a beacon of the coming world proletarian revolution. It is just for that reason that Karl Marx fought tooth and nail in the First International to defend it against the rage of capitalist
Below is a tribute to the Paris
Commune written by the Bolshevik Revolutionary Leon Trotsky in 1921 in Russian
and later translated into English in the New International in March 1935, Volume 2, No. 2
LESSONS OF THE PARIS
COMMUNE
EACH
TIME that we study the history of the Commune we see it from a new aspect, thanks to the
experience acquired by the later revolutionary struggles and above all by the latest revolutions, not only
the Russian but the German and Hungarian revolutions. The Franco-German
war was a bloody explosion, harbinger of an immense world slaughter, the
Commune of Paris a lightning harbinger of a
world proletarian revolution.
The
Commune shows us the heroism of the working masses, their capacity to unite into a single
bloc, their talent to sacrifice themselves in the name of the future, but at
the same time it shows us the incapacity of the masses to choose their path,
their indecision in the leadership of the movement, their fatal penchant to come to a halt after the first
successes, thus permitting the enemy to regain its breath, to reestablish its position.
The
Commune came too late. It had all the possibilities of taking the power on
September 4 and that would have permitted the proletariat of Paris
to place itself at a single stroke at the head of the workers of the country in their
struggle against all the forces of the
past, against Bismarck
as well as against Thiers. But the
power fell into the hands of the democratic praters, the deputies of Paris . The Parisian
proletariat had neither a party, nor leaders to whom it would have been closely
bound by previous struggles. The petty bourgeois patriots who thought
themselves socialists and sought the support of the workers did not really have
any confidence in themselves. They shook the proletariat's faith in itself,
they were continually in quest of celebrated
lawyers, of journalists, of deputies, whose baggage consisted only of a
dozen vaguely revolutionary phrases, in order to entrust them with the leadership of the movement.
The reason why Jules
Favre, Picard, Gamier-Pages and Co. took power in Paris on September 4 is the same as that
which permitted Pall-Boncour, A. Varenne,
Renaudel and numerous others to be for a time the masters of the party of
the proletariat. The Renaudels and the Boncours and even the Longuets and the Pressemanes are much closer, by virtue of
their sympathies, their intellectual habits and their conduct, to the
Jules Favres and the Jules Ferrys than to the revolutionary proletariat. Their
socialist phraseology is nothing but an historic mask which permits them to
impose themselves upon the masses. And it is just because Favre, Simon, Picard
and the others used and abused a democratico-liberal phraseology that their
sons and their grandsons are obliged to resort to a socialist phraseology. But
the sons and the grandsons have remained worthy of their fathers and continue
their work. And when it will be necessary to decide not the question of the
composition of a ministerial clique but the much more important question of knowing what class in France must take power,
Renaudel, Varenne, Longuet and their similars will be in the camp of
Millerand-collaborator of Galliffet, the butcher of the Commune .... When the revolutionary babblers of
the salons and of parliament find themselves face to face, in real life, with the revolution, they never recognize it.
The
workers' party-the real one-is not a machine for parliamentary manoeuvres, it
is the accumulated and organized experience of the proletariat. It is only with the aid
of the party, which rests upon the whole history of its past, which foresees
theoretically the paths of development, all its stages, and which extracts from
it the necessary formula of action, that the proletariat frees itself from the
need of always recommencing its history: its hesitations, its lack of decision, its mistakes.
The proletariat of Paris did not have such a
party. The bourgeois socialists with whom the Commune swarmed, raised their eyes
to heaven, waited for a miracle or else a prophetic word, hesitated, and during
that time the masses groped about and lost their heads because of the
indecision of some and the fantasy of others. The result was that the
revolution broke out in their very midst,
too late, and Paris
was encircled. Six months elapsed before the proletariat had
reestablished in its memory the lessons of past revolutions, of battles of yore, of the reiterated betrayals of democracy-and
it seized power.
These six months
proved to be an irreparable loss. If the centralized party of revolutionary
action had been found at the head of the proletariat of France in September 1870, the whole history of France and with
it the whole history of humanity would have
taken another direction.
If
the power was found in the hands of the proletariat of Paris
on March 18, it was not because it had been deliberately seized, but because its enemies
had quitted Paris .
These latter were
losing ground continuously, the workers despised and detested them, the petty
bourgeoisie no longer had confidence in them and the big bourgeoisie feared
that they were no longer capable of defending it. The soldiers were hostile to
the officers. The government fled Paris
in order to concentrate its forces elsewhere. And it was then that the
proletariat became master of the situation.
But it understood this
fact only on the morrow. The revolution fell upon it unexpectedly.
This first success was
a new source of passivity. The enemy had fled to Versailles . Wasn't that a victory? At that
moment the governmental band could have been crushed almost without the
spilling of blood. In Paris ,
all the ministers, with Thiers at their head, could have been taken prisoner.
Nobody would have raised a hand to defend them. It was not done. There was no organization of a centralized party, having a
rounded view of things and special organs
for realizing its decisions.
The debris of the
infantry did not want to fall back to Versailles .
The thread which tied the officers and the soldiers was pretty tenuous. And had
there been a directing party center at Paris, it would have incorporated into
the retreating armies-since there was the
possibility of retreating-a few hundred or even a few dozen devoted
workers, and given them the following instructions: enhance the discontent of
the soldiers against the officers, profit by the first favorable psychological
moment to free the soldiers from their officers and bring them back to Paris to
unite with the people. This could easily have been realized, according to the
admissions of Thiers' supporters themselves. Nobody even thought of it. Nor was
there anybody to think of it. In the midst of great events, moreover, such
decisions can be adopted only by a revolutionary party which looks forward to a
revolution, prepares for it, does not lose its head, by a party which is accustomed to having a rounded view and
is not afraid to act.
And
a party of action is just what the French proletariat did not have.
The Central Committee
of the National Guard is in effect a Council of Deputies of the armed workers
and the petty bourgeoisie. Such a Council, elected
directly by the masses who have taken the revolutionary road, represents an
excellent apparatus of action. But at the same time, and just because of its
immediate and elementary connection with the masses who are in the state in
which the revolutionary has found them, it reflects not only all the strong
sides but also the weak sides of the masses, and it reflects at first the weak
sides still more than it does the strong:
it manifests the spirit of indecision, of waiting, the tendency to be inactive after the first
successes.
The Central Committee of the National
Guard needed to be led. It was indispensable
to have an organization incarnating the political experience of the proletariat and always
present-not only in the Central Committee, but in the legions, in the battalion,
in the deepest sectors of the French proletariat. By means of the Councils of
Deputies-in the given case they were organs of the National Guard-the party could have been in continual contact with the
masses, known their state of mind; its leading center con! I each
day put forward a slogan which, through the medium of the party's militants,
would have penetrated into the masses,
uniting their thought and their will.
Hardly
had the government fallen back to Versailles
than the National Guard hastened to unload its responsibility, at the very
moment when this responsibility was enormous. The Central Committee
imagined "legal" elections to the Commune. It entered into negotiations
with the mayors of Paris
in order to cover itself, from the Right,
with "legality".
Had a violent attack
been prepared against Versailles
at the same time, the negotiations with the mayors would have been a ruse fully
justified from the military standpoint and in conformity with the goal. But in
reality, these negotiations were being conducted only in order to avert the
struggle by some miracle or other. The petty bourgeois radicals and the
socialistic idealists, respecting "legality" and the men who embodied
a portion of the "legal" state-the deputies, the mayors, etc.-hoped
at the bottom of their souls that Thiers would
halt respectfully before revolutionary Paris the minute the latter covered itself with the "legal" Commune.
Passivity
and indecision were supported in this case by the sacred principle of federation and
autonomy. Paris ,
you see, is only one commune among many other communes. Paris wants to impose nothing upon anyone; it
does not struggle for the dictatorship,
unless it be for the 'dictatorship of example".
In sum, it was nothing
but an attempt to replace the proletarian revolution, which was developing, by a petty bourgeois reform: communal autonomy.
The real revolutionary task consisted
of assuring the proletariat the power all over the country. Paris had to serve as its
base, its support, its stronghold. And to attain this goal, it was necessary to vanquish Versailles
without the loss of time and to send
agitators, organizers, and armed forces throughout France . It was necessary to
enter into contact with sympathizers, to strengthen the hesitators and to
shatter the opposition of the adversary. Instead of this policy of offensive
and aggression which was the only thing
that could save the situation, the leaders of Paris attempted to seclude themselves in
their communal autonomy: they will not attack the others if the others do not
attack them; each town has its sacred right
of self-government. This idealistic chatter-of the same gender as mundane anarchism covered up in reality a cowardice in
face of revolutionary action which should have been conducted
incessantly up to the very end, for otherwise it should not have been begun.
The hostility to capitalist
organization-a heritage of petty bourgeois localism and autonomism-is without a
doubt the weak side of a certain section of the French proletariat. Autonomy for the
districts, for the wards, for the battalions, for the towns, is the supreme
guarantee of real activity and individual independence for certain revolutionists.
But that is a great mistake which cost the
French proletariat dearly.
Under the form of the
"struggle against despotic centralism" and against "stifling" discipline, a fight takes
place for the self preservation of various groups and sub-groupings of
the working class, for their petty interests, with their petty ward leaders and
their local oracles. The entire working class, while preserving its cultural
originality and its political nuances, can act methodically and firmly, without
remaining in the tow of events, and directing each time its mortal blows
against the weak sectors of its enemies, on the condition that at its head,
above the wards, the districts, the groups, there is an apparatus which is
centralized and bound together by an iron discipline. The tendency towards
particularism, whatever the form it may assume, is a heritage of the dead past.
The sooner French communist-socialist communism and syndicalist communism-emancipates itself from it, the better it will be
for the proletarian revolution.
The
party does not create the revolution at will, it does not choose the moment for
seizing power as it likes, but it intervenes actively in the events, penetrates
at every
moment the state of mind of the revolutionary masses and evaluates the power of
resistance of the enemy, and thus determines the most favorable moment for
decisive action. This is the most difficult side of its task. The party has no
decision that is valid for every case. Needed are a correct theory, an intimate
contact with the masses, the comprehension of the situation, a revolutionary perception, a great resoluteness.
The more profoundly a revolutionary party penetrates into all the
domains of the proletarian struggle, the more unified it is by the unity of
goal and discipline, the speedier and better will
it arrive at resolving its task.
The difficulty
consists in having this organization of a centralized party, internally welded
by an iron discipline, linked intimately with the movement of the masses, with
its ebbs and flows. The conquest of power cannot be achieved save on the condition of a powerful revolutionary
pressure of the toiling masses. But in this act the element of
preparation is entirely inevitable. The better the party will understand the
conjuncture and the moment, the better the bases of resistance will be prepared, the better the force and the roles will be
distributed, the surer will be the
success and the less victims will it cost. The correlation of a carefully prepared action and a mass movement is
the politico-strategical task of the
taking of power.
The comparison of
March 18, 1871 with November 7, 1917 is very instructive from
this point of view. In Paris ,
there is an absolute lack of initiative for action on the part of the
leading revolutionary circles. The proletariat, armed by the bourgeois
government, is in reality master of the town, has all the material means
of power-cannon and rifles-at its disposal, but it is not aware of it. The bourgeoisie
makes an attempt to retake the weapon of the giant: it wants to steal the
cannon of the proletariat. The attempt fails. The government flees in panic from
Paris to Versailles .
The field is clear. But it is only on the morrow that the proletariat
understands that it is the master of Paris .
The "leaders" are in the wake of
events, they record them when the latter are already accomplished, and they do
everything in their power to blunt the revolutionary edge.
In Petrograd ,
the events developed differently. The party moved firmly, resolutely, to the seizure of power, having its
men everywhere, consolidating each
position, extending every fissure between the workers and the garrison on the one side and the government on the other.
The
armed demonstration of the July days is a vast reconnoitering conducted by the party to sound
the degree of close contact between the masses and the power of resistance of
the enemy. The reconnoitering is transformed into a struggle of outposts. We
are thrown back, but at the same time the action establishes a connection between the party and the depths of the
masses. The months of August,
September and October see a powerful revolutionary flux. The party
profits by it and augments considerably its points of support in the working
class and the garrison. Later, the harmony between the conspirative preparations and the mass action takes place
almost automatically. The Second Congress
of the Soviets is fixed for November '. All our preceding agitation was to lead to the seizure of power by the Congress.
Thus, the overturn was adapted in advance to November 7. This fact was
well known and understood by the enemy.
Kerensky and his councillors could not fail to make efforts to consolidate themselves, to however small an extent, in Petrograd for the decisive moment. Also, they stood in need of shipping out of the
capital the most revolutionary sections
of the garrison. We on our part profited by this attempt by Kerensky in order to make it the source of a new conflict
which had a decisive importance. We openly accused the Kerensky
government-our accusation subsequently found a written confirmation in an
official document-of having planned the removal
of a third of the Petrograd garrison not out of military considerations but for the purpose of counter-revolutionary
combinations. This conflict bound us
still more closely to the garrison and put before the latter a well-defined
task, to support the Soviet Congress
fixed for November 7. And since the government insisted-even if in a
feeble enough manner-that the garrison be sent off, we created in the Petrograd
Soviet, already in our hands, a Revolutionary War Committee, on the pretext of verifying the military reasons for the
governmental plan.
Thus we had a purely military organ,
standing at the head of the Petrograd garrison, which was in reality a legal organ of
armed insurrection. At the same time we designated (communist)
commissars in all the military units, in the military
stores, etc. The clandestine military organization accomplished specific technical
tasks and furnished the Revolutionary War Committee with fully trustworthy militants for important military
tasks. The essential work concerning the preparation, the realization
and the armed insurrection took place openly, and so methodically and naturally
that the bourgeoisie, led by Kerensky, did not clearly understand what was
taking place under their very eyes. (In Paris ,
the proletariat understood only on the following day that it had been really victorious-a victory which it had
not, moreover, deliberately sought-that it was master of the situation.
In Petrograd , it was the contrary. Our party,
basing itself on the workers and the garrison, had already seized the power,
the bourgeoisie passed a fairly tranquil night and learned only on the
following morning that the helm of the
country was in the hands of its gravedigger.)
As
to strategy, there were many differences of opinion in our party.
A part of the Central
Committee declared itself, as is known, against the taking of power, believing
that the moment had not yet arrived, that Petrograd
was detached from the rest of the country,
the proletariat from the peasantry, etc.
Other
comrades believed that we were not attributing sufficient importance to the
elements of military complot. One of the members of the Central Committee demanded in October
the surrounding of the Alexandrine Theater where the Democratic Conference was in session, and the proclamation of the
dictatorship of the Central Committee of the party. He said: in concentrating
our agitation as well as our preparatory military work for the moment of
the Second Congress, we are showing our plan to the adversary, we are giving
him the possibility of preparing himself and even of dealing us a preventive
blow. But there is no doubt that the attempt at a military complot and the surrounding
of the Alexandrine Theater would have been
a fact too alien to the development of the events, that it would have been an event disconcerting to the masses.
Even in the Petrograd Soviet, where our faction dominated, such an
enterprise, anticipating the logical development of the struggle, would have
provoked great disorder at that moment, above all among the garrison where
there were hesitant and not very trustful regiments, primarily the cavalry
regiments. It would have been much easier for Kerensky to crush a complot
unexpected by the masses than to attack the garrison consolidating itself more
and more on its positions: the defense of its inviolability in the name of the
future Congress of the Soviets. Therefore the majority of the Central Committee
rejected the plan to surround the Democratic Conference and it was right. The
conjuncture was very well judged: the armed
insurrection, almost without bloodshed, triumphed exactly on the date,
fixed in advance and openly, for the convening of the Second Soviet Congress.
This strategy cannot, however, become a
general rule, it requires specific conditions. Nobody believed any longer in
the war with the Germans, and the less
revolutionary soldiers did not want to quit Petrograd
for the front. And even if the garrison as a whole was on the side of the
workers for this single reason, it became stronger in its point of view
to the extent that Kerensky's machinations were revealed. But this mood of the Petrograd garrison had a still deeper cause in the
situation of the peasant class and in the development of the imperialist war. Had there been a
split in the garrison and had Kerensky obtained the possibility of support from
a few regiments, our plan would have failed. The elements of purely military
complot (conspiracy and great speed of action) would have prevailed. It would
have been necessary, of course, to choose another
moment for the insurrection.
The
Commune also had the complete possibility of winning even the peasant regiments,
for the latter had lost all confidence and all respect for the power and the
command. Yet it undertook nothing towards this end. The fault here is not in the
relationships of the peasant and the working classes, but in the revolutionary strategy.
What will be the
situation in this regard in the European countries in the present epoch? It is
not easy to foretell anything on this score. Yet, with the events developing
slowly and the bourgeois governments exerting all their efforts to utilize past experiences, it may be foreseen that the proletariat,
in order to attract the sympathies
of the soldiers, will have to overcome a great and well organized resistance at a given moment. A
skillful and well~ timed attack on the part
of the revolution will then be necessary. The duty of the party is to prepare itself
for it. That is just why it must maintain and develop its character of a
centralized organization, which openly guides the revolutionary movement of the
masses and is at the same time a clandestine apparatus of the armed insurrection.
The question of the
electibility of the command was one of the reasons of the conflict between the
National Guard and Thiers. Paris
refused to accept the command designated by Thiers. Varlin subsequently
formulated the demand that the command of the National Guard, from top to
bottom, ought to be elected by the National Guardsmen themselves. That is where
the Central Committee of the National Guard
found its support.
This question must he
envisaged from two sides: from the political and the military sides, which are
interlinked but which should be distinguished. The political task consisted in purging the National Guard of the counterrevolutionary
command. Complete electibility was the only means for it, the majority of the
National Guard being composed of workers and revolutionary petty bourgeois. And
in addition, the motto "electibility of the command", being extended also to the infantry, Thiers would have
been deprived at a single stroke of his essential weapon, the
counterrevolutionary officers. In order to realize this plan, a party
organization, having its men in all the military units, was required. In a
word, electibility in this ease had as its immediate task not to give good
commanders to the batallions, but to liberate them from commanders devoted to
the bourgeoisie. Electibility served as a wedge for splitting the army into two
parts, along class lines. Thus did matters occur with its in the period of Kerensky, above all on the eve of October.
But the liberation of
the army from the old commanding apparatus inevitably involves the weakening of
organizational cohesion and the diminution of combative power. As a rule, the
elected command is pretty weak from the technico-military standpoint and with
regard to the maintenance of order and of discipline. Thus, at the moment when
the army frees itself from the old counterrevolutionary command which oppressed
it, the question arises of giving it a revolutionary command capable of
fulfilling its mission. And this question can
by no means be resolved by simple elections. Before wide masses of soldiers acquire
the experience of well choosing and selecting commanders, the revolution will
be beaten by the enemy which is guided in the choice of its command by the
experience of centuries. The methods of shapeless democracy (simple
electibility) must be supplemented and to a certain extent replaced by measures
of selection from above. The revolution must create an organ composed of
experienced, reliable organizers, in which one can have absolute confidence, give it full powers to choose,
designate and educate the command. If particularism and democratic
autonomism are extremely dangerous to the proletarian revolution in general,
they are ten times more dangerous ¥to the army.
We saw that in the tragic example of the Commune.
The Central Committee
of the National Guard drew its authority from democratic electibility. At the
moment when the Central Committee needed to develop
to the maximum its initiative in the offensive, deprived of the leadership of
a proletarian party, it lost its head, hastened to transmit its powers to the
representatives of the Commune which required a broader democratic basis. And
it was a great mistake in that period to play with elections. But once the
elections had been held and the Commune brought together, ft was necessary to
concentrate everything in the Commune at a single blow and to have it create an
organ possessing real power to reorganize the National Guard. This was not the case. By the side of the elected Commune there
remained the Central Committee; the elected character of the latter gave
it a political authority thanks to which it was able to compete with the
Commune. But at the same time that deprived it of the energy and the firmness
necessary in the purely military questions which, after the organization of the
Commune, justified its existence. Electibility, democratic methods, are but one
of the instruments in the hands of the proletariat and its party. Electibility
can in no wise be a fetish, a remedy for all evils.
The methods of electibility must be combined with those of appointments. The
power of the Commune came from the elected National Guard. But once created,
the Commune should have reorganized with a strong hand the National Guard, from
top to bottom, given it reliable leaders and established a regime of very
strict discipline. The Commune did not do this, being itself deprived of a powerful revolutionary directing center. It too
was crushed.
We can thus thumb the whole history of
the Commune, page by page, and we will find in it one single lesson: a strong
party leadership is needed. More than any other proletariat has the French made
sacrifices for the revolution. But also more than any other has it been duped.
Many times has the bourgeoisie dazzled it with all the colors
of republicanism, of radicalism, of socialism, so as always to fasten
upon it the fetters of capitalism. By means of its agents, its lawyers and its journalists, the
bourgeoisie has put forward a whole mass of democratic, parliamentary,
autonomist formulae which are nothing but impediments on the feet of the proletariat, hampering its forward
movement.
The temperament of the
French proletariat is a revolutionary lava. But this lava is now covered with
the ashes of skepticism result of numerous deceptions and disenchantments.
Also, the revolutionary proletarians of France must be severer towards
their party and unmask more pitilessly any non-conformity between word and
action. The French workers have need of an organization, strong as steel, with
leaders controlled by the masses at every new stage of the revolutionary movement.
How
much time will history afford us to prepare ourselves? We do not know. For fifty years the
French bourgeoisie has retained the power in its hands after having elected the
Third Republic on the bones of the Communards.
Those fighters of '71 were not lacking in heroism. What they lacked was clarity
in method and a centralized leading organization. That is why they were
vanquished. Half a century elapsed before the proletariat of France could
pose the question of avenging the death of
the Communards. But this time, the action will be firmer, more
concentrated. The heirs of Thiers will have to pay the historic debt in full.