Friday, June 21, 2013

***In The Time Of The Time Of The British Blues Explosion- This Ain't No One-Trick Pony- The Belfast Cowboy Rides Again Van Morrison’s “Brown Eyed Handsome Man”



CD Review

Brown Eyed Handsome Man , Van Morrison, Bono Records, 2000


Apparently just now, although this time rather accidentally, I am on something of an outlaw country moment tear, again. I have mentioned on previously occasions when I have discussed county music, or rather more correctly outlaw country music, that I had a very short, but worthwhile period when I was immersed in this genre in the late 1970s. After tiring somewhat of Willie Nelson, Waylon Jennings and other more well know country outlaws I gravitated toward the music, eerily beautiful and haunting music, of Townes Van Zandt whose Steve Earle tribute album Townes I have recently reviewed in this space. As I noted there, as well, while this outlaw country thing was short-lived and I scrambled back to my first loves, blues, rock and folk music I always had time to listen to Townes and is funny mix of blues, folk rock, rock folk, and just downright outlaw country.

And that brings us to the album under review, Pay The Devil, and another “outlaw” country music man, the Belfast cowboy Van Morrison. Wait a minute, Van Morrison? Belfast cowboy? Okay, let me take a few steps back. I first heard Van Morrison in his 1960s rock period when I flipped out over his Into The Mystic on his Moondance album. And when I later saw him doing some blues stuff highlighted by his appearance in Martin Scorsese PBS History of Blues series several years ago I also flipped out, and said yes, brother blues. But somewhere along the way he turned again on us and has “reinvented” himself as the “son”, the legitimate son, of Hank Williams. And hence the Belfast Cowboy. But this ain't no one-trick pony. No way, no how not with that deep musical background.

If you do not believe me then just listen to him ante up on He Ain’t Give You None, a classic bluesy number; the thoughtful Beside You; the pathos of Send Your Mind; the title song from back in youthful rock times Brown Eyed Handsome Man; and, something out of time, In The Back Room. The Belfast Cowboy, indeed, although I always thought cowboys worn their emotions down deep, not on their blues high white note sleeves. But I guess they do.
***In The Time Of The Time Of The British Blues Explosion- This Ain't No One-Trick Pony-The Belfast Cowboy Rides Again Van Morrison’s “The Best Of Van Morrison, Volume Three”



CD Review

The Best Of Van Morrison: Volume Three, two CD set, Van Morrison, various artist, Exile Productions, 2007


Apparently just now, although this time rather accidentally, I am on something of an outlaw country moment tear, again. I have mentioned on previously occasions when I have discussed county music, or rather more correctly outlaw country music, that I had a very short, but worthwhile period when I was immersed in this genre in the late 1970s. After tiring somewhat of Willie Nelson, Waylon Jennings and other more well know country outlaws I gravitated toward the music, eerily beautiful and haunting music, of Townes Van Zandt whose Steve Earle tribute album Townes I have recently reviewed in this space. As I noted there, as well, while this outlaw country thing was short-lived and I scrambled back to my first loves, blues, rock and folk music I always had time to listen to Townes and is funny mix of blues, folk rock, rock folk, and just downright outlaw country.

And that brings us to the album under review, The Best Of Van Morrison, Volume Three, and another “outlaw” country music man, the Belfast cowboy Van Morrison. Wait a minute, Van Morrison? Belfast cowboy? Okay, let me take a few steps back. I first heard Van Morrison in his 1960s rock period when I flipped out over his Into The Mystic on his Moondance album. And when I later saw him doing some blues stuff highlighted by his appearance in Martin Scorsese PBS History of Blues series several years ago I also flipped out, and said yes, brother blues. But somewhere along the way he turned again on us and has “reinvented” himself as the “son”, the legitimate son, of Hank Williams. And hence the Belfast Cowboy. But this ain't no one-trick pony. No way, no how.

If you do not believe me then just listen to him ante up on Gloria , a classic bluesy number with legendary bluesman John Lee Hooker; the thoughtful Centerpiece Stone with Georgie Fame and the Flames;the pathos of That’s Life, The Healing Game; and, something out of time, out of youthful rock time Tupelo Honey with bluesman Bobby Bland. The Belfast Cowboy, indeed, although I always thought cowboys worn their emotions down deep, not on their blues high white note sleeves. And as loners, not with legendary company. But fine, fine indeed.
***In The Time Of The Time Of The British Blues Explosion- He Ain't No One-Trick Pony-The Belfast Cowboy Rides Again- Van Morrison’s "How Long Has This Been Going On"



CD Review

How Long Has This Been Going On, Van Morrison, with Georgie Fame and the Flames, Exile Productions, 1995


Apparently just now, although this time rather accidentally, I am on something of an outlaw country moment tear, again. I have mentioned on previously occasions when I have discussed county music, or rather more correctly outlaw country music, that I had a very short, but worthwhile period when I was immersed in this genre in the late 1970s. After tiring somewhat of Willie Nelson, Waylon Jennings and other more well know country outlaws I gravitated toward the music, eerily beautiful and haunting music, of Townes Van Zandt whose Steve Earle tribute album Townes I have recently reviewed in this space. As I noted there, as well, while this outlaw country thing was short-lived and I scrambled back to my first loves, blues, rock and folk music I always had time to listen to Townes and is funny mix of blues, folk rock, rock folk, and just downright outlaw country.

And that brings us to the album under review, Pay The Devil, and another “outlaw” country music man, the Belfast cowboy Van Morrison. Wait a minute, Van Morrison? Belfast cowboy? Okay, let me take a few steps back. I first heard Van Morrison in his 1960s rock period when I flipped out over his Into The Mystic on his Moondance album. And when I later saw him doing some blues stuff highlighted by his appearance in Martin Scorsese PBS History of Blues series several years ago I also flipped out, and said yes, brother blues. But somewhere along the way he turned again on us and has “reinvented” himself as the “son”, the legitimate son, of Hank Williams. And hence the Belfast Cowboy. But this ain't no one-trick pony. No way.

If you do not believe me then just listen to him ante up on Early In The Morning , a classic bluesy number; the thoughtful Gershwin tune How Long Has This Been Going On ; the pathos of That’s Life;and, Blues In The Night; and, something out of lost time, Early In The Morning. The Belfast Cowboy, indeed, although I always thought cowboys worn their emotions down deep, not on their blues high white note sleeves. And kudos to Brother Fame, who rode that same train, as well.

From The Archives Of The “Revolutionary History” Journal-I: Mutiny and the Cohesion of the Armed Forces

Click on the headline to link to the Revolutionary History Journal index.

 
  
Markin comment:

This is an excellent documentary source for today’s militants to “discovery” the work of our forebears, whether we agree with their programs or not. Mainly not, but that does not negate the value of such work done under the pressure of revolutionary times. Hopefully we will do better when our time comes.

Additional Markin comment:

I place some material in this space which may be of interest to the radical public that I do not necessarily agree with or support. Off hand, as I have mentioned before, I think it would be easier, infinitely easier, to fight for the socialist revolution straight up than some of the “remedies” provided by the commentators in these entries. But part of that struggle for the socialist revolution is to sort out the “real” stuff from the fluff as we struggle for that more just world that animates our efforts.
***********

I: Mutiny and the Cohesion of the Armed Forces

Mutinies may be conspired into existence by activists, or they may be spontaneous. They may have limited demands, such as swift demobilisation, respect from the officer class, or better food. Or they may be more ‘politically conscious’ and develop new forms of self-governance or articulate internationalist sentiments and agitate for an end to war against their brothers. Mutinies may express a high level of class-consciousness and definite political demands – or they may appear to be more chaotic, a riotous breakdown of the chain of command. But even the temporary breakdown of such a key command chain has potentially great implications. Any mutiny can be a flashpoint of revolution.
This issue of Revolutionary History is especially keen to trace the connections between mutiny, social class and class consciousness. It is for this reason that we open this section with Ted Crawford’s article on changing social and technological relations in the armed forces, in particular in the navy. Mutinies are frequently associated with sea-based rather than land-based forces. This impression may be based on the widespread cultural resonance of one notorious mutiny: the mutiny on the Bounty. However, it is also the case that the most dramatic mutinies have occurred at sea or in ports. The ship of war in the modern period was a condensed rendition of the larger class society, its hierarchy was extremely rigidly enforced, and its conditions harsh for some and less harsh for the few with whom those abused sailors shared close quarters. When the majority decides to overturn that inequity, there are few places for the officer class to hide.
We begin by implicitly posing a question of immediate relevance to the present – to what extent is mutiny possible in the hi-tech, professional armies of today’s advanced capitalist nations? Is widespread ‘political’ mutiny a possibility in today’s hi-tech professional armies of Europe and the USA (where mutiny – or the ‘fragging’ of officers – was last experienced during the Vietnam war)? Or is mutiny reserved for the under-equipped and overwhelmed armed forces in faraway countries facing the might of NATO in today’s new perma-war adventures? The reader is also pointed to Ted Crawford’s further work on these matters – Military Matters, New Interventions, Volume 7, no. 3, Autumn 1996, pp. 18–24.
Also of interest for broader questions of Marxism, militarism and war are Siegfried Kissin, War and the Marxists, two volumes, London 1988; reviewed by Ted Crawford in Revolutionary History, Volume 2, no. 1, Summer 1990, pp. 39–40; Dona Torr (ed.), Armies and the People and Antimilitarism, in Marxism, Nationality and War, Volume 1, London 1940, pp. 109–21.
Leon Trotsky was, of course, also well versed in military matters. Key writings include How the Revolution Armed: The Military Writings and Speeches of Leon Trotsky, five volumes, New Park Publications, London 1981 – Volume 1 (1918), Volume 2 (1919), Volume 3 (1920), Volume 4 (1921–23), Volume 5 (1921–23); Marxism and Military Affairs, Colombo 1969; Leon Trotsky, The Balkan Wars, Pathfinder Press, New York 1980.
See also Harold Walter Nelson, Leon Trotsky and the Art of Insurrection, London 1988; reviewed by Ted Crawford in Revolutionary History, Volume 3, no. 1, Summer 1990, pp. 37–9; Hal Draper, War and Revolution: Lenin and the Myth of Revolutionary Defeatism, edited by E. Haberkern (from articles originally published in New International), New Jersey 1996, also excerpted in Lenin and the Myth of Revolutionary Defeatism, Workers Liberty, Volume 2, no. 1, pp. 84–110.
The old Socialist classic on the question of war is Jean Jaurés, L’Armée nouvelle, 1910, reprint reviewed by Genéviéve Lagrange in Lutte ouvrière, no. 85, 15–21 April 1970. Other key texts include Karl Liebknecht, Militarism and Anti-Militarism, Writers and Readers, London 1972 (original 1907); Karl Liebknecht, The Future Belongs to the People (speeches made during the First World War), New York 1918; Ralph Lyndal Worrall, Footsteps of Warfare: A Study of the Origin and Development of War, Peter Davies, London 1936.
Questions of cohesion, discipline and disintegration within the armed forces are discussed in Bruce Allen Watson, When Soldiers Quit: Studies in Military Disintegration, Praeger, New York, 1997; Dale O. Smith, What Is Morale?, Air University Quarterly Review, Winter 1951–52, pp. 42–50; S.P. MacKenzie, Politics and Military Morale: Current Affairs and Citizenship Education in the British Army, 1914–50, Clarendon, Oxford 1992; Brian Holden Reid and John White, “A Mob of Stragglers and Cowards”: Desertion from the Union and Confederate Armies, 1861–65, Journal of Strategic Studies, no. 8, 1985, pp. 64–77; Desmond Morton, Kicking and Complaining: Demobilization Riots in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1918–1919, Canadian Historical Review, Volume 61, no. 3, September 1980, pp. 334–60.
Social class and the armed forces is also considered in C.B. Otley, The Social Origins of British Army Officers, Sociological Review, Volume 18, 1970; C.B. Otley, Militarism and the Social Affiliations of the British Army Élite, in J. van Doorn (ed.), Armed Forces and Society, Mouton, The Hague 1968; C.B. Otley, The Educational Background of British Army Officers, Sociology, Volume 2, no. 2, September 1963; P. Razzell, Social Origins of Officers in the Indian and British Home Army, British Journal of Sociology, Volume 14, 1963, pp. 248ff.; D. Englander and J. Osbourne, Jack, Tommy and Henry Dubb: The Armed Forces and the Working Class, Historical Journal, 1978, pp. 593–662.
For a general study of naval mutinies across history, see Leonard Guttridge, Mutiny: A History of Naval Insurrection, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis 1992; Lawrence James, Mutiny: In the British and Commonwealth Forces, 1797–1956, Buchan and Enright, London 1987. This study of mutinies includes the Spithead mutiny, the revolt of Sudanese troops in Uganda in 1898, mutineering Indian troops in Singapore in 1915, the mutiny of British forces in Etaples in 1917 and the mutiny, shortly afterwards, by Chinese Labour Corps workers on the Western Front; and revolts by the Slavo-British Legion in Russia in 1919, the Connaught Rangers in India in 1920, British forces at Salerno in 1943, and the Royal Indian Navy in 1946.
For a study of mutiny across history but with particular reference to Vietnam and the US army, see the work of peace activist David Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt: The American Military Today, Anchor/Doubleday, New York 1975; reviewed in The New York Review of Books, 13 May 1976, p. 30. See also David Cortright and Max Watts, Left Face: Soldier Unions and Movements in Modern Armies, Greenwood Press, Westport 1991. Also of interest, for a view of mutiny as a part of the creation of the modern working class on all sides of the Atlantic, is Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: The Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic, Verso, London 2000.
Others too, of course, have argued that the term ‘to strike’ has its origins in mutiny, particularly the ‘Great Mutinies’ at Spithead and the Nore in 1797 when sailors would strike the sails – that is, lower them – in order to hold up the flow of trade and disrupt the war machinery of state. The OED registers the first usage of the word ‘strike’, referring to a concerted cessation of work by a body of workers, in an American document from 1810.
This section closes with a short article by Julian Putkowski. These observations from a historian of British Army mutinies discuss the difficulties of defining what mutiny is and assessing what any particular mutiny means politically. The article exposes and accounts for a tendency to over-value the significance of mutinies within the socialist tradition. In pointing out the shortcomings of previous attempts, the article hopes set further research in this area on a more secure and self-aware footing.
*******

Ted Crawford

Mutiny and the Cohesion of the Armed Forces



THE classical Marxist writers and thinkers were very often deeply concerned with the sociology of the armed services and military technique. One need only think of Engels, Liebknecht, Jaurès and Trotsky. This was not because of their wish to play toy soldiers, but because they were aware that the armed forces embodied the state – and the state in its sharpest and most brutal form. What is more, on the continent of Europe the universality of military service and its reserve obligations meant that from 1870 to 1918 – also a period of rising working-class consciousness – the whole male population had experienced such service, with all its social pressures and its brutality. Even in the interwar period, the Left Book Club produced a number of books by people like Tom Wintringham and Max Werner on military themes. Today this tradition seems almost dead, although during the period of the quarter of a century of anti-colonial partisan war during 1950–75, there was some interest by left-wingers in some politico-military guerrilla techniques. This period has now come to an end, and in any case ‘guerrillaism’ was always an orientation to the Third World and socially backward states rather than the most developed capitalist ones. To that extent it was quite different in the pre-1914 period. Yet it remains true that the state is still ‘armed bodies of men’, and in the final analysis the mode of production rests on them. The rest of this article is a very poor and preliminary attempt to show some social trends within the armed services in the last 100 years.
As far as military technique itself is concerned, Marxists have no more to say than other intelligent observers, but the direction in which society may be pushed as a result of the changing forces of military production, if I can coin this Marxist term, and the ways in which technologies alter the ‘relations of military production’ can perhaps be illuminated by the Marxist method. More important still is the fact that as society changes so will its armed forces reflect this fact, and such changes will not always be in the direction of greater military effectiveness. But whether this is so or not, it is important to be aware of what is happening. As in so many other non-military respects, there seems to be some convergence internationally.
I shall commence by considering naval mutiny, since the most striking and famous mutinies of the twentieth century were often naval ones. This arose in part because the events often occurred in major towns and seaports, and had a very concentrated dramatic impact which was impossible to keep secret, while mutinies of soldiers generally occurred in faraway places, colonial lands and distant military fronts. But there are other reasons, including the fact that naval warfare has been the most advanced technical form of ‘war production’, which is why, qualitatively speaking, there has been a more ‘progressive’ and political aspect in naval mutinies – sometimes of a class nature, and sometimes a nationalist one.
To make two preliminary points: Firstly, in naval warfare, since at least the middle of the nineteenth century, there has been no possibility of personal contact with the enemy, although this is also true of air warfare, and such contacts have diminished in land warfare too. The problems involved in the creation of a warrior leadership ethos in a bourgeois society were greatly reduced as sailors were carried into action against their will. Sailors cannot, as individuals, run away from the battle or desert to the enemy – their best chance of survival in action is to do their job as well as possible and hope that everybody else acts similarly. [1] Secondly, naval warfare has always been more technically advanced than land warfare, and has generally operated at the edge of the available technology. This was so in the sixteenth century (broadside galleons), eighteenth century men-of-war (dockyards were by far the biggest and most complex industrial units at that time), the Franco-British naval races in the late nineteenth century, the Dreadnought era, and the Pacific carrier battles fought at ranges of hundreds of miles and dependent on radar, cryptography, etc., or, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, submarine operations where the technical complexities (and expense) are as great or greater than space activities.
Thus the general level of skill required at sea (and now air) has always been greater than in the army, whether the topman in Nelson’s navy or the sonar operator today. Because of these skill levels, there was always more autonomy in the work process in these two services. The drilled soldier of the eighteenth century was the antithesis of this, and was flogged into becoming an automaton – or that was the aim. This meant that the mode of thought of the seaman was more akin to that of the skilled industrial worker, and he was more likely to consider the possibility of industrial action than was the soldier. This was recognised by the English ruling class, and the institution of marines (or naval soldiers) was invented for shipboard use. Their quarters always lay between those of the officers and the seamen, and they were designed to be used against possible mutineers. They lacked the sailor’s skills and were supposed to be unthinking automatons, and thus you will still hear naval officers joking about marines: ‘Royal Marines! On your heads! Bounce! One-two! One-two!’ Only since the Second World War have the marines been concentrated in infantry units for amphibious use and not posted on most RN ships, though there are still a few on their biggest vessels – the light aircraft carriers.
There have been no significant naval mutinies in fact since 1947 (Bombay), except perhaps Chile in 1972, where there was unrest on a large old cruiser. Before that, there were the early precursors in the Great Mutinies of Nore and Spithead in 1797, the biggest strikes ever seen in this country until then, the Potemkin mutiny in 1905, the Kiel mutiny, the French Black Sea mutinies in 1919, Kronstadt in 1921, the Invergordon one in 1931, and finally the Indian Navy Bombay mutiny itself in 1947. For Marxists, the ‘classical’ mutinies are therefore those in the short quarter of a century of 1905–31. [2] These mutinies of the Dreadnought era have in common the fact that fleets consisted of large, intensively manned, steel ships. The battleships were the naval analogues of a Ford factory, but in some ways even more inhuman. There was within them an immense and minute division of labour. The conditions when afloat had similarities to those in a prison, since everybody was locked into his narrow space. With some 1,000 or 2,000 men aboard, officers did not know the men, while isolation, alienation, gossip, rumour and sexual repression were rife. For instance, and unlike in the army, even today naval officers eat separately and have different food from their men on active service. (I was told by a Guards officer with wonderment that he got a de luxe menu (first class) on the QE2 sailing to the Falklands while receiving an active service allowance. ‘Asparagus on active service!’) In conditions of political or, as at Invergordon, economic crisis, this can boil up.
On the other hand, unlike in Nelson’s navy or even today’s army on active service, minimal comforts, food, shelter and warmth, are always available, and death rates are quite low, even in action, unless the ship is actually sunk, when, for a few minutes, at most an hour or two, conditions approximate to an appalling industrial accident such as the Piper Alpha affair. Indeed, in the Royal Navy, food on board ship is invariably of far better quality than on shore stations in order to encourage enthusiasm for a life on the ocean wave. (As the Potemkin incident showed, the Tsarist officers were not as perceptive as those of the Royal Navy.) It was noticed by the authorities that unrest was far less likely on small vessels where crews numbered 200 or less, where the Captain knew everybody by name, and where his own living conditions were nearly as uncomfortable. Despite the greater discomfort for all ranks, duty on small ships was invariably preferred because of the more human atmosphere. There is an analogy here with small firms, the more personal relations within them and the relative absence of industrial action in that sector.
These preconditions for naval mutiny have altered considerably in the last half-century. From a social point of view, there are basically two sorts of ships nowadays, firstly, aircraft carriers (or floating air bases), and, secondly, escorts and submarines. There are very few aircraft carriers. The escorts and submarines all have very small complements (submarines between 30 and 110, escorts between 160 and 300), and the crews are becoming much, much smaller still. Frigates now on the drawing board will be manned by a mere 80 or so seamen. Conditions on these escorts, which are the size of Second World War light cruisers, are far less cramped and more comfortable then ever before, while up to half the crews are officers and skilled petty officers. The Able Seamen just clean the lavatories, while their seniors fight the ship. Thus the conditions on small ships, which made mutinies less likely in the past, act with redoubled force today.
In the carriers, there is much more overcrowding, and, on the British ones, too, there are significantly still marines. But there are only three light carriers in the RN (900 men each), one much larger nuclear one in France, and one each in Russia, India, Italy, Spain, Brazil and Thailand – the last one very small and seldom leaving port, while the Indian one is over 40 years old and saw service in the Falklands. The USA has about 10 plus a dozen large amphibious ships which are similar. Compared with Dreadnoughts, where Britain alone had nearly 30 in 1914 together with a large number of big, heavily manned cruisers, there are very few, and, even though the complements of the nuclear powered Nimitz class in the USN are enormous, over 6,000 people, their social weight, as either a proportion of the population or of the armed forces, is much less significant than 85 or even 50 years ago.
There are certain analogies here with the development of the labour process in areas of productive technique. The concentration of skills in certain strata, the devaluing of manual labour – guns are all loaded automatically now, not by the brawny arms of Able Seamen – and the emphasis on ‘human capital’ or Marxist ‘variable capital’ in the form of training and psychological manipulation, are all areas where Braverman has interesting things to say. The real military competition can be summed up thus: ‘Yah-Boo! Our software engineers are better than your software engineers!’
Mutinies, as in Vietnam, are perhaps more likely to be found in future in infantry battalions composed of impoverished or even lumpen elements which have been thinned out a bit by a real war. The prosperous working class and middle class decreasingly serve in such units, and, since ‘la misère est l’école du soldat’, the consumer society is a bad school. If it is the casualty rate that determines whether soldiers, rather than sailors, are nowadays likely to rebel, it becomes important to know the degree of sacrifice expected of the different social strata and the tensions likely to be set up within the armed forces and in particular the army, the land forces. It is these, after all, that are used for internal repression, rather than the navy or air force.
How far the upper classes among the fighting men suffer relative to those beneath them in war depends on two factors: the differential casualty rates of officers as opposed to other ranks, and the degree to which such officers come from the upper classes. Changes in either of these will have social and political effects. This has some importance for Marxists, as the degree to which the upper classes have a higher chance of dying in conflicts as opposed to the lower orders may effect their enthusiasm for war, and whether they remain enthusiastic for longer than the hoi-poloi. It is also important that the bourgeoisie control the armed forces, which have to act, if not in their name, then in their interests. Attempts to throw some light on this matter have been obscured, on the one hand, by the belief by the left that the poor always suffer most, and, on the other, the opinion of the British upper classes that their losses were disproportionately high in two world wars. Furthermore, statistics are not collected to provide details of the class origin of casualties, and some rough guesswork has to be done. [3]
There is no doubt that in the gunpowder age from about 1650 to 1900, the casualties of the rank and file in land forces were always much greater proportionately than among the officers. This was because the overwhelming proportion of such casualties were ‘non-battle’ ones, largely from disease, so that the superior food and living conditions of the officers, particularly while on campaign, meant that they fell ill less often, and, if they did fall ill, they were far more likely to be nursed back to health or sent home. In battle itself, infantry and cavalry officers tended to suffer rather more than their men, and medical aid, however costly, was often as deadly as neglect, but even so their losses were not too disproportionate because, as weapon accuracy was poor, deaths were distributed fairly randomly among those present on the ‘field of honour’. It was a matter of some comment that battles in the American War of Independence and in the American war of 1812 against frontiersmen, who were good marksmen with muzzle loading rifles, led to much heavier officer casualties in the British army relative to their men. [4]
A few statistics from the end of the eighteenth century onwards are of interest here, always remembering that before then, when the data are not so good, disease seems to have been even more deadly, and armies swiftly wasted away during European campaigns even when there was no fighting to speak of. The most disastrous campaign ever recorded in terms of casualties for the British army was that in the West Indies during 1793–99 when perhaps 75,000 men died of disease, comprising the vast majority who had been sent out, and including most of the officers. [5] A more micro example of this is shown in the regimental history of the Eighty-Fifth Foot which says that after a tour of duty in Jamaica in 1803–08 they came back numbering nine officers, 30 NCOs and 31 privates. They recruited heavily, and went to Shorncliffe to train as Light Infantry 600 strong. At Walcheren in August 1809, the Eighty-Fifth went out nearly 700 strong, and came back numbering about 120 of all ranks, though only one man had been killed in action. [6] Wellington, though a fearful reactionary, was very careful of the health of his troops, knowing that they were very difficult to replace by voluntary enlistment, but in the six-year-long Peninsular War two-thirds of the 24,000 dead were from sickness and not battle. In the Crimean War, in which about 25,000 British lives were lost, fewer than 4,000 were killed or died of wounds. The hospital at Scutari over which Florence Nightingale presided was full of sick – not wounded. The American Civil War, involving vastly greater numbers, had similar proportions of battle to non-battle dead as the British experienced in the Peninsular War, and the same was true 40 years later in the Boer War, with 7,000 killed to about 13,000 dead of disease. [7] Indeed, the first prolonged war in history in which the battle dead outnumbered fatalities from sicknesses was as late as the twentieth century in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–05. And in all cases, sickness was far deadlier to the rank and file.
Naval service, which invariably involved far fewer people than land service, was, before the middle of the nineteenth century, always characterised by very high death rates among sailors, and in the Great War with France of 1793–1815 80 per cent of the deaths among British sailors were from sickness, 15 per cent from accident (including wrecks), and only five per cent in battle. Seamen had a far, far greater chance of dying from disease and falling out of the rigging than did officers. In battles such as Trafalgar, senior officers, including Captains, Admirals and captains of marines, had very high casualty rates [8], much higher than the seamen, but battles were few and far between. Earlier than Trafalgar, non-battle losses were an even larger proportion of the total. In more modern times, death rates on board ship are generally very low, even in action, unless the entire vessel disintegrates in a horrible sort of industrial accident. There is not much distinction therefore between the losses of officers and men on board ship in a modern naval battle, but, as in the eighteenth century, naval losses are a very small proportion of the total deaths in war.
As the twentieth century opened, the accuracy and deadliness of modern weapons on land meant that when the fighting did occur officer casualties were getting proportionately higher, and the accuracy of the Chassepot rifle led to frightful casualties among the Prussian Guard officers at Gravelotte and St Privat in 1870. It was very noticeable at the battle of Spion Kop in the Boer War that the proportions of officers to other rank dead among the colonial troops, Australian and South African, were similar, for the Boers could not distinguish between them, and simply aimed at the tallest men in the unit. Unlike the colonials, who had been fed on a decent diet in their youth, the stunted offspring of the slums among the British regulars were pygmies compared with their officers, so the officer losses were proportionately double. This provided an excellent rationale for the upper classes to support health and welfare reforms in the period of 1902–14.
Thus when the First World War opened, there was an historically new situation. Because of medical advances, losses from sickness were very small in Western Europe in 1914–18, although much worse in ‘side-shows’ like the East African campaign. [9] The socially prestigious corps were the infantry and the cavalry, which suffered far more in battle than the artillery and engineers, particularly the infantry, though cavalry frequently had to take a turn on foot in the trenches too. [10] Troops even further back than the gunners, the non-combatant corps such as railway troops, had grown in the nineteenth century, but by the First World War the ratio was still about 9:1 in favour of the front-line. As a result, the many literary and historical accounts of this period do accurately reflect the fact that the upper classes suffered even more than the poor. In Britain, it has been said that of those members of the aristocracy who served in the military, one out of five was killed, as opposed to one out of eight of the general population. [11] A brief glance at the war memorials of the great public schools tells the same story. Indeed, not since the Wars of the Roses had there been such a kill-off of the English nobility. [12] The social, technical and tactical situation was similar in all European countries, and so the ancient aristocracies paid a terrible price – as too did the aspiring middle classes who sought to emulate their style and coveted junior commands in the ‘smart’ regiments. If there was any group that suffered rather less, it was probably the skilled workers who were held back for essential war work, but in the First World War the importance of these for total mobilisation had often not been realised, and they were frequently called up to be duly mown down, with unfortunate effects on the production of munitions and therefore the war effort as a whole. Sometimes industrial workers in Russia and Germany were not called up because they were considered politically unreliable – the peasants were preferred, but this option was not open to the British, as there were not enough peasants here – though Scottish Highlanders served in relatively large numbers. Proportionately fewer Irishmen served, as they were never conscripted. [13]
The Second World War was not very different for the British, save that the period of time when great armies were in combat was very much shorter, and so casualties as a whole were that much smaller, even if the rate of casualties over any given time was much the same. [14] Once more, the officers in the infantry, and this time the cavalry as well, who were frequently burnt alive in their tanks, suffered disproportionately, but with this difference that the proportion of rear echelon troops was growing and the more mechanised and therefore the more mobile the armies became, the bigger did the proportion supplying them. But officers in such corps as the RAOC, RASC and REME were less socially elevated members of the lower middle classes, and once more the war memorials of the public schools repay study. The losses among the general male population of that age range were about a third of World War One, but Eton had more ex-pupils killed in the Second than the First World War [15], while my own rather less prestigious old school had about 50 per cent of the slaughter in the previous conflict, 278 as opposed to 578. [16] It is true that staffs [17], which were disproportionately of higher rank, became relatively larger and amounted in total to a division or two on the main fronts, but to balance this there were huge losses in the RAF, so that 40,000 air-crew of Bomber Command, mostly commissioned but generally of middle-class or lower-middle-class rather than upper-class origin, died over Germany.
But it was the American armed services which perhaps heralded the future. In their drafting process, skilled workers were funnelled into those sectors of the services where their skills would be of use, the most striking example being the engineering troops composed of construction workers who constructed airfields, even if occasionally under fire, at the most amazing speed on Pacific islands. In this respect, at least the United States was far ahead of anywhere else in military effectiveness. The technical arms, the navy and the air force ground staff, had the first choice of the draftees (aviators were all volunteers), while the infantry had the worst-educated and socially-deprived recruits, and often the less well-educated junior officers as well. The more upper-class Americans went into the Intelligence Services, the more flash parts of the staff, perhaps the navy which maintained its social prestige, and sometimes the air force or naval aviation, though these last two did suffer severely. [18] Both in the United States and Britain, war mobilisation was far more efficiently run than in the First World War, and, as a result, skilled workers, engineers, electricians and so forth were as far as possible slotted into civilian or military tasks where their abilities would be useful, and which, coincidentally, were either totally out of danger or were much further back than the fighting arms. In both countries it is probable that unskilled workers lost a much higher proportion than the skilled, but in Britain as opposed to the United States the upper classes suffered far more than the average. [19]
In the 57 years that have elapsed since 1945, a longer period than that from the Boer War to the Hiroshima bomb, we have seen no all-out war. The experience of the USA in Vietnam and, on a more Lilliputian scale, the New Zealand and Australian contingent in the same conflict, is however very suggestive. In such colonial-type wars against technically inferior opposition, the technical troops, the air force ground staff, the men on board ship and the enormous planning and administrative staff suffered very little indeed save boredom, fatigue, traffic accidents, the disruption of their lives from military service, and venereal disease. To a considerable extent, this was true of the artillery too, but the overwhelming proportion of losses fell on the infantry, and even within battalions tended to fall on the rifle companies – a tiny minority of the whole army. The wireless operators and those in the support companies suffered a great deal less when the enemy lacked much artillery support. It was for this reason that such a disproportionate number of American casualties were black soldiers, but, I suspect, no more than the general percentage of the ill-educated and unskilled, for both Mexican and American Indians suffered disproportionately as well. [20] White ‘blue collar’ workers lost a great deal too. Vietnam was truly ‘a rich man’s war and a poor man’s fight’, and this broke the army, which eventually disintegrated and forced a withdrawal. There was no explosion in a great mutiny, but rather a disintegration and collapse and a massive number of small rebellions.
There was no land fighting to speak of in the Gulf War, but those who did die often did so as a result of accident – rather more than the official statistics suggest. [21] In the Korean War, 33,000 Americans died as a result of enemy action and 20,000 in accidents. I have not seen the figures for Vietnam. In any case, large numbers of not very mature, very young men who would not be able to get insurance in civilian life, driving very heavy and dangerous vehicles, frequently extremely tired and often under the influence of drugs or drink, are a recipe for a massive accident rate. The accident figures would also tend to be over-represented among the other ranks rather than officers – a trend back to the eighteenth century pattern of non-battle casualties.
Any prolonged war with heavy losses would mean conscription, and this will be difficult, if not impossible, for present-day Western societies. Conscript infantrymen who got killed today would be more inclined than ever to mutiny, so in every wealthy society there is pressure for smaller volunteer armed services, and they are becoming steadily more general. This trend will continue, but this may not be sufficient to create an effective and loyal bodyguard for capitalism. The skilled arms can be recruited by the incentive of training to those with aptitude but who are poorly qualified, while the infantry who will have to do the messy boot and bayonet work will get the merely poorly qualified. There are far fewer air force pilots today in their expensive but highly effective machines, but increasingly the risky job of aerial fighting will be delegated to nerveless machines, drones, cruise and stand-off missiles. Unlike the poor and fit young infantryman, the educated and the manager will not be much at risk in such a scenario. So the first 50 years of the last century may be the exception that proves the rule, a period of mass armies and mass production where class differences in battle casualty rates as well as living standards tended to narrow greatly in the areas of developed capitalism. This era seems to have come to an end.
As far as the cost to the rank and file is concerned, all this has analogies with the widening class differentials as regards wages, security of employment, conditions and general welfare in civilian society. In the past, the difference between the armed services and the productive labour force was that a section of the managers, the officer class, had to put themselves into danger, many of them into even more danger than those whom they commanded, and, since in the last analysis such managers had control over the application of force and violence in society, they had to be utterly loyal and committed to the existing ruling class. To some extent this is still true. The question of how this has been guaranteed in the past and how it is to be guaranteed in the future is, however, an interesting one and perhaps one of considerable difficulty for present-day international capital. Before moving on to the question of the class origins and interests of the present-day military officers, let us turn to some historical sociology.
The ideas of an anti-Marxist but a most fertile thinker, the economist Joseph Schumpeter, repay study. In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, he remarked in the chapter The Destruction of the Protecting Strata [22] on the fact that the processes of capitalism itself destroy the pre-bourgeois military classes. By this he meant that, faced with a threat from outside its society (presumably the Soviet Union or, as he thought, the anti-bourgeois Nazi Germany) or a non-bourgeois one within it (presumably the working class), capitalism was doomed. He said that the old land-owning aristocratic classes provided the steel framework within which capitalist relations could flourish, and here he was obviously thinking of Hohenzollern Germany and his own Habsburg Austria, but not only there. This framework was undermined and rotted away by the market, which destroyed the landed classes with their traditions of military command. His metaphor is that bourgeois society destroys its own entrenchments, and is left defenceless. This consequence, of course, has not happened, or not yet anyway, and to be fair it does not look like happening in the near or medium-term future, so it is interesting to see why. Weapons of mass destruction have meant both that all-out warfare between nuclear armed states has ceased to be in any sense a rational policy, and the carrying out of such a nuclear strike does not need a warrior class, so the question of mass destruction will not be dealt with.
But Schumpeter’s forecast that the values of bourgeois society were profoundly antipathetic to military virtue seems to me to be true. It does seem the case that the armed services of capitalist states are most effective when their tone is determined by pre-capitalist social formations. It is difficult to be an individual welfare maximiser and win the Victoria Cross. I do not think that it is a trivial point that Mark Thatcher, the epitome of self-seeking capitalist (rather than noble) youth, was not a Harrier pilot in the Falklands. The experience of this century has shown that the armies and populations of advanced capitalist states seem less and less willing to accept casualties as the pre-capitalist formations within them become less and less important. Consider the declension of the First and Second World Wars, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and finally the political fear of casualties in the Gulf. In each successive war, the blood-tax became more and more unpopular. That itself cries out for an explanation, which may arise in part from the smaller size of family, so that the death of an only child or son is unendurable [23], in part from a general mood when death is not expected among the young and the more resented when, for whatever reason, it does occur.
There is no difficulty in recruiting poor and even lumpen elements for the rank and file, so long as not too large an army is required. Capitalism creates these strata quite plentifully, in fact more plentifully than it would like in strictly functional terms. Falstaff’s cynical comment, ‘Food for powder Hal, food for powder, they’ll fill a grave as well as any man’, must be the unspoken thought about the poor on the part of many of our rulers – if unexpressed openly in these mealy-mouthed and politically correct times. There are masses of them on the Millwall terraces. It is also perfectly possible to get officers for the support elements; the job has many civilian analogies (technical training can be offered as a bribe), and even in wartime the casualty rate here is relatively low. Any shortage arises from the demand for similar skills in civilian life. It is in the creation of officers for the front line units that there is a problem. There is an element of primitive blood sacrifice in this. For 600 years, the Spartans never lost a battle without losing their commanders – the kings. Often when they won a battle, they also lost a commander or two. Unless the ruling class are there being slaughtered with the rest, there is an insufficient sense of solidarity and community, so the phalanx will not go forward. Capitalist development, of course, increasingly breaks down this sentiment, and this is most noticeable when the social system contains even fewer tribal or aristocratic elements, as in the USA compared to Europe. Schumpeter would not disagree with any of this.
The solution to this problem by the developed world is that of a technical fix. An increasing proportion of both the personnel and material of the armed forces is devoted to air power, where only a small minority of individuals are put at risk, unless there is a counter-bombardment of the air bases, and today even this task of aerial attack is increasingly delegated to robots and nerveless machines. In land warfare, there has been a move to put everyone into armoured vehicles which will move forward regardless of the wishes of those within the machine. The compulsion of the soldier is as least as much the cause of the mass of armoured vehicles as the need for protection. It has done so for a long time in naval warfare, where the trend reaches its apogee, and a sailor is carried into battle whether he wants to go or not. Sea operations are now increasingly automated, and the most extreme example is the bombardment of Iraq by cruise missiles launched from nuclear submarines in deep waters many hundreds, if not thousands, of miles away. So with these technologies, the political problem of casualties in advanced capitalist countries can be dealt with, and there arises the need for small, technically competent and reliable regular armed services. Such forces are relatively small, if only because the military machines are so expensive that few people can be afforded to run them. But such forces also reflect their own changing social structures as well as their external needs, which seem, at the moment, to be post-colonial policing and the deterrence of other great powers by weapons of mass destruction, rather than mass warfare. But these small forces still need a reliable managerial class at the sharp end, which is increasingly difficult to generate.
Schumpeter’s was a brilliant insight, even if the growing automation of war has prevented quite the military collapse of capitalism before a non-capitalist conqueror that he prophesied. But his insight does have implications for predictions as to how imperialism will behave. The Beast will, I envision, be far more fearful of war with anybody who could inflict a butcher’s bill. And this, as we can see in Kosova and elsewhere, will enormously hamper any attempt to impose any valid political solution, since a few thousand dead citizens, and in the case of the United States mostly black citizens at that, cannot be endured in the messy task of conquering populations and creating a stable postwar political structure – not just massacring them from afar. The inability to impose solutions has important implications, though a purely military solution can still be imposed by a wealthy state on an economically backward enemy. I say nothing one way or another of the justice of any solution imposed on Kosova, or anywhere else, I would simply emphasise that whether just or unjust such a solution must be stable, and this will involve lots of people on the ground for some time, and therefore casualties.
So even if Schumpeter may have been wrong in thinking that capitalist societies were not driven to war, he was correct in thinking that their social tone and style were increasingly anti-warrior. There is a distinction. He did not predict that technical change would make this less important as mass armies became less affordable – as has occurred. Recent experiences are moving many countries in the direction of small regular armies, though it is interesting to note that De Gaulle’s book in 1936, Une Armée de Métier, was denounced at the time as a call by a right-wing royalist to destroy the republican tradition of a ‘nation in arms’. Today this denunciation is far more muted on the politically correct left, and only in Germany have the Social Democrats expressed great concern about the move to all-regular forces. The more vegetarian elements on the left are delighted not to have to serve with sweaty football hooligans from the lower orders. This trend must have implications, both for imperialist intervention in the Third World, and for an eventual socialist insurrection. The problems of creating a reliable officer corps under present-day capitalism would move us too far in directions not simply relevant to that of mutiny, but the extreme fragility of the armed services of their armies is sensed, if not openly stated, by the political leaderships of the great capitalist powers.
They will therefore desperately avoid direct military confrontation, and against an enemy will increasingly use diplomatic pressure, bribery, blockade, even the mining of harbours, internal coups d’état, and, if a military clash is finally unavoidable, they will, as in Bosnia and the Gulf, seek to use precise air attacks to destroy military and communication centres, and will rely for the messy part of the fighting on irregular auxiliaries whose mothers have no votes within the imperialist centres. Thus far, that is what they have done against Third World and economically weak opponents. If things get of hand and they have to bring in masses of their own troops, their political strength, though not their economic muscles, would prove very feeble. But out of such an unforeseen political crisis opportunities for the working class might arise. Honesty makes me add that if the shape of such events is unforeseen by the intelligence, journalistic and academic agencies of the great powers, it is unlikely that I will be able to predict them except in the most general terms – the future is unknowable in detail. But this fragility can be noted and is tending, I believe, to increase, so that some optimism of the will can be engendered to counteract the deep pessimism that our intellect must feel today. At the backs of their minds, the thought of mutiny still haunts our rulers.

Notes

1. But see Keegan in The Face of Battle, pp. 315–7, and how this is increasingly true of soldiers at the forward edge of battle.
2. Thirty years ago during the Vietnam war, there was considerable disorder and a number of racial affrays on some of the US carriers and large cruisers (the latter are now scrapped), but these seem to have been directed less against the officers than the crew members of a similar rank but of a different race, and perhaps petty officers. On naval mutiny during 1910–50, see also Mutiny of HMNLS Der Zeven Provincien: Unions and Recruitment in the Royal Netherlands Navy 1890–1950, New Interpretations of Naval History, Ninth Naval History Symposium, Annapolis, 1991.
3. John Ellis has provided interesting data in The Sharp End of War on living conditions at the front and casualties by arm in the Second World War.
4. An Irish great-great-grandfather of mine, a Lieutenant Maunsell of the Eighty-Fifth Foot, was badly wounded at New Orleans in 1814 just before the main assault, although another Irish great-great-great-grandfather, Captain Spaight, survived Bunker Hill.
5. Those of a literary turn of mind will remember that Cassandra Austen, the sister of the novelist Jane, lost her admirer in present-day Haiti where whole regiments were wiped out by disease. See Michael Duffy, Soldiers, Sugar and Sea-Power, OUP, 1987.
6. C.R.B. Barrett, Eighty-Fifth Kings Light Infantry, Spottiswode, London 1913. The Eighty-Fifth was commanded when disembarking in England in 1808 by the step-father of a great-great-grandmother, a Major Hill, who perished in the Walcheren campaign the following year. The Eighty-Fifth (along with the Fifty-Third) was later the KSLI.
7. To be precise, officers lost 716 killed or died of wounds and 408 dead from disease, while the soldiers’ ratio was 7,010 to 12,699 (Times History of the War in South Africa, Volume 7, p. 23). In the Canadian, Australian and New Zealand contingents, which were probably much fitter to start with, the losses from disease and enemy action were equal. The relatively low battle loss was also due to the fact that the fighting was not very severe.
8. Nearly 20 per cent at Trafalgar, and of course 50 per cent of the British Admirals present. See Keegan, The Price of Admiralty, pp. 113–4.
9. Rupert Brooke died of disease on a Greek island awaiting the Gallipoli campaign.
10. The difficulty of the Woolwich exam for the gunners and sappers was always far greater than for the Sandhurst one, but such middle-class officers could live on their income (their Mess was cheaper) and had some small supplements to their pay.
11. See David Cannadine, The Decline and Fall of the British Aristocracy, 1992, pp. 72–84.
12. In the Wars of the Roses, fighting was almost invariably on foot. On the defeated side, the archers easily ran away, while the gentlemen were slaughtered in their heavy armour. In such a civil war no ransoms were taken – only estates.
13. What data we have suggests that the frequency of volunteering in the present Irish republic was a consequence of social class rather than religion or political allegiance, so more labourers served than prosperous farmers. Though the old Ascendancy gentry suffered severely, lower down the social scale for this reason Catholics were slightly more likely to be killed than Protestants.
14. Duncan Hallas told me that in the 10 months of fighting from the arrival of his infantry platoon in Normandy to the end of the war, there was almost a complete turnover of personnel. He went from a young private to a senior sergeant in the period. See Ellis, op. cit.
15. A high proportion of cavalry and Guards officers might account for much of this.
16. And 43 dead in the Boer War, in proportionate terms enormous. A school like Wellington, of comparable size but with an even stronger military tradition, had 68 killed in South Africa, 707 in the First World War, 502 in the Second, and has had 42 killed since 1945.
17. Typically this was where characters like the brothers Ian and Peter Fleming both served. My father told me that Peter, a great ‘explorer’ and ‘tough guy’, used to walk around Delhi festooned with Tommy guns, grenades and bowie knives, but always several hundred miles away from any dangerous Japanese, while of Ian (of James Bond fame) it is said that he always got his Wren (generally at the Ritz) while serving comfortably in London.
18. President Kennedy’s elder brother was killed as a pilot. President Bush was shot down, and Kennedy himself served in the Navy MTBs and was shot up.
19. In the Second World War, US blacks were often used in more ‘menial’ rather than fighting rôles, so their battle losses were proportionately lower than in Vietnam, and lower than those of the white working class.
20. About a third of the New Zealand dead were Maori, who comprised one tenth of the population.
21. I have heard it said that an individual in a unit was killed by a ‘sniper’ or more accurately a ‘stray bullet’. Nobody is going to check and search out precisely where the shot came from. The man is dead, distress would be caused, and no purpose would be served.
22. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Allen and Unwin, 1959, pp. 134–9.
23. In some countries with conscription, such as Spain or Latin America, the only son of a widow or even the eldest son was always exempted.

From The Marxist Archives- From The Pen Of Vladimir Lenin-Capitalist "Democracy": Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie

Workers Vanguard No. 864 
17 February 2006

LENIN






Capitalist "Democracy": Dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie
(Quote of the Week)

In a document for the First Congress of the Communist International, Bolshevik leader V.I. Lenin described bourgeois “democracy” as the dictatorship of the capitalist class over the exploited and oppressed, pointing to the violent suppression of U.S. labor struggles as well as the anti-Semitic frenzy against French officer Alfred Dreyfus in the 1890s. Polemicizing against social democrats who seek to reconcile the working class with its exploiters, Lenin defended the historic necessity for the proletariat to seize power through socialist revolution.

The history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries demonstrated, even before the war, what this celebrated “pure democracy” really is under capitalism. Marxists have always maintained that the more developed, the “purer” democracy is, the more naked, acute and merciless the class struggle becomes, and the “purer” the capitalist oppression and bourgeois dictatorship. The Dreyfus case in republican France, the massacre of strikers by hired bands armed by the capitalists in the free and democratic American republic—these and thousands of similar facts illustrate the truth which the bourgeoisie are vainly seeking to conceal, namely, that actually terror and bourgeois dictatorship prevail in the most democratic of republics and are openly displayed every time the exploiters think the power of capital is being shaken.…

In these circumstances, proletarian dictatorship is not only an absolutely legitimate means of overthrowing the exploiters and suppressing their resistance, but also absolutely necessary to the entire mass of working people, being their only defence against the bourgeois dictatorship which led to the war and is preparing new wars.

The main thing that socialists fail to understand and that constitutes their short-sightedness in matters of theory, their subservience to bourgeois prejudices and their political betrayal of the proletariat is that in capitalist society, whenever there is any serious aggravation of the class struggle intrinsic to that society, there can be no alternative but the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or the dictatorship of the proletariat. Dreams of some third way are reactionary, petty-bourgeois lamentations. That is borne out by more than a century of development of bourgeois democracy and the working-class movement in all the advanced countries, and notably by the experience of the past five years. This is also borne out by the whole science of political economy, by the entire content of Marxism, which reveals the economic inevitability, wherever commodity economy prevails, of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie that can only be replaced by the class which the very growth of capitalism develops, multiplies, welds together and strengthens, that is, the proletarian class.

—V.I. Lenin, “Theses and Report on Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship
of the Proletariat” (March 1919)

********
Thesis and Report on Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat
March 4
1. Faced with the growth of the revolutionary workers’ movement in every country, the bourgeoisie and their agents in the workers’ organizations are making desperate attempts to find ideological and political arguments in defense of the rule of the exploiters. Condemnation of dictatorship and a sense of democracy are particularly prominent among these arguments. The falsity and hypocrisy of this argument, repeated in a thousand strains by the capitalist press and at the Berne yellow International Conference in February 1919, are obvious to all who refuse to betray the fundamental principles of socialism.
2. Firstly, this argument employs the concepts of “democracy in general” and “dictatorship in general “, without posing the question of the class concerned. This nonclass or above class presentation, which supposedly is popular, is an outright travesty of the basic tenet of socialism, namely, its theory of class struggle, which Socialists who have sided with the bourgeoisie recognize in words but disregard in practice. For in no civilized capitalist country does “democracy in general” exist; all that exists is bourgeois democracy, and it is not a question of “dictatorship in general", but of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, i.e., the proletariat, over its oppressors and exploiters, i.e., the bourgeoisie, in order to overcome the resistance offered by the exploiters in their fight to maintain their domination.
3. History teaches us that no oppressed class ever did, or could, achieve power without going through a period of dictatorship, i.e., the conquest of political power and forceable suppression of the resistance always offered by the exploiters—the resistance that is most desperate, most furious, and that stops at nothing. The bourgeoisie, whose domination is now defended by the Socialists who denounce “dictatorship in general” and extol “democracy in general", won power in the advanced countries through a series of insurrections, civil wars, and the forcible suppression of kings, feudal lords, slaveowners and their attempts at restoration. In books, pamphlets, Congress resolutions, and propaganda speeches, Socialists have everywhere thousands and millions of times explained to people the class nature of these bourgeois revolutions and this bourgeois dictatorship. That is why the present defense of bourgeois democracy under the cover of talk about “democracy in general", and the present howls and shouts against proletarian dictatorship under the cover of shouts about “dictatorship in general", are an outright betrayal of socialism. They are, in fact, desertion to the bourgeoisie, denial of the proletariat’s right to its own, proletarian revolution, and a defense of bourgeois reformism at the very historical juncture when bourgeois reformism throughout the world has collapsed and the war has created a revolutionary situation.
4. In explaining the class nature of bourgeois civilization, bourgeois democracy and the bourgeois parliamentary system, all Socialists have expressed the idea formulated with the greatest scientific precision by Marx and Engels [Engels Introduction to the The Civil War in France], namely, that the most democratic bourgeois republic is no more than a machine for the suppression of the working class by the bourgeoisie, for the suppression of the working people by a handful of capitalists. There is not a single revolutionary, not a single Marxist among those now shouting against dictatorship and for democracy, who has not sworn and vowed to the workers that he excepts this basic truth of socialism. But now, when the revolutionary proletariat is in a fighting mood and taking action to destroy this machine of oppression and to establish proletarian dictatorship, these traitors to socialism claim that the bourgeoisie have granted the working people “pure democracy", have abandoned resistance and are prepared to yield to the majority of the working people. They assert that in a democratic republic there is not, and never has been, any such thing as a state machine for the suppression of labor by capital.
5. The Paris Commune —to which all who parade as Socialists pay lip service (for they know that the workers ardently and sincerely sympathize with though Commune) —showed very clearly the historically conventional nature and limited value of the bourgeois parliamentary system and bourgeois democracy; institutions which, though highly progressive compared with medieval times, inevitably require a radical alteration in the era of proletarian revolution. It was Marx who best appraised the historical significance of the Commune. In his analysis, he revealed the exploiting nature of bourgeois democracy in the bourgeois parliamentary system under which the oppressed classes enjoy the right to decide once in several years which representative of the propertied classes shall “represent and suppress” ( ver- und zertreten ) the people in parliament. And it is now, when the Soviet movement is embracing the entire world and continuing the work of the Commune for all to see, that the traitors to socialism are forgetting the concrete experience and concrete lessons of the Paris Commune and repeating the old bourgeois rubbish about “democracy in general”. The Commune was not a parliamentary institution.
6. The significance of the commune, furthermore, lies in the fact that it endeavored to crush, to smash to its very foundations, the bourgeois state apparatus, the bureaucratic, judicial, military and police machine, and to replace it by a self-governing, mass workers’ organization in which there was no division between legislative and executive power. All contemporary bourgeois-democratic republic’s, including the German republic—which the traitors to socialism, in mockery of the truth, describe as a proletarian republic—retain this state apparatus. We therefore again get quite clear confirmation of the point that shouting in defense of “democracy in general” is actually defense of the bourgeoisie and their privileges as exploiters.
7. “Freedom of assembly” can be taken as a sample of the requisites of “pure democracy”. Every class conscience worker who has not broken with his class will readily appreciate the absurdity of promising freedom of assembly to the exploiters at a time and in a situation when the exploiters are resisting the overthrow of their rule and are fighting to retain their privileges. When the bourgeoisie were revolutionary, they did not, neither in England in 1649 nor in France in 1793, grant “freedom of assembly” to the monarchists and nobles, who summoned foreign troops and “assembled” to organize attempts at restoration. If the present day bourgeoisie, who have long since become reactionary, demand from proletariat advance guarantees of “freedom of assembly” for the exploiters, whatever the resistance offered by the capitalists to being expropriated, the workers will only laugh at their hypocrisy.
The workers know perfectly well, too, that even in the most democratic bourgeois republic “freedom of assembly” is a hollow phrase, for the rich have the best public and private buildings at their disposal, and enough leisure to assemble at meetings, which are protected by the bourgeois machine of power. The rural and urban workers and small peasants—the overwhelming majority of the population—are denied all these things. As long as that state of affairs prevails, “equality", i.e., “pure democracy", is a fraud. The first thing to do to win genuine equality and enable the working people to enjoy democracy in practice is to deprive the exploiters of all the public and sumptuous private buildings, to give to the working people leisure and to see to it that their freedom of assembly is protected by armed workers, not by heirs of the nobility or capitalist officers in command of downtrodden soldiers.
Only when that change is affected can we speak of freedom of assembly and of equality without mocking at the workers, at working people in general, at the poor. And this change can be affected only by the vanguard of the working people, the proletariat, which overthrows the exploiters, the bourgeoisie.
8. “Freedom of the press” is another of the principal slogans of “pure democracy”. And here, too, the workers know — and Socialists everywhere have explained millions of times —that this freedom is a deception because the best printing presses and the biggest stocks of paper are appropriated by the capitalists, and while capitalist rule over the press remains—a rule that is manifested throughout the whole world all the more strikingly, sharply and cynically—the more democracy and the republican system are developed, as in America for example. The first thing to do to win really equality and genuine democracy for the working people, for the workers and peasants, is to deprive capital of the possibility of hiring writers, buying publishing houses and bribing newspapers. And to do that the capitalists and exploiters have to be overthrown and their resistance oppressed. The capitalists have always use the term “freedom” to mean freedom for the rich to get richer and for the workers to starve to death. And capitalist usage, freedom of the press means freedom of the rich to bribe the press, freedom to use their wealth to shape and fabricate so-called public opinion. In this respect, too, the defenders of “pure democracy” prove to be defenders of an utterly foul and venal system that gives the rich control over the mass media. They prove to be deceivers of the people, who, with the aid of plausible, fine-sounding, but thoroughly false phrases, divert them from the concrete historical task of liberating the press from capitalist enslavement. Genuine freedom and equality will be embodied in the system which the Communists are building, and in which there will be no opportunity for massing wealth at the expense of others, no objective opportunities for putting the press under the direct or indirect power of money, and no impediments in the way of any workingman (or groups of workingman, in any numbers) for enjoying and practicing equal rights in the use of public printing presses and public stocks of paper.
9. The history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries demonstrated, even before the war, what this celebrated “pure democracy” really is under capitalism. Marxists have always maintained that the more developed, the “purer" democracy is, the more naked, acute and merciless the class struggle becomes, and the “purer” the capitalist oppression and bourgeois dictatorship. The Dreyfus case in republican France, the massacre of strikers by hired bands armed by the capitalists in the free and democratic American republic—these and thousands of similar facts illustrate the truth which the bourgeoisie are mainly seeking to conceal, namely, that actually terror and bourgeois dictatorship prevail in the most democratic of republics and are openly displayed every time the exploiters think the power of capital is being shaken.
10. The imperialist war of 1914-18 conclusively revealed even to backward workers the true nature of bourgeois democracy, even in the freest republics, as being a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Tens of millions were killed for the sake of enriching the German or the British group of millionaires and multimillionaires, and bourgeois military dictatorships were established in the freest republics. This military dictatorship continues to exist in the Allied countries even after Germany’s defeat. It was mostly the war that opened the eyes of the working people, that striped bourgeois democracy of its camouflage and showed the people the abyss of speculation and profiteering that existed during because of the war. It was in the name of “freedom and equality” that the bourgeoisie wage the war, in the name of “freedom and equailty” that the munitions manufacturers piled up fabulous fortunes. Nothing that the yellow Berne International does can conceal from the people the now thoroughly exposed exploiting character of bourgeois freedom, bourgeois equality and bourgeois democracy.
11. In Germany, the most developed capitalist country of Continental Europe, the very first months of full Republican freedom, establish as a result of imperialist Germany’s defeat, have shown the German workers and the whole world the true class substance of the bourgeois-democratic republic. The murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg is an event of epoch-making significance not only because of the tragic death of these finest people and leaders of the truly proletarian, Communist International, but also because the class nature of an advanced European state—it can be said without exaggeration, of an advanced state, on a worldwide scale —has been conclusively exposed. If those arrested, i.e., those placed under state protection, could be assassinated by officers and capitalists with impunity, and this under the government headed by social patriots, in the democratic republic where such a thing was possible is a bourgeois dictatorship. Those who voice their indignation at the murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg but fail to understand this fact are only demonstrating their stupidity, or hypocrisy. “Freedom” in the German republic, one of the freest and advanced republics of the world, is freedom to murder arrested leaders of the proletariat with impunity. Nor can it be otherwise as long as capitalism remains, for the development of democracy sharpens rather than dampens the class struggle which, by virtue of all the results and influences of the war and of its consequences, has been brought to boiling point.
Throughout the civilized world we see Bolsheviks being exiled, persecuted and thrown into prison. This is the case, for example, in Switzerland, one of the freest bourgeois republics, and in America, where there has been anti-Bolshevik pogroms, etc. . From the standpoint of “democracy in general", or “pure democracy", it is really ridiculous that advanced, civilized, and democratic countries, which are armed to the teeth, should fear the presence of a few score men from backward, famine stricken and ruined Russia, which the bourgeois papers, in tens of millions of copies, described as savage, criminal, etc.. Clearly, the social situation that could produce this crying contradiction is in fact a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.
12. In these circumstances, proletarian dictatorship is not only an absolutely legitimate means of overthrowing exploiters and suppressing the resistance, but also absolutely necessary to the entire mass of working people, being their only defense against the bourgeois dictatorship which led to the war and is preparing new wars.
The main thing that Socialists fail to understand—which constitutes their shortsightedness in matters of theory, their subservience to bourgeois prejudices, and their political betrayal of the proletariat—is that in capitalist society, whenever there is any serious aggravation of the class struggle intrinsic to that society, there can be no alternative but the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or the dictatorship of the proletariat. Dreams of some third way are reactionary, petty-bourgeois limitations. That is borne out by more than a century of development of bourgeois democracy in the working-class movement in all the advanced countries, and notably by the experience of the past five years. This is also borne out by the whole science of political economy, by the entire content of Marxism, which reveals the economic inevitability, wherever commodity economy prevails, of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie that can only be replaced by the class which the very growth of capitalism develops, multiplies, welds together and strengthens; that is, the proletarian class.
13. Another theoretical and political error of the Socialists is their failure to understand that ever since the rudiments of democracy first appeared in antiquity, its forms notably changed over the centuries as one ruling class replaced another. Democracy assumed different forms and was applied in different degrees in the ancient republics of Greece, the medieval cities and the advanced capitalist countries. It would be sheer nonsense to think that the most profound revolution in human history, the first case in the world of power being transferred from the exploiting minority to the exploited majority, could take place within the time-worn framework of the old, bourgeois, parliamentary democracy, without drastic changes, without the creation of new forms of democracy, new institutions that embody the new conditions for applying democracy, etc.
14. Proletarian dictatorship is similar to dictatorship of other classes in that it arises out of the need, as every other dictatorship does, to forcibly suppresses the resistance of the class that is losing its political sway. The fundamental distinction between the dictatorship of the proletariat and a dictatorship of the other classes — landlord dictatorship in the Middle Ages and bourgeois dictatorship in all civilized capitalist countries — consists in the fact that the dictatorship of landowners and bourgeoisie was a forcible suppression of the resistance offered by the vast majority of the population, namely, the working people. In contrast, proletarian dictatorship is a forcible suppression of the resistance of the exploiters, i.e., of an insignificant minority the population, the landlords and capitalists.
It follows that proletarian dictatorship must inevitably entail not only a change in the democratic forms and institutions, generally speaking, but precisely such change as provides an unparalleled extension of the actual enjoyment of democracy by those oppressed by capitalism—the toiling classes.
And indeed, the form of proletarian dictatorship that has already taken shape, i.e., Soviet power in Russia, the Räte-System in Germany, the Shop Stewards Committees in Britain and similar Soviet institutions in other countries, all this implies and presents to the toiling classes, i.e., the vast majority of the population, greater practical opportunities for enjoying democratic rights and liberties than ever existed before, even approximately, in the best and the most democratic bourgeois republics.
The substance of Soviet government is that the permanent and only foundation of state power, the entire machinery of state, is the mass scale organization of the classes oppressed by capitalism, i.e., the workers and semi-proletarians (peasants who do not exploit the labor of others and regularly resort to the sale of at least a part of their own labor power). It is the people, who even in the most democratic bourgeois republics, while possessing equal rights by law, have in fact been debarred by thousands of devices and subterfuges from participation in political life and enjoyment of democratic rights and liberties, that are now drawn into constant and unfailing, moreover, decisive, participation in the democratic administration of the state.
15. The equality of citizens, irrespective of sex, religion, race, or nationality, which bourgeois democracy everywhere has always promised but never affected, and never could affect because of the domination of capital, is given immediate and full effect by the Soviet system, or dictatorship of the proletariat. The fact is that this can only be done by a government of the workers, who are not interested in the means of production being privately owned and in the fight for their division and redivision.
16. The old, i.e., bourgeois, democracy and the parliamentary system were so organized that it was the mass of working people who were kept farthest away from a machinery of government. Soviet power, i.e., the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the other hand, is so organized as to bring the working people close to the machinery of government. That, too, is the purpose of combining the legislative and executive authority under the Soviet organization of the state and of replacing territorial constituencies by production units—the factory.
17. The Army was a machine of oppression not only under the monarchy. It remains as such in all bourgeois republics, even the most democratic ones. Only the Soviets, the permanent organizations of government authority of the classes that were oppressed by capitalism, are in a position to destroy the Army’s subordination to bourgeois commanders and really merge the proletariat with the Army; only the Soviets can effectively arm the proletariat and disarm the bourgeoisie. Unless this is done, the victory of socialism is impossible.
18. The Soviet organization of the state is suited to the leading role of the proletariat as a class most concentrated and enlightened by capitalism. The experience of all revolutions and all movements of the oppressed classes, the experience of the world Socialist movement teaches us that only the proletariat is in a position to unite and lead the scattered and backward sections of the working and exploited population.
19. Only the Soviet government of the state can really affect the immediate breakup and total destruction of the old, i.e., bourgeois, bureaucratic and judicial machinery, which has been, and has inevitably had to be, retained under capitalism even in the most democratic republics, and which is, in actual fact, the greatest obstacle to the practical implementation of democracy for the workers and working people generally. The Paris Commune took the first epoch making step along this path. The Soviet system has taken the second.
20. Destruction of state power is the aim set by all Socialists, including Marx above all. Genuine democracy, i.e., Liberty and equality, is unrealizable unless this aim is achieved. But it’s practical achievement as possible only through Soviet, or proletarian, democracy, for by enlisting the mass organizations of the working people in constant and unfailing participation in the administration of the state, it immediately begins to prepare the complete withering away of any state.
21. The complete bankruptcy of the Socialists who assembled in Berne, their complete failure to understand the new, i.e., proletarian, democracy, is especially apparent from the following. On February 10, 1919, Branting delivered the concluding speech at the International Conference of the yellow International in Berne. In Berlin, on February 11, 1919, Die Freiheit, the paper of the International’s affiliates, published an appeal from the party of “Independence” to the proletariat. The appeal acknowledged the bourgeois character of the Scheidemann government, rebuked it for wanting to abolish the Soviets, which are described as Träger und Schutzer der Revolution — vehicles and guardians of the revolution—and proposed that the Soviets be legalized, invested with government authority and given the right to suspend the operation of National Assembly decisions pending a popular referendum.
That proposal indicates the complete ideological bankruptcy of the theorists who defend democracy and failed to see its bourgeois character. This ludicrous attempt to combine the Soviet system, i.e., proletarian dictatorship, with the National Assembly, i.e. bourgeois dictatorship, utterly exposes the paucity of thought of the yellow Socialists and Social-Democrats, their reactionary petty-bourgeois political outlook, and their cowardly concessions to the irresistible growing strength of the new, proletarian democracy.
22. From a class standpoint, the Berne yellow International majority, which did not dare to adopt a formal resolution out of fear of the mass of workers, was right in condemning Bolshevism. This majority is in full agreement with the Russian Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, and the Sheidemanns in Germany. In complaining of persecution by the Bolsheviks, the Russian Mensheviks and Socialist revolutionaries try to conceal the fact that they are persecuted for participating in the Civil War on the side of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat. Similarly, the Sheidemanns and their party have already demonstrated in Germany that they, too, are participating in the Civil War on the side of the bourgeoisie against the workers.
It is therefore quite natural that the Berne yellow International majority should be in favor of condemning the Bolsheviks. This was not an expression of defense of “pure democracy", but of the self defense of people who know and feel that in the Civil War they stand with the bourgeoisie against the proletariat.
That is why, from the class point of view, the decision of the yellow International majority must be considered correct. The proletariat must not fear the truth, it must face it squarely and draw all the necessary political conclusions.
Comrades, I would like to add a word or two to the last two points. I think that the comrades who are to report to us on the burn Conference will deal with it in greater detail.
Not a word was said at the Berne Conference about the significance of Soviet power. We in Russia have been discussing this question for two years now. At our Party Conference in April 1917, we raised the following question, theoretically and politically: “What is Soviet power, what is its substance and what is its historical significance?” We have been discussing it for almost two years. And at our [Seventh] Party Congress we adopted a resolution on it.
On February 11 the Berlin Die Freiheit published an appeal to the German proletariat signed not only by the leaders of the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany, but also by all members of the Independent Social Democratic group in the Reichstag. In August 1918, Kautsky, one of the leading theorists of these Independents, wrote a pamphlet entitled The Dictatorship of the Proletariat, in which he declared that he was a supporter of democracy and of Soviet bodies, but that the Soviets must be bodies merely of an economic character and that they must not by any means be recognized as state organizations. Kautsky says the same thing in Die Freiheit of November 11 and January 12. On February 9, an article appeared by Rudolf Hilferding, who is also regarded as one of the leading and authoritative theorists of the Second International, in which he proposed that the Soviet system be united with the National Assembly juridically, by state legislation. That was on February 9. On February 11 this proposal was adopted by the whole of the Independent Party and published in the form of an appeal.
There is vacillation again, despite the fact that the National Assembly already exists, even after “pure democracy” has been embodied in reality, after the leading theorists of the Independent Social Democratic Party have declared that the Soviet organizations must not be state organizations! This proves that these gentlemen really understand nothing about the new movement and about its conditions of struggle. But it goes to prove something else, namely, that there must be conditions, causes, for this vacillation! When, after all these events, after nearly two years of victorious revolution in Russia, we are offered resolutions like those adopted at the Berne Conference, which say nothing about the Soviets and their significance, about which not a single delegate uttered a single word, we have a perfect right to say that all these gentlemen are dead to us as Socialists and theorists.
However, comrades, from the practical side, from the political point of view, the fact that these Independents, who in theory and on principle have been opposed to these state organizations, suddenly making the stupid proposal to “peacefully” unite the National Assembly with the Soviet system, i.e., to unite the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie with the dictatorship of the proletariat, shows that a great change is taking place among the masses. We see that the Independents are all bankrupt in the Socialist and theoretical sense and that an enormous change is taking place among the masses. The backward masses among the German workers are coming to us, have come to us! So, the significance of the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany, the best section of the Berne Conference, is nil from the theoretical and Socialist standpoint. Still, it has some significance, which is that these waverers serve as an index to us of the mood of the backward sections of the proletariat. This, in my opinion, is a great historical significance of this Conference. We experienced something of the kind in our own revolution. Our Mensheviks traversed almost exactly the same path as that of the theorists of the Independents in Germany. At first, when they had a majority in the Soviets, they were in favor of the Soviets. All we heard then was: “Long live the Soviets!", “For the Soviets!", “The Soviets are revolutionary democracy!” When, however, we Bolsheviks secured a majority in the Soviets, they changed their tune; they said: the Soviets must not exist side-by-side with the Constituent Assembly. And various Mensheviks theorists made practically the same proposals, like the one to unite the Soviet system with the Constituent Assembly and to incorporate the Soviets into the state structure. Once again it is here revealed that the general course of the proletarian revolution is the same throughout the world. First the spontaneous formation of Soviets, then their spread and development, and then the appearance of the practical problem: Soviets, or National Assembly, or Constituent Assembly, or the bourgeois parliamentary system; utter confusion among the leaders, and finally—the proletarian revolution. But I think we should not present the problem in this way after nearly two years of revolution; we should rather adopt concrete decisions because for us, and particularly for the majority of the West European countries, spreading of the Soviet system is a most important task.
I would like to quote here just one Mensheviks resolution. I asked Comrade Obolensky to translate it into German. He promised to do so but, unfortunately, he is not here. I shall try to render it from memory, as I have not the full text of it with me.
It is very difficult for a foreigner who has not heard anything about Bolshevism to arrive at an independent opinion about our controversial questions. Everything the Bolsheviks assert is challenged by the Mensheviks, and vice versa. Of course, it cannot be otherwise in the middle of the struggle, and that is why it is so important that the last Menshevik Party conference, held in December 1918, adopted the long and detailed resolution published in full in the Menshevik Gazeta Pechatnikov . In this resolution the Mensheviks themselves briefly outline the history of the class struggle and of the Civil War. The resolution states that they condemn those groups in their Party which rallied with the propertied classes in the Urals, in the South, in the Crimea and in Georgia—all these regions are enumerated. Those groups of the Menshevik party which, in alliance with the propertied classes, fought against the Soviets are now condemned in the resolution; but the last point of the resolution also condemns those who joined the Communists. It follows that the Mensheviks were compelled to admit that there was no unity in their party, and that its members were either on the side of the bourgeoisie or on the side of the proletariat. The majority of the Mensheviks went over to the bourgeoisie and fought against us during the Civil War. We, of course, persecute Mensheviks, we even shoot them, when they wage war against us, fight against our Red Army and shoot our Red commanders. We responded to the bourgeois war with the proletarian war—there can be no other way. Therefore, from the political point of view, all this is sheer Menshevik hypocrisy. Historically, it is incomprehensible how people who have not been officially certified as mad could talk at the Berne Conference, on the instructions of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, about the Bolsheviks fighting the latter, yet keep silent about their own struggle, in alliance with the bourgeoisie, against the proletariat.
All of them furiously attack us for persecuting them. This is true. But they do not say a word about the part they themselves have taken in the Civil War! I think that I shall have to provide the full text of the resolution to be recorded in the minutes, and I shall ask the foreign comrades to study it because it is a historical document in which the issue is raised correctly and which provides excellent material for appraising the controversy between the “socialist” trends in Russia. In between the proletariat and bourgeoisie there is another class of people, who incline first this way and then the other. This has always been the case in all revolutions, and it is absolutely impossible in capitalist society, in which the proletariat and bourgeoisie formed to hostile camps, for intermediary sections not to exist between them. The existence of these waverers is historically inevitable, and, unfortunately, these elements, who do not know themselves on whose side they will fight tomorrow, will exist for quite some time.
I want to make the practical proposal that a resolution be adopted in the which three points shall be specifically mentioned.
First: one of the most important tasks confronting the West European comrades is to explain to the people the meaning, importance and necessity of the Soviet system. There is a sort of misunderstanding on this question. Although Kautsky and Hilferding are bankrupt as theorists, their recent articles in Die Freiheit show that they correctly reflect the mood of the backward sections of the German proletariat. The same thing took place in our country: during the first eight months of the Russian Revolution the question of the Soviet organization was very much discussed, and the workers did not understand what the new system was and whether the Soviets could be transformed into a state machine. In our revolution we advanced along the path of practice, and not of theory. For example, formally we did not raise the question of the Constituent Assembly from the theoretical side, and we did not say we did not recognize the Constituent Assembly. It was only later, when the Soviet organizations had spread throughout the country and had captured political power, that we decided to dissolve the Constituent Assembly. Now we see that in Hungary and Switzerland the question is much more acute. On the one hand, this is very good: it gives us the firm conviction that in the West European states the revolution is advancing more quickly and will yield great victories. On the other hand, a danger is concealed in it, namely, that the struggle will be so precipitous that the minds of the mass of workers will not keep pace with this development. Even now the significance of the Soviet system is not clear to a large mass on the politically educated German workers, because they have been trained in the spirit of the parliamentary system and ingrained with bourgeois prejudices.
Second: About the spread of the Soviet system. When we hear how quickly the idea of Soviets is spreading in Germany, and even in Britain, it is very important evidence that the proletarian revolution will be victorious. Its progress can only be retarded for a short time. It is quite another thing, however, when Comrades Albert and Platten tell us that in the rural districts in their countries there are hardly any Soviets among the farm laborers and small peasants. In Die Rote Fahne I read in article opposing peasant Soviets, but quite properly supporting Soviets of farm laborers and of poor peasants. [C] The bourgeoisie and their lackeys, like Sheidemann and company, have already issued the slogan of peasant Soviets. All we need, however, is Soviets of farm laborers and poor peasants. Unfortunately, from the reports of Comrades Albert, Platten and others, we see that, with the exception of Hungary, very little is being done to spread the Soviet system in the countryside. In this, perhaps, lies the real and quite serious danger threatening the achievement of certain victory by the German proletariat. Victory can only be considered assured when not only the German workers, but also the rural proletarians are organized, and organized not as before—in trade unions and cooperative societies — but in Soviets. Our victory was made much easier by the fact that in October 1917 we marched with the peasants, with all the peasants. In that sense, our revolution at that time was a bourgeois revolution. The first step taken by our proletarian government was to embody in a law promulgated on October 26 (old-style), 1917, on the next day after the revolution, the old demands of all the peasants which peasant Soviets and village assemblies had put forward under Kerensky. That is where our strength lay; that is why we were able to win the overwhelming majority so easily. As far as the countryside was concerned, our revolution continued to be a bourgeois revolution, and only later, after a lapse of six months, were we compelled within the framework of the state organization to start the class struggle in the countryside, to establish Committees of Poor Peasants, of semi-proletarians, in every village, and to carry on a methodical fight against the rural bourgeoisie. This was inevitable in Russia owing to the backwardness of the country. In Western Europe things will proceed differently, and that is why we must emphasize the absolute necessity of spreading the Soviet system also to the rural population in proper, perhaps new, forms.
Third: we must say that winning a Communist majority in the Soviets is the principal task in all countries in which Soviet government is not yet victorious. Our Resolutions’ Commission discussed this question yesterday. Perhaps other comrades will express their opinion on it; but I would like to propose that these three points be adopted as a special resolution. Of course, we are not in a position to prescribe the path of development. It is quite likely that the revolution will come very soon in many West-European countries, but we, as the organized section of the working-class, as a party, strive and must strive to gain majority in the Soviets. Then our victory will be assured and no power on Earth will be able to do anything against the Communist revolution. If we do not, victory will not be secured so easily, and it will not be durable. And so, I would like to propose that these three points be adopted as a special resolution.
Thesis published March 6, 1919 in Pravda No. 51; report first published in 1920 in the German and in 1921 in the Russian additions of the minutes of the First Congress of the Communist International.

Resolution to the Thesis on Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletarian

On the basis of these thesis and the reports made by the delegates from the different countries, the Congress of the Communist International declares that the chief task of the Communist Parties in all countries where Soviet government has not yet been established, is as follows:
1) to explain to the broad mass of the workers the historic significance and the political and historical necessity of the new, proletarian, democracy which must replace bourgeois democracy and the parliamentary system;
2) to extend the organization of Soviets among the workers in all branches of industry, among the soldiers in the Army and the sailors in the Navy and also among farm laborers and poor peasants;
3) to build a stable Communist majority inside the Soviets.
Pravda No. 54, March 11, 1919 and in the journal Communist International No. 1, May 1, 1919
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