"Spartacist", Number 61, Spring 2009 article in defense of Leon Trotsky's perspective on the Spanish Revolution and, in the final analysis the decisive role of the POUM, honest revolutionary organization or not, in not acting in a revolutionary manner in that revolution. Ouch!. That is for those who defended the POUM's politics then and now.
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Spartacist English edition No. 61
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Spring 2009
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Against Apologists for the Treachery of the POUM, Then and Now
Trotskyism vs. Popular Frontism in the Spanish Civil War
Corrections Appended
The Barcelona May Days of 1937 marked the high point of a decade of
revolution and counterrevolution in Spain that began with the fall of the Primo
de Rivera military dictatorship in 1930 and the monarchy a year later and ended
with the crushing of the Republic by General Francisco Franco in 1939. The bulk
of the bourgeoisie rallied behind Francoist reaction, which was backed by
Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy. The bourgeois Republican government
included only the shadow of the bourgeoisie, a handful of left Republican
politicians. But as Trotsky insisted, this “shadow” was key to subordinating the
workers organizations to the capitalist order and derailing proletarian
revolution.
Alongside the military conflict between Franco’s forces and the
Republican militias, there raged a class conflict within the Republican camp, as
the weak and fractured forces of the bourgeois state sought to rein in and
suppress the armed and insurgent proletariat and the embryonic organs of
power—militias, factory committees and agricultural collectives—that were
created when the workers rose up to repulse Franco’s military revolt on 19 July
1936. At the center of this conflict was Barcelona, capital of the industrial
heartland of Catalonia and vanguard of revolutionary Spain.
Repeated clashes between the popular-front Generalitat government
in Catalonia and the largely anarcho-syndicalist workers of Barcelona came to a
head on Monday, 3 May 1937. When three truckloads of hated Assault Guards, led
by the Stalinist chief of police, tried to seize the Telefónica (main telephone
exchange) from the National Confederation of Labor (CNT) workers who occupied
and controlled that strategic communications hub, workers throughout the city
poured into the streets and erected barricades. The bourgeois armed forces were
rapidly routed; sailors from the naval installation fraternized with the
insurgents. An eyewitness report by Lois Orr described the scene:
“Tuesday morning the armed workers dominated the greatest part of
Barcelona. Montjuich fortress, which commands the port and the city with its
cannon, was held by the Anarchists; Tibidabo, the port, and all the suburbs of
the city where the workers live were in their control; and the government
forces, except for a few isolated barricades, were completely outnumbered and
were concentrated in the center of the city, the bourgeois residential area,
where they could easily be closed in on from all sides as the rebels were on
July 19, 1936.”
— “May Events: A Revolution Betrayed,” Information Bulletin,
issued by International Bureau for the Fourth International, July 1937
Power was in the grasp of the heroic Barcelona workers. Yet by
week’s end, the workers had been disarmed and their barricades dismantled—a
result not of military defeat but of sabotage, confusion and defeatism sown by
the workers’ misleaders. At the core of the capitalist Catalan government, as of
the central government in Valencia (earlier in Madrid), were the Stalinists and
Socialists (who had merged in Catalonia into the United Socialist Party [PSUC])
and the anarcho-syndicalists of the Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI) and the
CNT union federation it led. The centrist Workers Party of Marxist Unification
(POUM), itself briefly a part of the capitalist Generalitat, provided the left
face for the popular-front government from without. The Stalinists were the
first to enter the popular-front government and the loudest in proclaiming the
inviolability of private property—they were “the fighting vanguard of the
bourgeois-republican counterrevolution” (Leon Trotsky, “The Class, the Party,
and the Leadership,” 20 August 1940, The Spanish Revolution [1931-39]
[New York: Pathfinder, 1973]). But they could not bring down the barricades.
That task was accomplished by the leaders of the CNT/FAI and the POUM, whose
militants manned the barricades. The CNT leadership demanded of the workers:
“Put down your arms” (quoted in Felix Morrow, Revolution and
Counter-Revolution in Spain [New York: Pathfinder, 1974]). The POUM
leadership took its cue from the CNT, as the POUM’s paper La Batalla (6
May 1937) exhorted the insurgents to “leave the streets” and “return to work”
(ibid.).
“The only thing that can be said is that the masses who sought at
all times to blast their way to the correct road found it beyond their strength
to produce in the very fire of battle a new leadership corresponding to the
demands of the revolution,” wrote Trotsky in “The Class, the Party, and the
Leadership”—an article left unfinished when he was murdered in Mexico by Spanish
Stalinist and Soviet GPU assassin Ramón Mercader. As the insurgent workers raged
against the treachery of their CNT/FAI and POUM leaders, only the left-anarchist
Friends of Durruti and the Trotskyist Bolshevik-Leninist Section of Spain (SBLE)
sought to drive the revolution forward. Though ultimately unable to break either
organizationally or politically with the CNT/FAI, the Friends of Durruti urged
the workers to fight for social revolution. The voice of revolutionary Marxism
was raised only by the tiny SBLE, which declared in a leaflet:
“LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTIONARY OFFENSIVE
“No compromise. Disarmament of the National Republican Guard and
the reactionary Assault Guard. This is the decisive moment. Next time it will be
too late. General strike in all the industries, excepting those connected with
the prosecution of the war, until the resignation of the reactionary government.
Only proletarian power can assure military victory.”
— SBLE leaflet, 4 May 1937, Information Bulletin, July
1937
This was the decisive moment. Victory in Barcelona
could have led to a workers and peasants Spain and set Europe aflame in
revolutionary struggle on the eve of World War II. Defeat opened the way to
intense repression, including the suppression of the POUM and the murder or
imprisonment of its leaders. Having thus disarmed the proletariat, the popular
front opened the gates to Franco’s forces and a bloody reign of rightist
reaction.
Popular Front: The Question of Questions
Seven decades later, a critical assimilation of the lessons of that
defeat remains as vital as ever in reforging a Trotskyist Fourth International.
The essential starting point for such a review is the compilation of Trotsky’s
writings, including many of those cited in this article, published in English in
The Spanish Revolution. A more extensive collection appears in French in
La révolution espagnole (1930-1940) (The Spanish Revolution) (Paris: Les
Éditions de Minuit, 1975), Pierre Broué’s edition of Trotsky’s writings. Also
invaluable is the narrative account written by Felix Morrow in the midst of the
Civil War, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Spain. A vivid depiction
of the heroism of the workers and the betrayals of their leaders, Morrow’s book
is grounded in a Marxist analysis and program. Several months after the
Barcelona May Days, Trotsky summarized the conflict as follows:
“Two irreconcilable programs thus confronted each other on the
territory of republican Spain. On the one hand, the program of saving at
any cost private property from the proletariat, and saving as far
as possible democracy from Franco; on the other hand, the program of
abolishing private property through the conquest of power by the proletariat.
The first program expressed the interests of capitalism through the medium of
the labor aristocracy, the top petty-bourgeois circles, and especially the
Soviet bureaucracy. The second program translated into the language of Marxism
the tendencies of the revolutionary mass movement, not fully conscious but
powerful. Unfortunately for the revolution, between the handful of Bolsheviks
and the revolutionary proletariat stood the counterrevolutionary wall of the
Popular Front.”
— “The Lessons of Spain: The Last Warning,” 17 December 1937
That there was no revolutionary party to lead the workers to
victory was conditioned above all by the political capitulation of Andrés Nin
and Juan Andrade, former leaders of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) who stood
at the head of the Trotskyist Left Opposition in Spain in the early 1930s. Nin
and Andrade threw away the accumulated capital of Spanish communism in order to
pursue unprincipled blocs and maneuvers, finally fusing with the right-centrist
Workers and Peasants Bloc (BOC) of Joaquín Maurín to form the POUM in 1935 and
going from there into the fold of the bourgeois popular front and the capitalist
Catalan government in 1936. In the course of the tumultuous struggles in Spain
in the 1930s, Nin and Andrade went from being semi-revolutionary to
non-revolutionary to counterrevolutionary. Their default meant that a handful of
Bolsheviks were left to struggle in the fire of battle—with little in the way of
experience, roots or resources—to construct anew a revolutionary vanguard
nucleus on the basis of the programmatic course outlined by Trotsky.
The popular front, a coalition of bourgeois and workers parties,
was the instrument for the strangulation of the Spanish Revolution. The presence
of the otherwise insignificant left Republican politicians in the popular front
served as a guarantor of its commitment to the maintenance of bourgeois rule,
“incarnating the principles of the ‘democratic revolution,’ that is, the
inviolability of private property” (ibid.). Excoriating apologists for
the POUM who dismissed the question of this class-collaborationist coalition as
a “small, temporary technical electoral agreement,” Trotsky stressed: “The
question of questions at present is the Popular Front. The left centrists seek
to present this question as a tactical or even as a technical maneuver, so as to
be able to peddle their wares in the shadow of the Popular Front. In reality,
the Popular Front is the main question of proletarian class
strategy for this epoch. It also offers the best criterion for the
difference between Bolshevism and Menshevism” (“The POUM and the Popular Front,”
16 July 1936).
So it remains. Innumerable books and articles have been written on
the Spanish Civil War; overwhelmingly, their purpose has been to alibi the
treacherous policies of the popular front that paved the way for defeat. Among
the few exceptions is left-anarchist Vernon Richards’ Lessons of the Spanish
Revolution (London: Freedom Press, 1953), which at least offers a frank
account of the betrayals of the CNT/FAI leaders. Various pseudo-Trotskyist
historians offer up oh-so-erudite accounts that quote Trotsky at great length
while amnestying the POUM centrists against whom Trotsky aimed his fire.
Prominent among the latter are the late Pierre Broué—who was a leading member of
the French Lambert group, an editor of Trotsky’s writings in French and author
of several works on the Spanish Civil War—and the British Labourites of
Revolutionary History, a “non-party” publication supported by a spectrum
of pseudo-Trotskyist individuals and groups. Revolutionary History has
published two articles by Andy Durgan, a supporter of the reformist tendency
founded by the late Tony Cliff, longtime leader of the British Socialist Workers
Party (“The Spanish Trotskyists and the Foundation of the POUM,”
Revolutionary History Vol. 4, No. 1/2, Winter 1991-92, and “Marxism, War
and Revolution: Trotsky and the POUM,” Revolutionary History Vol. 9, No.
2, 2006).
At bottom, the reformists’ defense of Nin and the POUM comes down
to the cynical worship of the accomplished fact, that the failure of the Spanish
Revolution “proves” that revolution was not possible in Spain. This, in turn, is
merely a reflection of their own social-democratic opposition to the fight for
proletarian state power today, anywhere. Having cheered the forces of capitalist
counterrevolution in the former Soviet Union and the deformed workers states of
East Europe, these opportunists now take up the “death of communism” cry that
the Russian Revolution proved to be, at best, a failed experiment. Thus they
write off the possibility of proletarian revolution in the future and rewrite
history to deny revolutionary opportunities in the past.
Our compass is the Russian October Revolution of 1917. The Spanish
Revolution is an object lesson, in the negative, of the need to forge
revolutionary workers parties of the Bolshevik type. Our purpose in reviewing
this critical chapter in the history of the revolutionary workers movement is to
educate and arm the future cadre of the Leninist vanguard that will lead the
fight for new Octobers around the globe.
The Russian Revolution and the Trienio
Bolchevista
The October Revolution had a tremendous impact on the workers and
peasants of Spain, not least because they saw in tsarist Russia a country
similar to their own. There, too, a decadent monarchy had been propped up by a
state church mired in medieval obscurantism and a huge aristocratic officer
corps. There, too, a large peasantry had been brutally exploited by a landowning
class derived from the old feudal nobility. There, too, the urban proletariat
was young, raw and combative, scarcely a generation or two removed from its
peasant origins. And like tsarist Russia, Spain was a “prison house of peoples,”
enforcing the national oppression of the Basque and Catalan peoples within its
borders and the colonial oppression of Spanish Morocco.
Under the leadership of Lenin’s Bolsheviks, the multinational
proletariat of Russia, rallying behind it the peasant masses, had seized state
power, replacing the class dictatorship of the exploiters with a dictatorship of
the proletariat organized on the basis of democratically elected councils
(soviets) of workers, peasants and soldiers. The new Bolshevik-led government
pulled Russia out of the interimperialist carnage of World War I and appealed to
the workers of all countries to follow its example and join in fighting for
world socialist revolution and a global, classless, egalitarian society.
Spain itself was in the throes of social upheaval as word of the
Bolshevik victory arrived, and that news electrified the worker and peasant
masses. “More than any other one factor, the Revolution was responsible for the
feeling of hope—vague yet compelling—that pervaded the Catalonian masses in this
era, convincing them that the advent of the workers’ society of equality and
justice was no longer a dream but a possibility,” writes Gerald H. Meaker in his
fascinating account of that period, The Revolutionary Left in Spain,
1914-1923 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1974). “Russian
fever” swept through the peasant south, particularly Andalusia, where three
years of peasant uprisings were called the Trienio Bolchevista and
workers in some towns proclaimed “Bolshevik-type” republics. Pro-Bolshevik
meetings and rallies were common everywhere. During a weeklong strike in
Valencia in 1919, streets and plazas were renamed “Lenin,” “Soviets” and
“Revolución de Octubre.”
But in Spain there was no revolutionary Marxist party. The
Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) claimed adherence to Marxism, but it was more
akin to Russia’s Mensheviks, putting off the struggle for socialism until after
the realization of a bourgeois-democratic stage and rejecting the revolutionary
mobilization of the working class in favor of bourgeois parliamentarism and
blocs with the “democratic” bourgeoisie. While Spain was officially neutral in
World War I, the PSOE leadership backed the “democratic” imperialists, Britain
and France (and their autocratic Russian ally), against Germany, which was
supported by the Spanish throne. While the PSOE-led General Workers Union (UGT)
predated and was substantially larger than the anarcho-syndicalist CNT at the
outset of the war, the most militant layers of the working class in the
industrial centers of Catalonia looked not to Marxism, but to anarchism.
Spanish anarchism was rooted in the rural peasantry and among the
small-scale artisans in the urban economy, who felt threatened by
industrialization. The Spanish section of the First International largely went
with the anarchist Bakunin when he and Marx split in the early 1870s. By the
early 20th century, a substantial working class had developed in the northern
areas of Spain—centrally Asturias, Vizcaya and Catalonia. But especially in
Catalonia, a center of anarchism, this was based mainly on light industry, not
the sort of modern factories that concentrated thousands of industrial workers
under one roof, as was typical of the Vyborg district in Russia’s St.
Petersburg, a Bolshevik stronghold. In Spain, anarchism adapted to the rise of
an industrial proletariat through the development of a syndicalist working-class
movement. The anarcho-syndicalists acknowledged the unique social power of the
proletariat in the struggle against capitalism but shared the anarchists’
hostility to all parties and states and any form of centralized authority.
Though outlawed for three years after its formation in 1911, the
CNT grew rapidly amid the social turbulence of the war years and the postwar
period, boasting about 700,000 members in 1919. As the CNT grew, its leadership
was increasingly divided between “pure” anarchists like Buenaventura Durruti—who
embraced Bakunin’s vision of a society of small autonomous communes and often
operated in guerrillaist/terrorist “affinity groups”—and “pure” syndicalists
like Angel Pestaña, who were essentially trade-union reformists much like
PSOE/UGT leader Francisco Largo Caballero.
The impact of the Bolshevik Revolution was felt in both the
Socialist and anarcho-syndicalist movements. Pacifist/neutralist elements who
rejected the pro-Allies (Aliadofilismo) line of the PSOE majority
coalesced around support to the Russian Revolution and in opposition to
Menshevik stagism and political blocs with the liberal bourgeois parties; but
this broad left wing was also opposed to breaking with the reformist PSOE
majority. It was the Young Socialists in Madrid, headed by Juan Andrade, who
first split from the Socialists in 1920. With their relatively meager and
inexperienced forces, they proclaimed the formation of the Communist Party. The
following year, a wing of the PSOE centered in Asturias and Vizcaya also split
in solidarity with the Communist International (CI). Organizational unity
between the two parties was achieved only in 1922, after much prodding by the
Comintern.
The effect of the Russian October on CNT militants was, if
anything, more pronounced. Some of the initial enthusiasm among radical
anarchists was based in part on a misunderstanding that the Russian
“maximalists,” i.e., Bolsheviks, were in fact anarchists. But as Meaker
observes: “Under the spell of the Bolshevik Revolution, Spanish Anarchists began
to think, as never before, about the uses of authority and the rationales of
violence. The idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat began to enjoy a
surprising vogue among them, and there was a growing acceptance of the Leninist
proposition that revolutions had to be organized, that not everything could be
left to the workings of spontaneity” (Meaker, op. cit.). Lenin’s The
State and Revolution (1917) reasserted against reformist Social Democracy
the authentic Marxist view that the bourgeois state had to be smashed and
replaced by a new form of state, a workers state. This work had a particular
impact on anarchists in Spain, and internationally.
Yet no mass Communist Party was to emerge from this fertile soil.
Above all, this failure was conditioned by Spain’s neutrality in the
interimperialist First World War. Neither the PSOE nor the CNT witnessed the
sort of sharp polarization seen in the workers movement in the combatant
countries. In those countries the social-chauvinist misleaders wallowed in
patriotic appeals for “defense of the fatherland” and acted as recruiting
sergeants for their “own” imperialist rulers, provoking bitter splits with the
internationalists who held true to the revolutionary unity of the working class.
(Even then, the split between the reformist and revolutionary-internationalist
wings was often initially muddied by the development of large centrist
formations, such as that around Karl Kautsky in Germany.) The Communist
International attracted many anarchists and revolutionary syndicalists who had
been repulsed by the abject bourgeois parliamentarism of the Second
International—e.g., Victor Serge, Alfred Rosmer in France and a number of
activists from the Industrial Workers of the World in the U.S., including
founding American Communist and, later, Trotskyist James P. Cannon. The Red
International of Labor Unions, or Profintern, founded in 1921, sought to
intersect and work with such syndicalist elements and win them to communism.
Andrés Nin and Joaquín Maurín were leaders of the
Communist-Syndicalist wing of the CNT in Barcelona and fought for the CNT to
affiliate to the Communist International. Both traveled to Moscow in 1921 to
take part in the founding conference of the Profintern, which coincided with the
Third Congress of the CI. Maurín returned to Spain but did not join the PCE
until 1924. His Communist-Syndicalists, centered in Catalonia, maintained
virtually total independence from the rest of the PCE. After trying
unsuccessfully to return to Spain, Nin went back to Moscow, becoming secretary
of the Profintern.
As the revolutionary tide in Spain receded, the CNT became openly
anti-Communist, breaking all relations with the Profintern in 1922. Faced with
Miguel Primo de Rivera’s military coup in 1923, neither the PSOE/UGT nor the
Catalonian CNT would join with the PCE in united-front protest against the coup.
Declaring “I have come to fight against Communism,” Primo de Rivera arrested PCE
leaders and closed party offices; both the CNT and PCE were driven underground.
Though some PSOE leaders were arrested, the dictatorship tolerated the
reformists, and UGT head Largo Caballero joined its Council of State in
1924.
The Rise of the Stalinist Bureaucracy
The isolation of the fledgling Soviet workers state, coupled with
the devastation of industry and infrastructure by World War I and the Civil War
which followed the Russian Revolution, facilitated the rise of a bureaucratic
layer as the arbiter of scarce resources. The Bolsheviks had understood that the
success of the revolution depended on its extension to the more advanced
industrial countries of Europe. But the failure of revolutionary opportunities
in the West, particularly the aborted German Revolution of 1923, and the ensuing
wave of demoralization in the Soviet working class led to the increasing
consolidation of the bureaucracy’s grip on power. Beginning in 1923-24, the
bureaucracy usurped political power from the Soviet proletariat.
This was the beginning of a political counterrevolution. Though the
Soviet Union still rested on the collectivized property forms established by the
Bolshevik Revolution, from then on the people who ruled the USSR, the way the
USSR was ruled and the purposes for which the USSR was ruled were all changed.
Ideologically, this political counterrevolution was codified in the nationalist,
anti-Marxist dogma of “socialism in one country,” promulgated by Stalin in late
1924, which effectively denied the iron necessity of extending socialist
revolution internationally. In 1926, the Soviet bureaucracy, through the
Anglo-Russian Trade Union Unity Committee, provided a left cover for the British
Trades Union Congress misleaders as they betrayed the General Strike. In the
1925-27 Chinese Revolution, Stalin/Bukharin instructed the Chinese Communist
Party to liquidate into the bourgeois-nationalist Guomindang in the name of
“two-stage revolution.” Communist parties around the world were increasingly
transformed into tools of Soviet diplomacy, aimed at pressuring their respective
bourgeoisies to “peacefully coexist” with the USSR.
Trotsky’s fight against the rising bureaucracy began with the 1923
Russian Opposition. His 1928 “Critique of the Draft Program of the Communist
International” (the core of The Third International After Lenin) analyzed
the link between Stalin’s dogma of “socialism in one country” and the
capitulatory zigzags of the Comintern, especially the betrayal of the Chinese
Revolution. Expelled from the Soviet Communist Party in 1927 and forcibly exiled
from the Soviet Union in 1929, Trotsky organized his supporters into the
International Left Opposition (ILO) to fight as an expelled faction of the
Communist International to return it to the road of revolutionary
internationalism. Among these supporters was Nin, who, while in Moscow, had been
won to Trotsky’s fight against the rising Stalinist bureaucracy.
Origins of the Spanish Left Opposition
Brought to power to impose capitalist order on the rebellious
proletariat of backward Spain, the Primo de Rivera dictatorship came toppling
down in January 1930 under the impact of the international capitalist crisis,
the Great Depression sparked by the stock market crash of late 1929. The pent-up
aspirations of the masses led to an explosion of protest. In May, students and
workers under red and Republican flags engaged in armed combat with the police
in Madrid. In December, Republican army officers staged a revolt against the
monarchy. The revolt was suppressed and its leaders executed, but it signaled
the death knell of the monarchy. The Socialists and Republicans swept the urban
vote in the April 1931 municipal elections, King Alfonso XIII fled, and the
Spanish Republic was declared, headed by a coalition government including the
PSOE.
In February 1930, Francisco Garcia Lavid (Lacroix) and other former
PCE members in exile founded the Spanish Communist Opposition in Belgium. In
Spain, Juan Andrade and several other ex-PCE cadre also affiliated to the Left
Opposition. They were joined by Nin later that year, following his expulsion
from the Soviet Union. Nin was an authoritative figure in the Spanish workers
movement. Yet a few years later, Trotsky was to write of Nin: “The greatest
misfortune for the Spanish section was the fact that a man with a name, with a
certain past and the halo of a martyr of Stalinism, stood at its head and all
the while led it wrongly and paralyzed it” (“The POUM and the Popular Front,” 16
July 1936).
In a 25 May 1930 letter to the exile group in Belgium, Trotsky
wrote: “The Spanish crisis is unfolding at this time with remarkable regularity,
which affords the proletarian vanguard a certain amount of time to prepare
itself” (“Tasks of the Spanish Communists”). The official Communist Party had no
authoritative leadership, only several hundred members, and was rent by internal
disarray. The PSOE, whose erstwhile opposition to bourgeois ministerialism had
simply been an expression of its lack of opportunity under the monarchy, was
part of an increasingly unpopular capitalist regime from 1931 to 1933. The
anarcho-syndicalist CNT/FAI rejected the very idea of a struggle for proletarian
state power, vacillating instead between boycotts of all political activity and
backhanded support to the “democratic” bourgeoisie.
Writing from a distance, Trotsky exerted every effort at working
with and guiding Nin and his comrades to take advantage of an exceptional
opening. Excerpts from the correspondence between Trotsky and Nin in 1931-33
were published in a 1933 International Bulletin and reprinted in The
Spanish Revolution. Unfortunately, the letters themselves are not in the
Trotsky archives at Harvard and appear to have been lost. The published excerpts
of Trotsky’s letters are a model of programmatic clarity, probing questions and
comradely persuasion, while Nin’s were filled with personalism, impressionism
and evasion. “Clarity, theoretical precision, and consequently political honesty
is what renders a revolutionary tendency invincible,” insisted Trotsky (“To Say
What Is,” 12 April 1931). But Nin turned his back on theoretical clarity and
precision. He argued: “With people whom we have to teach the first notions of
communism, we cannot begin by making Opposition propaganda” (Letter to Trotsky,
12 November 1930). Instead, Nin boasted of his personal prestige and influence
with Maurín.
Reading from a legal brief that has changed not at all over the
decades, Nin’s many political attorneys of today berate Trotsky for his
allegedly “sectarian” demeanor, for his supposed ignorance of the situation in
Spain and for the “harshness” of his polemics. This was the refrain in the 1930s
of some of Trotsky’s erstwhile collaborators and allies—such as Serge, Rosmer,
George Vereecken in Belgium and Henricus Sneevliet in Holland—who, under the
pressure of democratic “anti-fascism,” alibied Nin while acknowledging that he
had made “errors.” As Trotsky wrote in a letter to Serge:
“You are dissatisfied with our behavior toward Andrés Nin,
behavior that you find ‘sectarian.’ You do not and cannot know the political and
personal history of our relations.
“You can easily imagine how happy I was when Nin arrived abroad.
For several years, I corresponded with him quite regularly. Some of my letters
were veritable ‘treatises’ on the subject of the living revolution, in which Nin
could and should have played an active role. I think that my letters to Nin over
a period of two or three years would make up a volume of several hundred pages:
that should indicate how important I regarded Nin and friendly relations with
him. In his answers, Nin affirmed over and over again his agreement in theory,
but he always avoided discussing practical problems....
“Of course, no one is obligated to be a revolutionary. But Nin was
the head of the Spanish Bolshevik-Leninists, and by that fact alone, he had a
serious responsibility, which he failed to carry out in practice, all the while
throwing dust in my eyes.”
— “Is a Rapprochement with Nin Possible?” 3 June 1935
A Party, Once More a Party, Again a Party
In a 1931 article, “The Revolution in Spain,” Trotsky outlined the
program and strategy that could have guided Spanish revolutionaries on the road
to power. Trotsky put forward a series of demands aimed at linking the
democratic aspirations of the worker and peasant masses to the fight for the
class rule of the proletariat: confiscation of the large landed estates for the
benefit of the poor peasants; the separation of church and state—disarming the
bastions of clerical reaction and turning over the vast wealth of the church to
the masses; the creation of workers and peasants militias; the nationalization
of the railways, banks and mineral resources; workers control of industry; the
right of national self-determination for the Catalans and Basques.
Here Trotsky was applying the theory and program of permanent
revolution, vindicated in the Russian October of 1917 and confirmed in the
negative through the defeat of the 1925-27 Chinese Revolution. Given the belated
emergence of capitalism in these countries, the tasks historically associated
with the bourgeois-democratic revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries could
be accomplished only through the seizure of power by the proletariat standing at
the head of the peasant masses, which would necessarily and immediately place
not only democratic but also socialist tasks on the agenda.
Trotsky stressed the importance of reaching out to the militant
ranks of the CNT in order to break them from their anarcho-syndicalist
prejudices and called for a unified trade-union federation. He argued that it
was necessary to agitate for the formation of soviets—workers juntas—to act as
organs of united proletarian struggle against the capitalist class, “rising over
all the present political, national, provincial, and trade union divisions.” He
continued:
“The proletarian junta will become the broad arena in which every
party and every group will be put to the test and scrutinized before the eyes of
the broad masses. The communists will counterpose the slogan of the united front
of the workers to the practice of coalitions of Socialists and a part of the
syndicalists with the bourgeoisie. Only the united revolutionary front will
enable the proletariat to inspire the necessary confidence among the oppressed
masses of the village and city. The realization of the united front is
conceivable only under the banner of communism. The junta requires a leading
party. Without a firm leadership, it would remain an empty organizational form
and would inevitably fall into dependence upon the bourgeoisie.”
— “The Revolution in Spain,” 24 January 1931
Above all, concluded Trotsky, “For a successful solution of all
of these tasks, three conditions are required: a party; once more a party; again
a party!” (ibid.).
Yet it was the party question that most separated Nin from Trotsky.
Nin initially resisted Trotsky’s urgings to launch a theoretical journal to lay
down clear programmatic foundations for a Bolshevik-Leninist vanguard. He
likewise refused to heed Trotsky’s injunctions to take seriously the political
fights then taking place within the ILO, which were necessary to sort out the
genuine revolutionaries from a variety of dilettantes, dabblers and others who
had accidentally been attracted to Trotsky’s struggle against Stalinism. Such
debates were vital in forging a disciplined and politically homogeneous
international tendency and combating deforming national pressures. But the
Spanish Opposition leaders did not politically intervene in these debates or
bring them into their section. Rather, they “let themselves be guided by
personal connections, sympathies, or antipathies” (Trotsky, “The State of the
Left Opposition,” 16 December 1932).
Trotsky urged Nin to implement the ILO’s orientation toward the CI,
arguing that the Stalinist bureaucrats “must not be allowed to create the
impression that the Left Opposition is hostile to the workers who follow the
banner of the official Communist Party” (“Tasks of the Spanish Communists”).
Despite the bureaucratic atrocities, lies and betrayals of Stalin & Co., the
Communist parties continued to attract those elements within the international
working class who were drawn to the Russian Revolution and wanted to fight for a
workers revolution in their own countries. Moreover, it would have been a crime
to surrender the banner of the Communist International to the Stalinists without
a struggle or a decisive test.
Nin explicitly rejected the ILO’s international perspective,
pleading Spanish exceptionalism: “In Spain the proletariat will organize its
party outside of the official party (which does not exist in fact), and in spite
of it” (Letter to Trotsky, 3 December 1930). Trotsky responded, “Although the
official party as it is today may be feeble and insignificant, nevertheless it
possesses all the external historic possibilities in it, in the USSR, and
everything that is linked up with the USSR. That is why to guide yourself
empirically solely on the immediate relation of forces seems dangerous to me”
(Letter to Nin, 31 January 1931). Nin turned a deaf ear to such arguments,
demonstratively changing the name of the Spanish group from Left Opposition to
Left Communists (ICE) in March 1932.
Rejecting the fight of the Left Opposition, Nin looked instead to
the former Catalan Federation headed by Joaquín Maurín. Expelled from the PCE in
June 1930, the Catalan Federation was a rightward-moving centrist organization
whose politics Trotsky characterized as a “mixture of petty-bourgeois
prejudices, ignorance, provincial ‘science,’ and political crookedness”
(“Spanish Communism and the Catalan Federation,” 8 July 1931). In March 1931,
the Catalan Federation joined with the Catalan Communist Party (a
petty-bourgeois grouping not affiliated to the PCE) to found a “mass”
organization, the Workers and Peasants Bloc. Trotsky characterized the program
of Maurín’s BOC as “pure ‘Kuomintangism’ transported to Spanish soil” (i.e.,
Chiang Kai-shek’s bourgeois-nationalist Guomindang) and “a new edition of the
workers’ and peasants’ party” (“The Catalan Federation’s Platform,” 12 June
1931). This two-class formula had been used to justify liquidation into the
Guomindang and other bourgeois-populist formations such as the U.S.
“Farmer-Labor Party.”
Internationally, Maurín was aligned with the Right Opposition that
coalesced around the views of former Stalin ally Nikolai Bukharin (who himself
quickly capitulated to Stalin) in opposition to the policies of the so-called
“Third Period.” These policies were inaugurated by Stalin in 1929 as a supposed
new period in which international proletarian revolution was imminent. The
Communist parties internationally began to pursue an adventurist and sectarian
course, abandoning the reformist-led trade unions to build isolated “red” unions
and opposing any joint actions with the social democrats, who were labeled
“social fascists.” The International Right Opposition opposed this sectarian
course from a perspective of evolving class collaboration; its chief spokesman
was Heinrich Brandler, who had presided over the default of the German
Revolution in 1923. At the same time, the Brandlerites defended the Stalinists’
disastrous policies in China in 1925-27 and the nationalist dogma of “socialism
in one country.”
Trotsky waged repeated fights against any merging of banners with
the Right Opposition. In the Soviet Union, he had intransigently opposed a bloc
with the Bukharin wing of the bureaucracy, whose policies conciliated and
encouraged the internal forces of capitalist restoration—the layer of well-off
peasants (kulaks) and petty entrepreneurs. Internationally, unity with the Right
Opposition meant the liquidation of the fight for a communist vanguard. The
correctness of this understanding was starkly demonstrated by the course taken
by Nin and Andrade in their pursuit of Maurín.
The French Turn and Unprincipled Combinations
The rise to power of Hitler’s Nazis in early 1933, and the criminal
passivity of the leaders of the powerful Communist and Socialist organizations
of the German proletariat, sent shock waves through the working class
internationally. When the German debacle failed to provoke even a hint of revolt
within the Third International, Trotsky pronounced the Stalinized Comintern dead
for the cause of proletarian revolution and called for building new communist
parties to carry forward the banner of Leninism. “The Declaration of Four”
(August 1933), which was written by Trotsky and called for the formation of a
new, Fourth International, was signed by representatives of the ILO, the
Sneevliet group and a second group in Holland and the German Socialist Workers
Party (SAP), a left split from the Social Democracy. In 1934, the ILO
reconstituted itself as the International Communist League (ICL).
The Stalinists soon abandoned the sectarian adventurism of the
Third Period. Panicked by the Nazi victory, Stalin sought an alliance with the
imperialist “democracies”—Britain, France and the U.S. The new order of the day
was the “people’s front” against fascism, later codified at the Seventh Congress
of the Communist International in 1935 and realized in popular-front coalitions
with the parties of the “democratic” bourgeoisies in France, Spain and
elsewhere. Stalin’s strangulation of the Spanish workers revolution was in the
service of his hoped-for alliance with Britain and France, as he sought to prove
to the imperialists that the Comintern no longer posed a challenge to the
bourgeois order.
The Nazi victory in Germany coincided with a resurgence of class
struggle elsewhere after three years of the Great Depression. The radicalization
of a section of workers and youth found expression in the growth of vibrant,
combative left wings in the social-democratic parties and, in the U.S., in the
rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). For the first time in
years, in 1934 Socialist militants stood at the head of proletarian revolts—in
the Austrian capital of Vienna and in the mining region of Asturias in Spain.
Trotsky urged his supporters to carry out temporary entries into parties of the
Second International in order to intersect and win over revolutionary-minded
youth and workers. First implemented in France in 1934, this tactic became known
as the “French turn,” and was soon pursued in a number of other countries,
including, in 1936-37, the U.S., where the Trotskyists won a sizable layer of
youth and trade-union militants from the Socialist Party.
In Spain, the situation was probably the most open for the
successful implementation of this tactic. Renovación, the Madrid
newspaper of the Socialist Youth (JS), which had some 200,000 members at the
time, openly appealed to the Trotskyists as “the best revolutionaries and the
best theoreticians in Spain, who are invited to enter the Youth and the
Socialist Party in order to bring about Bolshevization” (quoted in Pierre Broué,
“Trotsky and the Spanish Revolution,” translated in Workers Vanguard No.
10, July-August 1972). Even the inveterate reformist Largo Caballero came out
for socialist revolution and a Fourth International.
Criminally, Nin and Andrade spurned the exhortations of Trotsky and
the entreaties of the Socialist Youth and refused to take their organization
into the PSOE/JS. A small handful of ICE members, including the future leader of
the Trotskyist SBLE, Manuel Fernández (Grandizo Munis), rejected Nin/Andrade’s
course and entered the PSOE, though with little success. Munis wrote later: “But
what seemed impossible for a little group could have been relatively easy for a
sizable contingent of the Communist Left. There is no doubt that the CL’s
[Communist Left] entry into the Socialist Party would have entirely changed the
course of the Spanish Revolution” (Munis, Jalones de Derrota: Promesa de
Victoria [España 1930-39] [Milestones of Defeat: Promise of Victory (Spain
1930-39)] [Mexico City: Editorial “Lucha Obrera,” 1948]). In April 1936, the JS
was captured by the Stalinists, providing the PCE with a mass base for the first
time, while in Catalonia the PCE merged with the PSOE to form the United
Socialist Party of Catalonia.
Nin and Andrade were not alone in their obstinate refusal to seize
a brilliant opportunity for strengthening the forces of revolutionary Marxism,
though it was their failure that cost the proletariat most dearly. In the U.S.,
a small minority around Hugo Oehler, an effective mass worker but a sectarian
bonehead, opposed the entry into the Socialist Party from an ultraleft sectarian
standpoint and soon split from the Trotskyist majority led by James P. Cannon.
Internationally, Oehler entered into a rotten bloc with Nin and others who
opposed the French turn on their national terrains from the standpoint of
opportunist accommodationism.
The Asturias Uprising
A particular factor in radicalizing the ranks of the Spanish
Socialist Party was anger over the criminal role played by its leaders in the
first Republican government, whose relentless attacks on the working class and
peasantry provoked widespread hatred and revulsion. The brutal suppression of an
anarchist-inspired peasant revolt in Casas Viejas in January 1933 was the
breaking point, forcing new elections. The CNT urged its members to abstain, and
the masses overwhelmingly withheld their votes in retribution against the
Republican-Socialist government. The elections were swept by the parties of
clerical and monarchist reaction.
When members of the clerical-fascist CEDA (Spanish Confederation of
Autonomous Rightist Groups) were invited to join the cabinet in October 1934,
general strikes erupted throughout Spain. The workers of Asturias rose up in
insurrection, centered on the powerful PSOE-led mine workers union. Police
barracks were stormed, machine guns and rifles (seized from a captured arms
factory) were distributed to the workers, and the capital, Oviedo, and other
areas were taken over by the insurgents. “The bitter experience of the German
workers was present in everyone’s minds. The Spanish workers were determined not
to repeat that experience,” wrote Manuel Grossi, a BOC member and a central
leader of the Asturian Workers Alliance at the head of the revolt, in his 1935
account, The Asturian Uprising: Fifteen Days of Socialist Revolution
(London: Socialist Platform, 2000).
Here was fertile soil for the realization of Trotsky’s insistent
calls for the building of workers juntas: broad, authoritative councils
democratically elected by the working class. As Trotsky put it in 1931: “Only
through juntas embracing the basic core of the proletariat can the communists
assure their hegemony in the proletariat, and thus also in the revolution. Only
to the extent that the influence of the communists grows among the working class
will the juntas be transformed into organs of struggle for power” (“The Spanish
Revolution and the Dangers Threatening It,” 28 May 1931). Instead, Nin’s Left
Communists signed on to the “workers alliances” launched by the BOC. These
bodies were neither elected by nor did they involve the participation of the
insurgent workers. The 28 March 1934 agreement setting up the Asturian Workers
Alliance—which, in addition to the ICE and BOC, included the PSOE/UGT, the PCE
and the regional CNT—specified: “Beginning from the date of signing of this
pact, all propaganda campaigns that could give rise to or worsen relations
between the different allied parties shall cease” (quoted in The Asturian
Uprising). Far from providing a forum in which the contending parties and
programs could be tested, and thus acting as a crucible in which a revolutionary
vanguard could be forged around a perspective for proletarian power, the Workers
Alliance was a political nonaggression pact based on the lowest common
denominator of agreement among the leaderships of the various organizations.
The Asturias revolt was a harbinger of the impending revolution,
and of its betrayal and defeat. It was General Franco who was called in to crush
the Asturian rebels. For the first time, Foreign Legionnaires and Moorish troops
from the Spanish colony of Morocco were deployed against the proletariat in
Spain, troops that would later be used by Franco to crush the Spanish
Revolution. The suppression of the isolated Asturian commune—leaving 5,000
workers dead and 30,000 imprisoned—fueled renewed sentiment among the Spanish
proletariat for unity among the workers organizations. These aspirations were
channeled by the reformists and centrists into support for a new
class-collaborationist coalition.
The Foundation of the POUM
At a September 1934 national plenum, Nin/Andrade’s ICE piously
resolved that to carry out the French turn would be to “immerse ourselves in an
amorphous conglomerate” (quoted in Durgan, “The Spanish Trotskyists and the
Foundation of the POUM”). A year later, in 1935, the ICE would immerse itself in
a truly amorphous conglomerate, fusing with Maurín’s BOC to found the POUM and
join the London Bureau. An unprincipled federation of various centrist
organizations—chiefly the Independent Labour Party (ILP) in Britain and the
German SAP—the London Bureau vacillated between the Second and Third
Internationals. The sole unifying force of this “International” was opposition
to the formation of a Leninist-Trotskyist Fourth International, i.e., opposition
to democratic-centralist constraints on their respective national-opportunist
appetites and to the principles of proletarian internationalism.
The POUM was sectarian in form, opportunist in essence. It
counterposed itself organizationally to the traditional mass organizations of
the Spanish proletariat. But what lay behind this was an unwillingness to
politically confront the misleaders of the PSOE, PCE and CNT. During the Civil
War, the POUM set up its own militias, separating off its militants from the
militias of organizations that claimed the allegiance of the mass of the Spanish
working class. All the while the POUM embraced the popular front, beginning with
signing on to the January 1936 “Left Electoral Pact,” a class-collaborationist
bloc between the Republicans, PSOE and PCE.
Trotsky laid bare the cynical hypocrisy and gross opportunism of
Nin/Andrade:
“It is in order to recall that the Spanish ‘Left Communists,’ as
their very name indicates, posed on every appropriate occasion as incorruptible
revolutionists. In particular, they thunderously condemned the French
Bolshevik-Leninists for entering the Socialist Party. Never! Under no
conditions! To enter temporarily into a mass political organization in order to
carry on an uncompromising struggle in its ranks against the reformist leaders
for the banner of the proletarian revolution—that is opportunism; but to
conclude a political alliance with the leaders of a reformist party on the basis
of a deliberately dishonest program serving to dupe the masses and cover up for
the bourgeoisie—that is valor! Can there be any greater debasement and
prostitution of Marxism?”
— “The Treachery of the POUM,” 23 January 1936
Here again, Nin’s latter-day apologists leap to his defense. Durgan
and former POUM youth leader Wilebaldo Solano, in his hagiographical El POUM
en la historia, Andreu Nin y la revolución española (The POUM in
History, Andrés Nin and the Spanish Revolution) (Madrid: Libros de la Catarata,
1999), claim that Trotsky and the ICL’s International Secretariat (I.S.)
approved of Nin’s merger with Maurín. In Durgan’s words, “The initial reaction
of both the IS and Trotsky to the foundation of the POUM, it should be
remembered, was of guarded optimism” (“Trotsky and the POUM”).
This is belied by the whole record of Trotsky’s writings on the BOC
and the POUM, which makes clear his irreconcilable hostility to their centrist
politics. Trotsky was hardly optimistic about the POUM. The fusion had been
preceded by a sharp exchange between the I.S. and the Nin leadership. In a July
1935 letter, the I.S. argued that the ICE was “being absorbed by the Workers and
Peasants Bloc” without even having factional rights and that “in such
circumstances nothing good can come out of the new party…. What will the banner
of the new party be? The well-known banner of the London-Amsterdam Bureau”
(reprinted in Trotsky, La révolution espagnole [our translation]).
Nin rejected these arguments out of hand and cut off further
discussion with the ICL, swearing that Maurín accepted “all our
fundamental principles” and snarling that the I.S. had a “fundamental lack of
understanding of Spanish affairs” (“Letter from the National Committee to the
International Secretariat,” 21 July 1935; reprinted in ibid. [our
translation]).
Durgan opines that Nin’s fusion with the BOC was comparable to the
fusion of Cannon’s Communist League of America with the leftward-moving
centrists of A.J. Muste’s American Workers Party to form the Workers Party of
the United States. But unlike the POUM, which adhered to the London Bureau, the
Workers Party explicitly declared for the founding of the Fourth International.
As the July 1935 I.S. letter noted: “If the new party that you want to found
takes a clear position regarding the Fourth International (as in America and
Holland), it can play a great role on the national level as a new
pole of attraction. Under such conditions a fusion is desirable. But if the new
party presents itself as an instrument of ‘socialist-communist
unification’...then joining such a party would mean the liquidation of our
tendency.” Durgan dismisses the POUM’s hostility to the Fourth International as
though it were a third-rate issue. In fact, it was a defining question
demarcating revolutionary Marxism from all manner of centrist confusion.
Echoing Nin’s false assurances, Durgan paints the Maurín group as
having moved toward Trotskyism and castigates Trotsky for his “apparent
unawareness of this evolution in the BOC’s politics” (“Trotsky and the POUM”).
Maurín was also “apparently unaware” of this evolution, as he later made clear:
“By its theory and practice, the BOC approximated to being a left
Socialist party that had been able to grasp what was positive and what was
negative in the Russian Revolution. The BOC was ideologically influenced by Marx
and Engels, by Lenin and Bukharin, hardly at all by Trotsky, and by Stalin not
at all.”
— quoted in Georges Garnier, “Preface to the French Edition,”
The Asturian Uprising
Indeed, the only “evidence” Durgan dredges up of Trotsky’s “guarded
optimism” toward the foundation of the POUM comes not from any article by
Trotsky but from an October 1935 report on the fusion by Jean Rous, who had been
sent to Spain as the I.S. delegate. Rous cites Trotsky saying: “The new party is
proclaimed. We take note. Insofar as that can depend on international factors,
we must do everything we can to help this party win power and authority, which
is only possible on the path of consistent and uncompromising Marxism”
(reprinted in La révolution espagnole [our translation]). All this
“proves” is that Trotsky offered his continued collaboration—if
the new party followed the road of consistent and uncompromising Marxism! Like
all opportunists, Durgan equates tactical flexibility with unprincipled
conciliationism.
Nin and Andrade had broken with the ICL and presented Trotsky and
the I.S. with a fait accompli. The question was what could be done from afar to
salvage Spanish Trotskyism. Trotsky hammered away at the politics. After reading
the fusion manifesto, Trotsky stressed the need to relentlessly hammer on the
POUM’s contradictions and evasions, focusing on the antirevolutionary
significance of its adherence to the London Bureau (“Letter to a Comrade,” 18
October 1935). In his January 1936 article, he warned against any confusion
within the ICL on the nature of the Nin/Maurín group and stressed his implacable
opposition to these centrist renegades and traitors:
“The Spanish organization of ‘Left Communists,’ which was always a
muddled organization, after countless vacillations to the right and to the left,
merged with the Catalan Federation of Maurín into a party of ‘Marxist (?)
Unification’ on a centrist program. Some of our own periodicals, misled by this
name, have written about this party as though it were drawing close to the
Fourth International. There is nothing more dangerous than to exaggerate one’s
own forces with the aid of...a credulous imagination. Reality will not be
restrained thereby from bringing cruel disillusion!”
— “The Treachery of the POUM”
Centrist Vacillation and Popular-Front Betrayal
The 1936 “Left Electoral Pact” initiated by the Republicans was a
treatise in defense of private property and bourgeois rule. It guaranteed the
sanctity of the officer corps and the church, rejected any nationalization of
agricultural lands, industries or banks and maintained the national oppression
of Catalonia and the Basque country. It affirmed the colonial occupation of
(Spanish) Morocco and recommended that Spain’s foreign policy follow the
“principles” of that imperialist den of thieves, the League of Nations. The
signatories included the PSOE/UGT, the PCE, the Syndicalist Party of former CNT
leader Angel Pestaña and Juan Andrade for the POUM. Though not a signatory, the
CNT encouraged its members to vote for the popular front. Trotsky wrote:
“Most of these parties stood at the head of the Spanish revolution
during the years of its upsurge and they did everything in their power to betray
it and trample it underfoot. The new angle is the signature of the party of
Maurín-Nin-Andrade. The former Spanish ‘Left Communists’ have turned into a mere
tail of the ‘left’ bourgeoisie. It is hard to conceive of a more ignominious
downfall!...
“How ironic is the name ‘Marxist Unification’...with the
bourgeoisie. The Spanish ‘Left Communists’ (Andrés Nin, Juan Andrade, and
others) have more than once tried to parry our criticism of their
collaborationist policies by citing our lack of understanding of the ‘special
conditions’ in Spain. This is the customary argument put to use by all
opportunists. But the first duty of a genuine proletarian revolutionist lies in
translating the special conditions of his country into the
international language of Marxism, which is understandable even beyond the
confines of one’s own country.”
— Ibid.
Once again, Durgan rushes to the defense of Nin. While chiding the
POUM for formally signing on to the electoral pact, he writes: “Given the
political situation, the POUM had little choice but to support the pact against
the right, but the only viable way to do this without confusing the party’s
position was to do so independently from outside” (“Spanish Trotskyists and the
Foundation of the POUM”). Here again, as in the 1930s and since, support for the
popular front is presented simply as a tactical maneuver rather than, as Trotsky
put it, “the greatest crime”—one paid for in the blood of the working class.
The February 1936 election of the popular-front government under
Republican Left politician Manuel Azaña, who had also been prime minister in the
1931-33 coalition government, opened a period of massive worker and peasant
unrest, including seizures of agricultural lands and hundreds of strikes between
February and July 1936. While working mightily to suppress the proletariat, the
popular front could not satisfy its bourgeois masters. On 17 July 1936, Franco
radioed garrisons in Spain to seize the cities. The government scrambled to make
a deal with the Franco forces while working to prevent any resistance by the
working class. The next day, the PSOE and PCE leaders issued a declaration
loyally proclaiming: “The government commands and the Popular Front obeys.” But
the workers were not about to “obey” the government’s efforts to lull them with
lies. On July 19, CNT/FAI and POUM workers spontaneously started organizing
barricades. Refused arms by the popular-front government, workers seized stocks
of rifles and dynamite and surrounded and disarmed army garrisons. A
revolutionary uprising had begun.
Within days, the whole of Catalonia was in the hands of the
proletariat. On July 20, a column of 5,000 dynamiters outfitted by the Asturian
miners arrived in Madrid to guard the streets. Armed workers committees
displaced customs officers at the borders; a union book or affiliation card from
a working-class political party was the only requirement to enter the country.
Important sectors of the bourgeoisie, particularly in Catalonia, either fled or
were driven out, flocking to the areas controlled by Franco’s army. A joint
committee of the UGT and CNT took charge of transportation throughout Spain.
Workers seized the abandoned factories and created factory collectives that
organized production on a local level. Such collectives or cooperatives were
organized in shipping, mining, electric power, transportation, gas and water
supply and many other industries.
The bourgeois government continued to “govern,” but power was
effectively in the hands of the armed workers and their committees. This was a
situation of dual power. As Trotsky wrote: “The historic preparation of a
revolution brings about, in the pre-revolutionary period, a situation in which
the class which is called to realize the new social system, although not yet
master of the country, has actually concentrated in its hands a significant
share of the state power, while the official apparatus of the government is
still in the hands of the old lords.” The question was whether this “twofold
sovereignty,” as Trotsky called it, would be resolved in favor of revolution or
counterrevolution. In the period between the February and October revolutions in
Russia, “the question stood thus,” explained Trotsky:
“Either the bourgeoisie will actually dominate the old state
apparatus, altering it a little for its purposes, in which case the soviets will
come to nothing; or the soviets will form the foundation of a new state,
liquidating not only the old governmental apparatus, but also the dominion of
those classes which it served. The Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries
[SRs] were steering toward the first solution, the Bolsheviks toward the
second.... The Bolsheviks were victorious.”
— The History of the Russian Revolution (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1932)
But in Spain there was no Bolshevik party. The Stalinists,
Socialists and anarchists pleaded with the bourgeoisie, in the name of the
“democratic revolution,” to take back the power that the workers had wrenched
from the capitalists arms in hand. As recounted by CNT leader García Oliver,
Luis Companys, head of the bourgeois-nationalist Catalan Esquerra, declared to
an assemblage of anarchist leaders after the workers had repulsed Franco:
“You have won and everything is within your power. If you have no
need of me, if you do not want me as president of Catalonia, say so now, and I
will be just another soldier in the antifascist struggle. If, on the other hand,
you believe that I, along with the men of my party, my name and my prestige, may
be of use in this office in a struggle which, while resolved today in this city
is yet to be decided in the rest of Spain, then you can count on me and on my
word as a man and as a politician convinced that a past of shame has today been
put to rest in the sincere hope that Catalonia will put itself in the vanguard
of the most socially advanced countries in the world.”
— quoted in José Peirats Valls, The CNT in the Spanish
Revolution (Hastings, England: Meltzer Press, 2001)
This was all the anarchist leaders needed to hear. García Oliver
concludes his account: “The CNT and the FAI opted for collaboration and
democracy, eschewing the revolutionary totalitarianism which would have led to
the strangulation of the revolution by a confederal-anarchist dictatorship. They
trusted in the word of a Catalan democrat and retained and supported Companys as
president of the Generalitat.”
Dual Power in the Absence of a Bolshevik Vanguard
Unlike the soviets in Russia, the various factory and militia
committees in Spain were generally unelected, their composition and character
varying from one place to another depending on which group was in control. It
was necessary to transform them into real soviets through the election of
delegates, subject to immediate recall, from the factories and barracks, and to
centralize them into organs of united proletarian struggle against the
capitalist class countrywide. “Only when dual power assumes such organizational
proportions is there put on the order of the day the choice between the
prevailing régime and a new revolutionary order of which the Councils become the
state form” (Morrow, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Spain).
The Central Committee of Anti-Fascist Militias (CCMA) stood at the
pinnacle of the network of workers committees in Catalonia. Set up on 21 July
1936 as a committee of 15, it included representatives not only of the CNT, UGT
and other workers organizations but also of the bourgeois Esquerra. Given the
presence of the Esquerra, historian Agustín Guillamón argues in his valuable
account of the left-anarchist Friends of Durruti: “At no point was there a
dual power situation in existence. This is crucial to any
understanding of the Spanish revolution and civil war. The CAMC was a class
collaborationist agency” (The Friends of Durruti Group: 1937-1939 [San
Francisco: AK Press, 1996]).
The inclusion of the Esquerra in the CCMA was an expression of the
class-collaborationist politics of the reformist and anarchist leaders. But the
CCMA was not simply an extension of the popular-front government,
as was demonstrated by the fact that it was soon smashed by that government. As
Morrow explained:
“Unlike a coalition government which in actuality rests on the old
state machine, the Central Committee, dominated by the anarchists, rested on the
workers organizations and militias. The Esquerra and those closest to it—the
Stalinists and the UGT—merely tagged along for the time being. The decrees of
the Central Committee were the only law in Catalonia. Companys unquestioningly
obeyed its requisitions and financial orders. Beginning presumably as the center
for organizing the militias, it inevitably had to take on more and more
governmental functions. Soon it organized a department of worker-police; then a
department of supplies, whose word was law in the factories and seaport....
“Around the Central Committee of the militias rallied the
multitudinous committees of the factories, villages, supplies, food, police,
etc., in form joint committees of the various antifascist organizations, in
actuality wielding an authority greater than that of its constituents. After the
first tidal wave of revolution, of course, the committees revealed their basic
weakness: they were based on mutual agreement of the organizations from which
they drew their members, and after the first weeks, the Esquerra, backed by the
Stalinists, recovered their courage and voiced their own program. The CNT
leaders began to make concessions detrimental to the revolution. From that point
on, the committees could have only functioned progressively by abandoning the
method of mutual agreement and adopting the method of majority decisions by
democratically elected delegates from the militias and factories.”
— Morrow, op. cit.
A concrete expression of the fight against the
class-collaborationist politics that were strangling the revolutionary struggles
of the proletariat would have been the demand to expel the Esquerra from the
CCMA. This call would have struck a powerful chord among the militant Catalan
proletariat, which had been refused arms by the Esquerra in the fight against
Franco only to witness the anarchist and reformist leaders turn around and
embrace these bourgeois “democrats” after the workers had defeated Franco’s
forces. Calling for the expulsion of the Esquerra from the CCMA would have drawn
a sharp class line, elucidating the betrayals of the workers’ misleaders and
thus serving as a lever to win the proletariat to the banner of workers power
and the fight to forge a revolutionary party.
At the same time, simply expelling the representatives of the
bourgeoisie from the CCMA hardly exhausts the question. In fact, in its Lérida
stronghold, the POUM had evicted representatives of the Esquerra from the local
workers committee. But the POUM bowed to the popular front and
opposed the formation of democratically elected juntas of workers,
peasants and militiamen, rejecting the election of such committees even in the
factories and militia units under its control.
Nin argued that there was no need for soviets in Spain, ludicrously
asserting that such broad, authoritative organs of class struggle had arisen in
Russia because the proletariat lacked a tradition of struggle: “In Russia there
was no democratic tradition. There did not exist a tradition of organization and
of struggle in the proletariat.... Our proletariat, however, had its unions, its
parties, its own organizations. For this reason, the soviets have not risen
among us” (“The Fundamental Problem of Power,” La Batalla, 27 April 1937,
quoted in Morrow, op. cit.). This was an expression of Nin’s lack of
appetite for political struggle with the CNT and other tendencies. Nonetheless,
the POUM’s ability to speak the language of revolution gave it real authority,
an authority that would be wielded in disarming the proletariat and dissolving
the CCMA and the local workers committees.
The Counterrevolution Rearms
In September 1936, Nin denounced the popular-front government in
Madrid and raised the call, “Down with the bourgeois ministers.” Nin
simultaneously declared that Catalonia was already under a dictatorship of the
proletariat! That same month, Nin himself became a minister of the bourgeois
state, as the POUM joined the CNT/FAI in entering the Catalan Generalitat. Nin
was appointed Minister of Justice, the same position Kerensky first occupied in
the bourgeois Provisional Government in Russia! In that capacity, Nin presided
over a frontal assault by the Republican government against the incipient organs
of proletarian power established by the revolutionary workers of Catalonia. The
centerpiece of this counterrevolutionary attack was the “militarization” of the
militias: a Generalitat decree in early October ordered the dissolution of the
CCMA and the subordination of the workers militias to the bourgeois state. The
local committees were also dissolved and replaced with bourgeois municipal
administrations. An article signed “Indegeta” in the POUM’s La Batalla (7
October 1936) baldly declared:
“The Central Committee of the Anti-Fascist Militias was dissolved
as a logical consequence of the formation of the new government of the Council
of the Generalitat. ‘Dual power,’ a classic revolutionary phase, was completely
detrimental to the course of our revolution.... Two months of civil war and
revolution have shown us the evils of such a duality.”
— quoted in José Rebull, “On Dual Power,”
October 1937, reprinted in Revolutionary History Vol. 4, No. 1/2
October 1937, reprinted in Revolutionary History Vol. 4, No. 1/2
This was followed by an order to disarm all urban workers. In the
name of “collectivization of industry,” another decree sought to eradicate the
factory collectives by putting them increasingly under the thumb of a
government-appointed agent.
Nin personally accompanied bourgeois-nationalist Esquerra leader
Luis Companys to Lérida to oversee the dissolution of the POUM-dominated
committee there. Enric Adroher (Gironella), a POUM leader, would later
acknowledge that the Generalitat had “one historical mission...to liquidate the
committees” and that the POUM had been “entrusted to convince the revolutionary
forces” to accept this, only to be expelled from the government once this
“invaluable service” had been carried out (quoted in Durgan, “Trotsky and the
POUM”).
Following its ouster from the Generalitat in December 1936, the
POUM then appealed to this bourgeois government to convoke a
congress of the unions, peasants and combatants. As Trotsky noted, this was
merely a means by which the POUM sought to find a way back into the
popular-front government:
“The leaders of the POUM plaintively try to persuade
the government to take the road of socialist revolution. The POUM leaders
respectfully try to make the CNT leaders understand at last the Marxist teaching
about the state. The POUM leaders view themselves as ‘revolutionary’ advisors to
the leaders of the Popular Front. This position is lifeless and unworthy of
revolutionaries.
“It is necessary to openly and boldly mobilize the masses against
the Popular Front government. It is necessary to expose, for the syndicalist and
Anarchist workers to see, the betrayals of those gentlemen who call themselves
Anarchists but in fact have turned out to be simple liberals. It is necessary to
hammer away mercilessly at Stalinism as the worst agency of the bourgeoisie. It
is necessary to feel yourselves leaders of the revolutionary masses, not
advisors to the bourgeois government....
“In La Batalla of April 4, we find the ‘thirteen points for
victory.’ All the points have the character of advice that the
Central Committee of the POUM is offering to the authorities. The POUM demands
the ‘calling of a delegated congress of workers’ and peasants’ syndicates and of
soldiers.’ In form, what seems to be involved is a congress of workers’,
peasants’, and soldiers’ deputies. But the trouble is that the POUM respectfully
proposes that the bourgeois-reformist government itself call such a congress,
which then ought to ‘peacefully’ substitute itself for the bourgeois government.
A revolutionary slogan is turned into empty phrases!”
— “Is Victory Possible in Spain?” 23 April 1937
The Role of the Anarchist CNT/FAI
The militarization of the militias marked a turning point. The
Republican bourgeoisie, emboldened by the treachery of the workers’ misleaders,
began to reassert its dominance. The revolutionary workers were thrown on the
defensive. Franco launched his siege of Madrid, forcing the central government
to move to Valencia. The CNT/FAI leadership accepted the subordination of the
militias to the state in exchange for being granted four government ministries
in Valencia. As Trotsky observed, “In opposing the goal, the
conquest of power, the Anarchists could not in the end fail to oppose the
means, the revolution”:
“More precisely, the Anarchist workers instinctively yearned to
enter the Bolshevik road (July 19, 1936, and May days of 1937) while their
leaders, on the contrary, with all their might drove the masses into the camp of
the Popular Front, i.e., of the bourgeois regime.
“The Anarchists revealed a fatal lack of understanding of the laws
of the revolution and its tasks by seeking to limit themselves to their own
trade unions, that is, to organizations permeated with the routine of peaceful
times, and by ignoring what went on outside the framework of the trade unions,
among the masses, among the political parties, and in the government apparatus.
Had the Anarchists been revolutionists, they would first of all have called for
the creation of soviets, which unite the representatives of all the toilers of
city and country, including the most oppressed strata, who never joined the
trade unions. The revolutionary workers would have naturally occupied the
dominant position in these soviets. The Stalinists would have remained an
insignificant minority. The proletariat would have convinced itself of its own
invincible strength. The apparatus of the bourgeois state would have hung
suspended in the air. One strong blow would have sufficed to pulverize this
apparatus....
“Instead of this, the anarcho-syndicalists, seeking to hide from
‘politics’ in the trade unions, turned out to be, to the great surprise of the
whole world and themselves, a fifth wheel in the cart of bourgeois democracy.”
— “Lessons of Spain: The Last Warning,” 17 December 1937
Despite his incisive portrayal of the traitorous role played by the
CNT leadership, Vernon Richards can situate these betrayals only in the
“corruption of power” (Lessons of the Spanish Revolution). The CNT’s
capitulation to Companys and the bourgeois state was a reflection, not a
repudiation, of the radical idealism at the core of anarchism. Rejecting
political power, anarchism posits instead that liberation from oppression is an
act of moral regeneration by all persons of “good will.” As Morrow explained:
“Class collaboration, indeed, lies concealed in the heart of
anarchist philosophy. It is hidden, during periods of reaction, by anarchist
hatred of capitalist oppression. But, in a revolutionary period of dual power,
it must come to the surface. For then the capitalist smilingly offers to share
in building the new world. And the anarchist, being opposed to ‘all
dictatorships,’ including dictatorship of the proletariat, will require of the
capitalist merely that he throw off the capitalist outlook, to which he agrees,
naturally, the better to prepare the crushing of the workers.”
— Morrow, op. cit.
When it had a mass base and operated under conditions of bourgeois
legality, the CNT acted pretty much like any other trade union. As Trotsky wrote
in 1938, “As organizations expressive of the top layers of the proletariat,
trade unions, as witnessed by all past historical experience, including the
fresh experience of the anarcho-syndicalist unions in Spain, developed powerful
tendencies toward compromise with the bourgeois-democratic regime. In periods of
acute class struggle, the leading bodies of the trade unions aim to become
masters of the mass movement in order to render it harmless” (“Trade Unions in
the Transitional Epoch,” Leon Trotsky on the Trade Unions [New York:
Pathfinder, 1969]). If the trade unions did not come under the leadership of a
revolutionary party struggling for proletarian state power, they would act as
auxiliaries of bourgeois democracy. The CNT leaders, notwithstanding their more
radical rhetoric, demonstrated themselves to be nothing other than what they
were—reformist trade-union bureaucrats.
Reflecting increasing anger and discontent at the base of the CNT
in response to the dissolution of the militias, one group of anarchists, the
Friends of Durruti, did finally raise the call for workers juntas. Formed in
March 1937, the group took its name from longtime radical anarchist Buenaventura
Durruti, a leading militant in the FAI and the head of a CNT militia at the
Aragon front. In November 1936, Durruti had publicly denounced the CNT
leadership’s support for the militarization of the militias; he was killed later
that month under suspicious circumstances. As Guillamón points out in The
Friends of Durruti Group: 1937-1939, the group represented a fusion of those
radical anarchist combatants opposed to the dissolution of the militias—such as
Durruti’s former collaborator, Pablo Ruiz—and anarchist intellectuals opposed to
participation in the government. Among the latter was Jaime Balius, a central
writer for the CNT’s Solidaridad Obrera. The Friends had some 4,000 or
more militants and significant roots in the CNT/FAI. (See “Trotskyism and
Anarchism in the Spanish Civil War,” Workers Vanguard Nos. 828 and 829,
11 June and 9 July 2004.)
Although the Friends of Durruti never made the leap from anarchism
to Marxism, their desire to see the workers revolution through to victory
propelled them to the limits of anarchist ideology. In a 1938 pamphlet,
Towards a Fresh Revolution, Balius declared:
“We are introducing a slight variation into our program. The
establishment of a Revolutionary Junta.
“As we see it, the revolution needs organisms to oversee it and to
repress, in an organized sense, hostile sectors. As current events have shown,
such sectors do not accept oblivion unless they are crushed.”
— quoted in Guillamón, The Friends of Durruti Group:
1937-1939
This “slight variation,” recognizing the need for an organ of
repression against “hostile sectors,” amounted to an implicit recognition of the
need for a workers state, that is, the dictatorship of the proletariat. As Lenin
put it, “Should the workers ‘lay down their arms,’ or use them against the
capitalists in order to crush their resistance? But what is the systematic use
of arms by one class against another if not a ‘transient form’ of state?”
(The State and Revolution, 1917).
From the start of the Spanish events, Trotsky had emphasized the
need to reach out to the CNT, which “indisputably embraces the most militant
elements of the proletariat”:
“Here the selection has gone on for a number of years. To
strengthen this confederation, to transform it into a genuine organization of
the masses, is the obligation of every advanced worker and, above all, of the
communists....
“But at the same time we have no illusions about the fate of
anarcho-syndicalism as a doctrine and a revolutionary method.
Anarcho-syndicalism disarms the proletariat by its lack of a revolutionary
program and its failure to understand the role of the party. The anarchists
‘deny’ politics until it seizes them by the throat; then they prepare the ground
for the politics of the enemy class.”
— “The Revolution in Spain,” January 1931
Both the ICE and Maurín’s BOC initially had some forces inside the
CNT. In 1932-33, the anarchist FAI consolidated its grip on the CNT, driving out
most of the Maurínists (as well as the reformist syndicalists around Pestaña).
Anarchist Murray Bookchin, who rails against the alleged authoritarianism and
brutality of Lenin’s Bolsheviks, cynically declaims of the FAI’s bureaucratic
stranglehold over the CNT: “No illusion should exist that this success was
achieved with an overly sensitive regard for democratic niceties” (Bookchin,
“Introductory Essay,” ed. Sam Dolgoff, The Anarchist Collectives [New
York: Free Life Editions, 1974]).
The CNT/FAI, Trotsky observed, was drawn in the wake of the Catalan
nationalists; the Maurín group, in turn, was in the tow of the
anarcho-syndicalists. And Nin trailed behind the CNT/FAI and Maurín. This
politically conciliationist course came to full flower under the impact of the
Civil War and the popular front. Andrade, Nin’s “left” voice, openly
acknowledged the POUM’s bankrupt reliance on the anarcho-syndicalist leaders:
“The future of the Spanish revolution will depend on the attitude of the CNT and
of the FAI and on the ability which their leaders (!) will demonstrate in
orientating the masses which they influence” (quoted in Adolphe, “History and
Lessons of a Mistake,” 28 May 1937, Information Bulletin, July 1937). As
Morrow wrote:
“The POUM leadership clung to the CNT. Instead of boldly
contending with the anarcho-reformists for the leadership of the masses, Nin
sought illusory strength by identifying himself with them. The POUM sent its
militants into the smaller and heterogeneous Catalan UGT instead of contending
for leadership of the millions in the CNT. It organized POUM militia columns,
circumscribing its influence, instead of sending its forces into the enormous
CNT columns where the decisive sections of the proletariat were already
gathered. La Batalla recorded the tendency of CNT unions to treat
collectivized property as their own. It never attacked the anarcho-syndicalist
theories which created the tendency. In the ensuing year, it never once made a
principled attack on the anarcho-reformist leadership, not even when the
anarchists acquiesced in the expulsion of the POUM from the Generalidad. Far
from leading to united action with the CNT, this false course permitted the
CNT-FAI leadership, with perfect impunity, to turn its back on the POUM.”
— Morrow, op. cit.
The Durruti Group: Left Anarchists Without a Compass
The POUM initially praised (seemingly uncritically) the Friends of
Durruti. After the fact, Andrade dismissed the significance of this left current
within anarcho-syndicalism, writing in 1986: “An attempt has since been made to
depict the ‘Friends of Durruti’ as a mightily representative organization,
articulating the revolutionary consciousness of the CNT-FAI. In reality, they
counted for nothing organizationally and were a monument of confusion in
ideological terms” (quoted in Guillamón, op. cit.). Durgan echoes: “There
has also been a tendency in Trotskyist writings on the Spanish Revolution to
overestimate the importance of the POUM’s potential allies in May 1937, the
radical anarchist group, the Friends of Durruti” (Durgan, “Trotsky and the
POUM”).
These are alibis for the POUM’s refusal to politically combat the
anarcho-syndicalists. The Durruti group was deeply confused. But
it was in political motion. Had there been a Leninist party to intersect that
motion, the best of these left anarchists could have been stripped of the
ideological baggage they carried and won to Bolshevism. Through the experience
of the popular front and the treachery of the CNT/FAI leaders, the militants of
the Durruti group had begun to empirically reject key aspects of anarchist
doctrine, including the “anti-authoritarianism” with which the CNT leaders
justified their capitulation to Companys. Before its dissolution, the Gelsa
sector of the Durruti Column at the Aragon front called on the CNT/FAI
leadership to reorganize the militias under a central command responsible to
democratically elected delegates, and took some steps to realize this. In a
similar vein, Balius wrote in January 1937:
“Everybody is starting to realize that in order for the
proletariat to triumph rapidly in this struggle against fascism, it needs an
army. But an army of its own, born of itself, ruled by itself—controlled at
least by itself…. An army with command and discipline; workers command.”
— quoted in Miquel Amorós, La revolución traicionada: La
verdadera historia de Balius y Los Amigos de Durruti (The Revolution
Betrayed: The True History of Balius and the Friends of Durruti) (Barcelona:
Virus, 2003) (our translation)
In one of his last articles in the CNT’s Solidaridad Obrera
(6 December 1936), “Durruti’s Testament,” Balius wrote: “Durruti bluntly stated
that we anarchists require that the revolution be of a totalitarian nature”
(quoted in Guillamón, op. cit.). Balius later denied that the group ever
conceived of the junta as the organ of a new class power (see Ronald Fraser,
Blood of Spain: An Oral History of the Spanish Civil War [New York:
Pantheon Books, 1979]). But in an April 1937 poster, the group called for a
workers junta to replace the capitalist Generalitat government:
“Immediate establishment of a Revolutionary Junta made up of workers of city and
countryside and of combatants.... Rather than the Generalidad, a Revolutionary
Junta!” (quoted in Guillamón, op. cit.).
Yet the Friends of Durruti remained loyal to the CNT/FAI
throughout, and retained the anarchists’ hostility to political parties. Thus
they viewed the revolutionary juntas as being composed of delegates elected
solely from the unions. This denied representation to the masses of unorganized
workers, who were generally from the more oppressed and volatile layers of the
proletariat. Moreover, the trade unions, as organizations of routine defensive
struggle in peacetime, tended to act as a conservative brake on revolutionary
struggle. Trotsky wrote: “The epigones of syndicalism would have one believe
that the trade unions are sufficient by themselves. Theoretically, this means
nothing, but in practice it means the dissolution of the revolutionary vanguard
into the backward masses, that is, the trade unions” (“Communism and
Syndicalism,” October 1929, Leon Trotsky on the Trade Unions).
The Durruti group’s anti-political prejudice was also expressed in
a false distinction between junta control of the military effort and trade-union
control of the economy. Its 1938 platform, Towards a Fresh Revolution,
specified: “The Junta will steer clear of economic affairs, which are the
exclusive preserve of the unions.” But there is no way to separate political,
military and economic questions. The fighting capacity of the proletarian army
depended on the production of weapons, food and other materials; a revolutionary
junta could not prosecute the war without such considerations, nor could the
unions run economic affairs without consideration of what was necessary
militarily.
This was posed concretely around the question of providing the
workers with adequate arms. The CNT leaders justified their support to the
bourgeois state by arguing that a centralized military with modern weaponry was
needed to wage the war against Franco’s armies. Towards a Fresh
Revolution observed: “The North of Spain could have been saved if the war
materials needed for resistance to the enemy had been obtained. The means were
there. The Bank of Spain had enough gold to flood Spanish soil with weaponry.
Why was it not done?” The CNT could not and would not seize the banks because it
was itself part of the bourgeois state. The expropriation and collectivization
of finance and industry was the task of a workers state based on a centralized
junta power. But the Durruti group did not accept that such was the task of a
centralized soviet state, and was left without an answer to its question.
Perhaps even more telling of the Friends’ failure to break fully
from the CNT/FAI was its line on the national/colonial question. The anarchists’
hostility to all states logically led them to oppose the fight for independence
for Spanish Morocco. In its 1938 pamphlet, the Durruti group described Spain as
a colony while never once calling for Morocco’s independence. Vernon Richards’
criticism of the CNT/FAI leaders applies with equal force to the Friends of
Durruti:
“By their actions, it is clear that the C.N.T. had no
revolutionary programme which could have transformed Morocco from an enemy to an
ally of the popular movement, and at no time did the leaders take notice of
those anarchist militants in their midst, such as Camillo Berneri, who urged
that the Spanish anarchists should send agitators to N. Africa and conduct a
large scale propaganda campaign among the Arabs in favour of autonomy.”
— Lessons of the Spanish Revolution
The question of Morocco figured heavily in the birth of the CNT,
which followed in the wake of a 1909 general strike against the call-up of
military reservists to Morocco. Just after its founding in 1911, the CNT called
for another general strike, in part against the war in Morocco. But by the end
of 1936, the CNT/FAI leaders were serving as ministers of the Spanish bourgeois
state enforcing the colonial oppression of the Moroccan people.
The Trotskyists proclaimed: “Morocco for the Moroccans; the moment
that this slogan is publicly proclaimed it will foment insurrection among the
oppressed masses of Morocco and cause disintegration in the mercenary fascist
army” (“The Program of the Spanish Bolshevik-Leninists,” July 1937,
Revolutionary History Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 1988). Franco’s shock troops
were made up principally of Moroccans and the Spanish Foreign Legion, as well as
some troops supplied by Mussolini and Hitler. In exile on the island of Réunion,
Abd-el-Krim, the leader of the 1921-26 Rif war against the French and Spanish
colonialists in Morocco, asked PSOE prime minister Largo Caballero to use his
influence with the French popular-front government of Léon Blum to secure his
release so that Krim could return to Morocco to lead an insurrection against
Franco. But the British and French imperialists whom the Spanish Republic looked
to would not countenance such a move. As Morrow remarked, “Caballero would not
ask, and Blum would not grant. To rouse Spanish Morocco might endanger
imperialist domination throughout Africa” (Revolution and Counter-Revolution
in Spain).
The Fight to Reforge a Trotskyist Nucleus
With Nin’s liquidation into the POUM in 1935, a betrayal and
default of historic proportions, the banner of the Fourth International
disappeared from Spain for over a year. Writing immediately after the POUM
signed the popular-front pact, Trotsky stated that it was necessary to
“mercilessly expose the betrayal of Maurín, Nin, Andrade, and their associates,
and lay the foundation for the Spanish section of the Fourth International”
(“The Treachery of the POUM”). A few months later, he wrote: “Marxist action in
Spain can begin only by means of an irreconcilable condemnation of the whole
policy of Andrés Nin and Andrade, which was and remains not only false but also
criminal.” Asserting that “the truly revolutionary elements still have a certain
period of time, not too long, to be sure, in which to take stock of themselves,
gather their forces, and prepare for the future,” Trotsky argued that the tasks
of “the Spanish supporters of the Fourth International...are as clear as day”:
“1. To condemn and denounce mercilessly before the masses the
policy of all the leaders participating in the Popular Front.
“2. To grasp in full the wretchedness of the leadership of the
‘Workers Party of Marxist Unification’ and especially of the former ‘Left
Communists’—Andrés Nin, Andrade, etc.—and to portray them clearly before the
eyes of all the advanced workers.
“3. To rally around the banner of the Fourth International on the
basis of the ‘Open Letter’ [Spring 1935].
“4. To join the Socialist Party and the United Youth in order to
work there as a faction in the spirit of Bolshevism.
“5. To establish fractions and other nuclei in the trade unions
and other mass organizations.
“6. To direct their main attention to the spontaneous and
semi-spontaneous mass movements, to study their general traits, that is, to
study the temperature of the masses and not the temperature of the parliamentary
cliques.
“7. To be present in every struggle so as to give it clear
expression.
“8. To insist always on having the fighting masses form and
constantly expand their committees of action (juntas, soviets), elected ad
hoc.
“9. To counterpose the program of the conquest of power, the
dictatorship of the proletariat, and the social revolution to all hybrid
programs (à la Caballero, or à la Maurín).
“This is the real road of the proletarian revolution. There is no
other.”
— “Tasks of the Fourth International in Spain,” 12 April 1936
This letter was written to a supporter in Spain, but it is
unclear if it ever made it to its destination, or was circulated in Spain. It
was, however, published in the Trotskyist press internationally.
It was necessary to build anew a Spanish Trotskyist nucleus that
would openly fly the banner of the Fourth International and turn an independent
face to the masses. This required a struggle as well against conciliationist
elements within the ICL. Many of the older European Oppositionist
cadres—including Vereecken and Sneevliet—were under the sway of the centrist
London Bureau, and they ended up siding with Nin against Trotsky. In late July
1936, the ICL held a conference in Paris, out of which issued the Movement for
the Fourth International. Sneevliet walked out of this conference after a few
hours, having declared that he intended to participate in a conference of the
London Bureau later that autumn. By and large, the International Secretariat,
based in Paris, consisted of relatively young and inexperienced elements. They,
too, were subject to the pressures of popular frontism, particularly pronounced
in France, which was then under the Popular Front government of Léon Blum. Jean
Rous, one of the leaders of the French section, served as the I.S.
representative in Spain in 1936.
Thus, as the Spanish Civil War broke out, the international center
of the Trotskyist movement was new and ungelled. Above all, it was deprived of
Trotsky’s intervention for five crucial months. In late August 1936, as Moscow
announced the first in a series of frame-up trials that led to massive blood
purges, Trotsky was interned by the Norwegian government at the behest of the
Stalinist bureaucracy. Having just completed The Revolution Betrayed, his
definitive analysis of the Stalinist degeneration of the Soviet Union, Trotsky
was immediately faced with the task of exposing the Stalin regime’s slanders of
himself and the other old Bolsheviks. In December, Trotsky was deported to
Mexico, arriving there the following month. His absence as an active factor of
intervention in Spain during this period was an incalculable loss.
A wealth of documentary material by or about the Spanish
Trotskyists and the debates in the Fourth International over Spain is now
available at Harvard and the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, among
other facilities. But the job of reviewing it all and putting together a
complete picture of the Trotskyist intervention remains to be done. We have
reviewed some I.S. minutes and correspondence and reports on Spain as well as
memoirs by participants and other materials published in English in
Revolutionary History and other sources. We have also looked through the
collection of Spanish Trotskyist materials compiled by Agustín Guillamón in
Documentación Histórica del Trosquismo Español (1936-1948) (Historical
Documentation of Spanish Trotskyism) (Madrid: Ediciones de la Torre, 1996).
However, even the best of the memoir material, like Munis’ Jalones de
Derrota: Promesa de Victoria, says little about the internal disputes and
discussions that took place between the liquidation of the ICE in 1935 and the
Barcelona insurrection in 1937. Thus, our knowledge of the work of the Spanish
Trotskyists is fragmentary, and we can make only some general observations. Much
more work needs to be done for a thorough assessment of the work of the Fourth
International in Spain in 1936-37.
Conciliation of the POUM
In the summer of 1936, after several largely unsuccessful efforts
to re-establish contacts in Spain, the I.S. was contacted by the small
Bolshevik-Leninist Group (GBL) headed by Nicola di Bartolomeo (Fosco). The GBL
was made up largely of foreigners, many of them Italians like Fosco, who had
been members of the Left Opposition in their countries and had come to Spain to
fight in the Civil War. The bulk of them immediately went to the front to join
the POUM militia. The Spanish Trotskyists overwhelmingly ignored what had to be
their central task, getting out a journal with theoretical and polemical
articles needed to programmatically arm their intervention. As Lenin stressed in
his seminal work What Is To Be Done? (1902), a regular party press is the
critical scaffolding for building a revolutionary party. It wasn’t until April
1937 that the GBL’s successor, the SBLE, began publishing a newspaper, La Voz
Leninista (Leninist Voice). Only three issues were produced before the SBLE
was suppressed in 1938. The lack of a regular press fundamentally crippled the
Trotskyists’ intervention.
Instead of putting forward its own independent face to the masses,
the GBL was drawn into the wake of the POUM. Fosco, who was assigned by Nin to
take charge of organizing foreign volunteers for the POUM militia, pledged his
allegiance to the POUM as “the only revolutionary party” (La Batalla, 4
August 1936, Guillamón, Documentación [our translation]). When an I.S.
delegation led by Jean Rous arrived in Spain in August 1936 and distributed the
issue of the French Trotskyists’ La Lutte Ouvrière containing “The
Treachery of the POUM,” Fosco was no less incensed than the POUM leaders. “That
alone,” he later wrote, “was enough to condemn the entire policy of the
International Secretariat” (Guillamón, Documentación [our translation]).
Rous described Fosco as “an agent of the POUM in our ranks, who
facilitated the POUM’s repression of us” (Bulletin Intérieur
International No. 1, April 1937 [our translation]). Fosco was subsequently
expelled from the GBL and went on to produce several issues of a French-language
publication, Le Soviet, in league with Raymond Molinier, an unprincipled
maneuverer who had been expelled from the French section in late 1935. But it
was not only Fosco who denounced Trotsky for his scathing attacks on the POUM
leaders. Sneevliet, Serge and Vereecken did so, too. In 1936-37, the younger
elements in the I.S. were engaged in heated but often inconclusive struggles
with the pronounced pro-POUM views of Sneevliet, Vereecken and Serge. Among the
more solid elements in the I.S. were Erwin Wolf (Braun), a Czech Oppositionist
who served as Trotsky’s secretary in Norway, and Rudolph Klement (Adolphe), who
had been Trotsky’s secretary before that, in Turkey and France.
In a 20 December 1936 letter, Rous reported: “When Sneevliet came
to Barcelona, he categorically and publicly condemned the political line of the
I.S. in order to praise the political line of the POUM, in his position as a
member of the Bureau for the IVth International” (ibid. [our
translation]). Vereecken likewise defended the POUM. Vereecken acknowledged that
the POUM had made some “mistakes,” though he would not call these by their right
name—betrayals. He reserved his fire for Trotsky’s “criminal” denunciations of
these “mistakes.” When Vereecken’s paper ran an article by the POUM with an
introduction praising Nin & Co., Trotsky wrote in a letter to the editorial
board:
“For six years, Nin has made nothing but mistakes. He has flirted
with ideas and eluded difficulties. Instead of battle, he has substituted petty
combinations. He has impeded the creation of a revolutionary party in Spain. All
the leaders who have followed him share in the same responsibility. For six
years they have done everything possible to subject this energetic and heroic
proletariat of Spain to the most terrible defeats.... Such wretchedness! And you
reproduce that with your approbation instead of flaying the Menshevik traitors
who cover themselves with quasi-Bolshevik formulas.
“Do not tell me that the workers of the POUM fight heroically,
etc. I know it as well as others do. But it is precisely their battle and their
sacrifice that forces us to tell the truth and nothing but the truth. Down with
diplomacy, flirtation, and equivocation. One must know how to tell the bitterest
truth when the fate of a war and of a revolution depend on it. We have nothing
in common with the policy of Nin, nor with any who protect, camouflage or defend
it.”
— “To the Editorial Board of La Lutte Ouvrière,” 23 March
1937
In response to Trotsky, Vereecken raged: “We consider this article
as well as the attitude, in general, of our Buro and of the French Section on
the POUM as sectarian and harmful, and if we were tempted to use strong words,
we would say criminal” (Vereecken, “For a Correct Policy in Respect to the
Spanish Revolution and POUM,” reprinted in Information Bulletin, July
1937). Vereecken echoed Nin’s parochial justifications for rejecting the lessons
of the Bolshevik Revolution: “A party is not a piece of goods which can be
imported and exported at will. The Spanish Revolution will be ‘Spanish’ just as
the Russian Revolution was ‘Russian’.” Finally, concluded Vereecken, “What we
wish to bring out with all our strength is that the POUM is the revolutionary
organization in Spain,” complaining, “The whole activity of the Buro is directed
toward the building of a revolutionary party outside of the POUM”
(ibid.).
Unfortunately, this was not the case. Hampered by Trotsky’s
unavailability and the fact that differences over the POUM were not fully fought
out, elements in the I.S. initially bent to the pressures of POUM apologists
like Sneevliet and Vereecken and clearly did not “grasp in full the
wretchedness” of Nin & Co. This was compounded by the weakness of the forces
of Spanish Trotskyism on the ground. These had been strengthened with the return
in October 1936 of Grandizo Munis, one of the handful of ICE cadre who had sided
with Trotsky against Nin over the question of entry into the PSOE/JS. Even then
the Trotskyists in Spain were overwhelmingly foreign, politically incoherent and
confronted with mass organizations of the working class in a revolutionary
situation.
But this is not an argument against fighting to build the
proletarian vanguard leadership that was so desperately necessary. It was the
first duty of the Spanish Trotskyists to fight to split and regroup
revolutionary elements from the POUM, the anarchists and other workers parties
with the aim of forging the crucial instrument for victory—a Leninist vanguard
party. Instead, the Spanish Trotskyists and the I.S. were overwhelmingly
preoccupied with entry into the POUM as the only means through which a Bolshevik
party could be forged.
In a 24 August 1936 letter, Hans David Freund (Moulin), a
German émigré who became a leader of the Spanish Bolshevik-Leninists, described
the POUM as “a centrist party,” but concluded: “We must work towards the
Bolshevisation of the POUM, although we cannot predict whether it will
accomplish this by changing its present leadership for another one, or by the
evolution of its leaders in the direction of Bolshevism-Leninism”
(Revolutionary History Vol. 4, No. 1/2). With the support and urging of
the I.S., the Bolshevik-Leninists attempted to arrange an entry into the POUM
with factional rights.
Nin’s response to their first entreaty was to argue that the
Trotskyists could join only as individuals and to demand, “You must declare
publicly that you disassociate yourselves and disagree with the campaign of
calumny and defamation carried on against our party by the publications of the
would-be 4th International” (“Letter from Nin to the Bolshevik-Leninists of
Barcelona,” 13 November 1936, Information Bulletin, July 1937). The SBLE
tried another entry approach after this, with a sharply polemical letter to the
POUM leadership in April 1937 (Information Bulletin, July 1937). Also
published in the July 1937 Information Bulletin was an article by
Trotsky, following the Barcelona May Days, warning against focusing on the POUM:
“The POUM still remains a Catalan organization. Its leaders
prevented in its time entry into the Socialist Party, covering their fundamental
opportunism with a sterile intransigence. It is to be hoped, however, that the
events in Catalonia will produce fissures and splits in the ranks of the
Socialist Party and the U.G.T. In this case it would be fatal to be confined
within the cadres of the POUM, which moreover will be much reduced in the weeks
to come. It is necessary to turn towards the anarchist masses in Catalonia,
towards the socialist and communist masses elsewhere. It is not a question of
preserving the old external forms, but of creating new points of support for the
future.”
— “The Insurrection in Barcelona (Some Preliminary Remarks),” 12
May 1937
There is no question that the Trotskyists should have sought access
to the members of the POUM, which had grown from several thousand to some 30,000
in the first months of the Civil War and whose leftist rhetoric, as Trotsky put
it, “created the illusion that a revolutionary party existed in Spain” (“The
Culpability of Left Centrism,” 10 March 1939). Needless to say, it was much more
difficult to get such access to the POUM ranks from the outside. But this was
not at all like the situation confronting the Trotskyists at the time of the
French turn, where they entered large parties in ferment with the aim of
intersecting a short-lived opportunity and were able to put out a press openly
espousing their views and principles.
The POUM had gone over to the class enemy when it signed on to the
“Left Electoral Pact” in January 1936. As Trotsky insisted, the fight to win
over revolutionary elements within the POUM’s ranks had to begin with an
“irreconcilable condemnation” of this betrayal. The demand that the POUM
repudiate this pact was the only principled basis for even considering the
tactic of entry. Nin’s participation as Minister of Justice in the Catalan
popular-front government was simply the concrete expression of its original
betrayal. Although Nin was thrown out of the government in December 1936, the
whole orientation of the POUM remained focused on gaining re-entry into the
government. To have joined the POUM, even with factional rights, would have
subjected the Trotskyists to the POUM’s discipline. This would have been a
betrayal in Spain 1936-37. There was no place in the POUM for Trotskyists. As
Trotsky wrote in a later polemic against Sneevliet and Vereecken:
“That Vereecken should reduce the question to the simple right of
factions to exist shows only that he has completely wiped out the line of
demarcation between centrism and Marxism. Here is what a true Marxist would say:
‘They say there is no democracy in the POUM. This is not true. Democracy does
exist there—for the right-wingers, for the centrists, for the confusionists, but
not for the Bolshevik-Leninists.’ In other words, the extent of democracy in the
POUM is determined by the real content of its centrist policy, radically hostile
to revolutionary Marxism.”
— “A Test of Ideas and Individuals Through the Spanish Experience,”
24 August 1937
The task confronting the tiny Trotskyist forces was to build the
nucleus of a vanguard party through regrouping left-wing elements from the POUM
and the anarcho-syndicalists, as well as from the Socialist or Communist
parties. Only by constructing such a nucleus as a fulcrum could a lever be
applied for splitting the mass of revolutionary workers from their misleaders.
The tactic of the united front would have been an important weapon to exploit
the contradictions between the working-class base and the leaderships of the
reformist, centrist and anarcho-syndicalist tendencies. The combination of unity
in action against the blows of reaction and freedom of criticism in exposing the
treachery of the other workers organizations would have aided in translating the
political premises of Trotskyism into living reality.
The SBLE also bent in the direction of the POUM programmatically
with its call for a “revolutionary front of the proletariat” of the POUM and the
CNT to lead the fight against the popular front. A February 1937 SBLE leaflet
declared:
“It is necessary, urgently necessary, to form a revolutionary
front of the proletariat that rises up against the sacred unity represented by
the Popular Front....
“As the most powerful organizations on the extreme left, the POUM
and the CNT must initiate the revolutionary front. Its objectives, as well as
free access to all workers organizations that reject the disastrous policy of
the popular front, must be clearly established.”
— SBLE leaflet, “Workers of the CNT, the POUM, the FAI, the JJ.LL.
[Young Libertarians]—Proletarians All,” Guillamón Documentación (our
translation)
The SBLE slogan was a direct echo of the POUM’s call for a
“revolutionary workers front,” by which Nin meant sealing a political pact with
the CNT leaders for the purpose of re-entering the Catalan government. Trotsky
argued that a united revolutionary front of the proletariat was only possible
through the creation of soviets and under the leadership of a revolutionary
party. Unlike the POUM, the SBLE did raise the call for soviets. Nonetheless,
the demand for a “revolutionary proletarian front” separate from soviets and
under the leadership of the CNT and the POUM could only have built illusions in
the anarchist and centrist misleaders.
After Trotsky arrived in Mexico in January 1937, he resumed his
writing on Spain, much of it polemics against apologists for the POUM. Klement
and Wolf in the I.S. began to acknowledge some problems with their earlier
partial attempts to address the pro-POUM opportunism of the Dutch and Belgian
leaderships. An I.S. meeting in May 1937 saw a sharp fight with Vereecken and
passed a self-critical resolution on the earlier acquiescence to Sneevliet’s
demands not to publish criticisms of him in an internal bulletin. The resolution
conceded: “The I.S. regrets having lost precious time trying in vain to convince
the [Dutch] RSAP leadership to accept an international discussion on these
differences.” Wolf, reporting from Spain, later wrote critically of “the overly
prolonged silence and vacillations of the I.S. The POUM skillfully used the
differences between the different sections of the IV International and weakened
the force of argumentation of the Spanish BL” (Wolf, “Internal Report,” 6-7 July
1937, Documentación [our translation]). Wolf also acknowledged, “In the
past, we focused almost exclusively on the POUM. The revolutionary anarchist
workers were too often forgotten, with the exception of the Friends of Durruti”
(ibid.). Finally, in “Resolutions of the International Buro for the 4th
International on the Present Situation in Spain and the Tasks of the
Bolshevik-Leninists” (undated), there appeared a categorical statement of the
need to build an independent party:
“The task of building a new revolutionary leadership of the 4th
International will be not to become the advisers of the leadership of the POUM,
but rather, above all, to address the workers directly and explain to them the
situation as it is, on the basis of the line and program of the movement for the
4th International.”
— reprinted in Information Bulletin, July 1937
Wolf, who had volunteered to go to Spain when the I.S. could find
no other cadre willing to go, was arrested shortly after by Stalinist GPU agents
in Spain and murdered, as was Freund (Moulin). The following year, Klement was
also assassinated by the Stalinists.
The Barcelona Insurrection
The last chapter of the POUM’s treachery was played out on the
streets of Barcelona in May 1937. On April 14, the bourgeoisie’s pitiful
commemoration of the founding of the Republic was drowned out by huge food riots
by the working-class women of the city. On April 29, as Hugo Oehler reports in
his 1937 eyewitness account, “Barricades in Barcelona” (reprinted in
Revolutionary History Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 1988), the Generalitat
ordered that all groups “not directly dependent on the Generality Council will
withdraw instantly from the streets so as to make possible the rapid elimination
of the unrest and alarm that Catalonia is now enduring” (quoted in
ibid.). The CNT, UGT, PSUC and POUM dutifully called off their May Day
demonstrations. On May 3, Stalinist-led Assault Guards attacked the Telefónica
occupied by CNT workers, and barricades went up throughout Barcelona and its
suburbs.
The SBLE fought to offer revolutionary leadership to the CNT and
POUM members who manned the barricades. In their 4 May 1937 leaflet, the
Trotskyists urged the workers to seize the “revolutionary offensive” and to form
“committees of revolutionary defence in the shops, factories, districts”
(reprinted in Information Bulletin, July 1937). A POUM leaflet argued
instead that “retreat is necessary” because the workers had already defeated the
counterrevolutionary provocation (ibid.). Calling for the withdrawal of
government forces from the streets and for the working class to keep its arms,
the POUM declared: “The accomplishment of these perfectly acceptable conditions
can put an end to the struggle.” But the bourgeoisie and its Stalinist henchmen
rejected these “perfectly acceptable conditions”—and the POUM leaders
nonetheless exerted every effort to “put an end to the struggle.”
Despite confusion and demoralization, the workers returned to the
barricades time and again. Angered by the brutality of the police, Oehler
reports, on Wednesday, May 5, “With renewed energy, with fury, the proletariat
attacked the class enemy.” A section of the Durruti Column and some 500 POUM
soldiers left the Aragon front—armed with machine guns, tanks and light
artillery, to join their comrades on the barricades, but were turned back with
the lie that the fighting had ended. That day, the Friends of Durruti also
distributed a leaflet on the barricades, proclaiming:
“Workers! A Revolutionary Junta. Shoot the culprits. Disarm the
armed corps. Socialize the economy. Disband the political parties which have
turned on the working class. We must not surrender the streets. The revolution
before all else. We salute our comrades from the POUM who fraternized with us on
the streets. Long live the Social Revolution! Down with the counterrevolution!”
— quoted in Guillamón, The Friends of Durruti Group:
1937-1939
But the Durruti group continued to look to the CNT leadership and
was itself disoriented when the CNT and POUM refused to fight for power. On May
5, representatives of the SBLE met with the Friends of Durruti to discuss the
possibility of coordinated action, to no avail.
On May 6, reports Oehler:
“Solidaridad Obrera (CNT) this morning announced, ‘The CNT
and the UGT have both commanded return to work.’ The same issue refused all
responsibility for the leaflet of the Friends of Durruti. La Batalla
(POUM) appeared and echoed the Anarcho-Syndicalist croaking: ‘Now that the
counter-revolutionary provocations have been smashed, it is necessary to
withdraw from the struggle. Workers, return to labour.’… When the POUM workers
on the barricades beside the Hotel Falcon [POUM headquarters] saw this sheet,
they raged and refused to leave their posts. They denounced their leaders as
betrayers. The Thursday issue of Soli, as the CNT paper was called, was
burnt like previous issues on many barricades.”
— Oehler, op. cit.
That day, the POUM leaders meekly surrendered the La Batalla
offices to the police, and the murdered body of Camillo Berneri, an honorable
left anarchist, was found on the streets, one of the first victims of the
renewed white terror. Within a few weeks, Andrés Nin was also arrested and
murdered. To the end he retained his illusions in the popular front, refusing to
heed a warning passed on to him by a sympathetic militiaman that he was about to
be arrested. Juan Andrade later commented, “None of us believed the situation
was serious enough to risk our arrest” (quoted in Fraser, Blood of
Spain).
Oehler concludes his account with a denunciation of Trotsky’s
“liquidationism,” falsely blaming the Bolshevik leader for the SBLE’s attempts
to enter the POUM. But Oehler says nothing of his own, very real political
responsibility for the POUM. In 1934-35, Oehler’s rotten bloc with Nin in
opposition to the French turn provided Nin with a leftist political cover as he
liquidated the forces of Spanish Trotskyism into the POUM. And at the time of
the Barcelona May Days, Oehler was aligned with an oppositional grouping
within the POUM, José Rebull’s Cell 72 in Barcelona. A 16 April
1937 “Eyewitness Account by Edward H. Oliver” (likely a pseudonym for Oehler),
published by Oehler’s Revolutionary Workers League, uncritically praised a
resolution of the Barcelona POUM Local Committee that called on the POUM, CNT
and FAI, as “organizations whose objectives [sic] is the proletarian
revolution,” to “form the revolutionary united front in an attempt to win the
masses” (quoted in Oliver, “Sixth Anniversary of the Spanish Republic in
Barcelona,” datelined 16 April 1937). This resolution, according to Oliver,
offered “the first clear workers solution for the crisis of the Generality”
(ibid.).
Rebull remained in the POUM through all of its betrayals. Just
after the May Days, Rebull authored an earnest critique of the POUM’s
governmental slogan that said not one word about the POUM’s role in dismantling
the barricades and subverting the insurrection! (See Rebull, “On the Slogan of
‘A UGT-CNT Government’,” May 1937, reprinted in Revolutionary History
Vol. 4, No. 1/2.)
Pierre Broué: Defeatism Clothed as “Objectivity”
In a history of the Spanish Civil War co-authored with Emile
Témime, Pierre Broué whitewashes the role of the POUM in the Barcelona May Days,
essentially retailing Nin/
Andrade’s version of the events:
Andrade’s version of the events:
“By Thursday 6 May order had nearly been restored. Companys
announced that there were neither winners nor losers. The mass of workers in
Barcelona had heard the appeals for calm, and the POUM backed down: ‘The
proletariat,’ it announced, ‘has won a partial victory over the
counterrevolution…. Workers, return to work’.”
— Broué and Témime, The Revolution and the Civil War in
Spain (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1970)
Far from “backing down” in the face of a retreat by the workers,
the POUM itself boasted in La Batalla (8 May 1937) of being “one of those
which have contributed the most to restoring normalcy” (quoted in Oehler,
“Barricades in Barcelona”). In contrast, a Leninist vanguard would have seized
the moment to break the insurgent anarchist workers from their betrayers and
lead a fight for power. But Nin & Co. were a gang of centrist capitulators
who joined with the traitors of the CNT/FAI in ordering the workers to “back
down.”
The “Spanish revolutionaries felt isolated,” write Broué and
Témime, by way of tacitly justifying the POUM’s entry into the popular front.
Pointing to the Stalinist blood purges in the Soviet Union, the triumph of
fascism in Germany and the alleged passivity of the proletariat elsewhere, they
assert: “In 1936 the world balance of power was by no means as favorable to the
Spanish Revolution as it had been in 1917-1919 to the Russian Revolution.” They
then pontificate:
“One could of course hold endless discussions about the
opportunities that they had of compensating for this isolation with a bold
revolutionary policy. It might be thought, as Trotsky did, that the Spanish
Revolution offered the possibility of a reversal of the world balance of power
and that it was precisely its defeat that opened the way to the outbreak of the
Second World War. The fact is that their sense of isolation was one of the
elements that determined the attitude of the Spanish Revolutionaries, many of
whom gave up the pursuit of the Revolution.”
— Ibid.
Broué and Témime return to this theme in concluding their account
of the Barcelona May Days:
“It is of course arguable [!] that the spontaneous reaction of the
Barcelona workers could have opened the road to a new revolutionary impetus and
that it was an opportunity to steam in reverse. Historians can merely state that
the Anarchist leaders did not wish to do so and that those of the POUM did not
believe that they could.”
— Ibid.
Like the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, a proletarian socialist victory
in Spain would have inspired revolutionary struggles of the working class
throughout the world, upsetting the course of the then-developing second
imperialist war. In 1936, France was engulfed in a prerevolutionary situation,
there were massive strikes in Belgium and throughout Europe the victory of
Hitler’s Nazis in Germany had impelled increasing leftward motion in the working
class. Even in the relatively politically backward United States, the 1930s
witnessed an unprecedented upsurge of class struggle. In 1934, three major
strikes—the Toledo Auto-Lite strike led by the American Workers Party, the
Trotskyist-led Teamsters strikes in Minneapolis and the eleven-week strike by
San Francisco longshoremen led by supporters of the Communist Party—laid the
basis for the class battles that built the CIO in the following years. The
Stalinist bureaucracy in the Soviet Union was sufficiently fearful that a
proletarian revolution in the West would reinvigorate the Soviet masses that it
pulled out all the stops to suppress the revolutionary Spanish proletariat and
drowned in blood any perceived challenge to the bureaucracy’s political grip
over the Soviet workers state.
In his 24 August 1937 article, Trotsky replied to Vereecken’s
assertion that a fight for power during the Barcelona May Days would have been
pure “adventurism.” Trotsky’s words serve also as a response to Broué’s haughty
above-the-battle “objectivity”:
“If the Catalan proletariat had seized power in May 1937—as it had
really seized it in July 1936—they would have found support throughout all of
Spain. The bourgeois-Stalinist reaction would not even have found two regiments
with which to crush the Catalan workers. In the territory occupied by Franco not
only the workers but also the peasants would have turned toward the Catalan
proletariat, would have isolated the fascist army and brought about its
irresistible disintegration. It is doubtful whether under these conditions any
foreign government would have risked throwing its regiments onto the burning
soil of Spain. Intervention would have become materially impossible, or at least
extremely dangerous.
“Naturally, in every insurrection, there is an element of
uncertainty and risk. But the subsequent course of events has proven that even
in the case of defeat the situation of the Spanish proletariat would have been
incomparably more favorable than now, to say nothing of the fact that the
revolutionary party would have assured its future.”
— “A Test of Ideas and Individuals Through the Spanish Experience”
The Fight for Revolutionary Leadership
Andy Durgan castigates Trotsky for an “almost millenarian and
messianic” political view, asserting that the Bolshevik leader “seemed confident
that the correct political line in a revolutionary situation could transform
even the smallest of groups into the leadership of the working class” (Durgan,
“Trotsky and the POUM”). The odds were certainly stacked against the small
forces of Spanish Trotskyism, up against mass organizations of the proletariat
in the midst of a revolutionary situation. But unlike the sages of
Revolutionary History, Trotsky understood that, regardless of the
circumstances, it was desperately necessary to fight to build a Leninist
vanguard party. To do otherwise is to admit defeat in advance.
One’s appreciation of the history of the workers movement and
revolutionary struggles of the past is, of course, conditioned by one’s own
programmatic outlook. Those who rule out the possibility of proletarian victory
in Spain in the 1930s do so from the vantage point of having themselves forsaken
the fight for the working-class seizure of state power. They read into the past
their own demoralized wallowing in the “politics of the possible”—i.e.,
reformist accommodation to the capitalist order. Thus, the Revolutionary
History crowd likewise denies the possibility of a socialist revolution in
Germany in 1923, in this case to amnesty the German Communist Party leadership
under Brandler (see “Rearming Bolshevism: A Trotskyist Critique of Germany 1923
and the Comintern,” Spartacist No. 56, Spring 2001).
In his pamphlet, The Lessons of October (1924), Trotsky
exposed and refuted the numerous “objective” arguments raised in 1923 as to why
a workers revolution had been impossible in Germany, noting that similar
arguments would have been made if the Russian Revolution had failed. Trotsky
repeated this point in his August 1940 polemical defense of a revolutionary
perspective in Spain against Victor Serge and other “attorneys of the POUM.”
“The historical falsification consists in this, that the responsibility for the
defeat of the Spanish masses is unloaded on the working masses and not those
parties that paralyzed or simply crushed the revolutionary movement of the
masses” (“The Class, the Party, and the Leadership”). The Spanish proletariat
stood at a higher level in 1936 than did the Russian proletariat at the
beginning of 1917. If Lenin had not been in Russia to carry out the struggles
needed to politically arm the Bolshevik Party for the seizure of state power,
wrote Trotsky, “There couldn’t even be talk of the victory of the proletarian
revolution. The Soviets would have been crushed by the counterrevolution and the
little sages of all countries would have written articles and books on the
keynote that only uprooted visionaries could dream in Russia of the dictatorship
of the proletariat, so small numerically and so immature” (ibid.).
The lessons of Spain were dearly bought. We learned from and sought
to avoid the political problems and weaknesses of the Spanish Trotskyists when
our tendency, the International Communist League, intervened into the incipient
political revolution in the East German deformed workers state, the DDR, in
1989-90. Although far different—one a battle against the rule of the bourgeoisie
and the other against the reinstitution of the rule of capital—both were
revolutionary situations. Like the SBLE and the Movement for the Fourth
International, our forces were small, although we had the advantage of
international phone and fax communication and an established section in West
Germany. But it wasn’t primarily a question of numbers, but of political
clarity, coherence and relentless political struggle for the program of
Bolshevism. In this we were guided by Trotsky’s understanding in his writings on
Spain that “the advantage of a revolutionary situation consists precisely in the
fact that even a small group can become a great force in a brief space of time,
provided that it gives a correct prognosis and raises the correct slogans in
time” (“The Character of the Revolution,” 18 June 1931).
We established a newspaper, Arbeiterpressekorrespondenz
(Workers Press Correspondence), which appeared first on a daily and then a
weekly basis and circulated in tens of thousands of copies in the DDR. We armed
our supporters with theoretical and polemical propaganda, including a special
issue devoted to polemics against the various pretenders to Trotskyism. For the
first time in a bureaucratically deformed workers state, we made publicly
available Trotsky’s writings, including The Revolution Betrayed, his
incisive 1936 analysis of the Soviet Stalinist bureaucracy and its origins.
The impact of our Trotskyist program was seen in the 3 January 1990
united-front demonstration of 250,000 in East Berlin’s Treptow Park against the
fascist desecration of a memorial to the Soviet soldiers who had died liberating
Germany from Hitler’s Nazis. This was a mobilization of the East German
proletariat in defense of the DDR and Soviet workers states. We initiated the
call for this rally. It was then taken up by the ruling Stalinist party which
feared how much our program resonated among East Berlin workers and felt
compelled to mobilize its base. Our comrades spoke from the platform at Treptow,
marking the first time Trotskyists had addressed a mass audience in a
degenerated or deformed workers state since Trotsky’s expulsion from the Soviet
Union. With a green light from the Soviet bureaucracy under Gorbachev, the West
German imperialists responded to the spectre of proletarian political revolution
with a full-throttle campaign aimed at annexing the DDR. We did not prevail in
the face of this onslaught, but we fought. And through that fight,
we helped lay the basis for the proletarian victories of the future.
The Trotskyists in Spain were committed to the fight for
proletarian state power. But they were caught in a revolutionary tidal wave with
few forces, little experience and insufficient tempering, in Trotsky’s words, in
the “pitiless manner of posing the fundamental questions and a fierce polemic
against vacillations” that “are the necessary ideological and pedagogical
reflection of the implacable and cruel character of the class struggle of our
time” (“The Culpability of Left Centrism”). As we honor Erwin Wolf, Rudolph
Klement and the other Trotskyists who gave their lives, many at the hands of
Stalin’s hirelings, in the fight for socialist revolution in Spain, we condemn
and refute the opportunists who apologize for past betrayals and thus prepare
new ones. This is an integral part of reforging a Trotskyist Fourth
International to lead the fight for new Octobers.
Corrections
The article “Marxist Principles and Electoral Tactics” in
Spartacist (English edition) No. 61 (Spring 2009) implies on page 20 that
Trotsky is referring to municipal elections in his May 1924 introduction to
The First Five Years of the Communist International when he hails the
French Communist Party (PCF) getting about 900,000 votes as “a serious success,
especially if we take into account the swift growth of our influence in the
suburbs of Paris.” In fact, as stated in the French (No. 39, Summer 2009) and
Spanish (No. 36, November 2009) editions of Spartacist, “Trotsky was
likely referring to a parliamentary election that had been held that month.”
However, as we also noted, “the PCF’s ‘influence’ in the suburbs also included
its administration of several municipalities.” Just after the above quote,
Trotsky’s “Nationalized Industry and Workers’ Management” is correctly dated as
12 May 1939, though the subsequent paragraph incorrectly refers to 1938. On page
18, the caption implies that the drawing of Nikolai Shablin is to the left and
that of Amadeo Bordiga to the right; it is rather the converse. (From
Spartacist [English edition] No. 62, Spring 2011.)