The Bolshevik-led revolution in Russia in October 1917 was consciously predicated by the leadership (Lenin, Trotsky, etc., some others pushing forward, some being dragged along in the fight) on the premise that the Russian revolution would not, could not, stand alone for long either against the backlash onslaught of world imperialism, or on a more positive note, once the tasks of socialist construction reached a certain point. The purpose of the Communist International, founded in 1919 in the heat of the Russian civil war, by the Bolsheviks and their international supporters was the organizational expression of that above-mentioned premise. To work through and learn the lessons of the Bolshevik experience and to go all out to defeat world imperialism and create a new social order. I might add that political, social, and military conditions in war-weary World War I Europe in 1918 and 1919 made those premises something more than far-fetched utopian hopes. And central to those hopes were events in Germany.
If the original premise of Marxism (espoused specifically by both Marx and Engels in their respective political lifetimes) that the revolution would break out in an advanced capitalist European country then Germany, with its high level of capitalist development and socialist traditions and organizations, was the logical place to assume such an event would occur. And that premise, despite the betrayals of the German social democratic leadership in the war period, animated Lenin and Trotsky in their planning for the extension of socialist revolution westward. The rise of a “peace” socialist wing (the Independent Socialists) during the late phases of the war, the events around the smashing of the German monarchy and the creation of a socialist-led bourgeois republic in the wake of military defeat, the ill-starred Spartacist uprising, the working class response to the later Kopp Putsch, the also-ill-starred March Action of 1921, and the possibilities of a revolution in 1923 in reaction to the French exactions in the Ruhr and other events that year all made for a period of realistic revolutionary upheaval that was fertile ground for revolutionaries. And revolutionary hopes.
As we are painfully, no, very painfully, aware no revolution occurred in that period and that hard fact had profound repercussions on the then isolated Russian experiment. That hard fact has also left a somewhat unresolved question among communist militants, thoughtful communist militants anyway, about the prospects then. The question boils down to, as foreshadowed in the headline to this entry, whether there was any basis for the notion that a revolution could have occurred in Germany in 1923. We know what happened because it didn’t, but there are sometimes valuable conditionals pose in absorbing the lessons of history, our communist history. The yes or no of a German revolution is one such question. I have given my opinion previously-if there was no chance of revolution in Germany in 1923, win or lose, then the whole notion of proletarian revolution was just a utopian dream of a bunch of European outcast radicals. The corollary to that proposition is that, in the year 2010, the socialist cooperative notion that we fight for, other than as an abstract intellectual idea, is utopian, and that we are the mad grandchildren (and great-grandchildren) of those mad Europeans. That idea, with world imperialism wreaking havoc and breathing down our backs relentlessly in all quarters makes that corollary ill-founded. So let’s take another look at Germany 1923 from the several perspectives I have gathered in today’s postings.
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Peter Paul Markin comment on this series:
This is an excellent documentary source for today’s leftist militants to “discover” the work of our forebears, particularly the bewildering myriad of tendencies which have historically flown under the flag of the great Russian revolutionary, Leon Trotsky and his Fourth International, whether one agrees with their programs or not. But also other laborite, semi-anarchist, ant-Stalinist and just plain garden-variety old school social democrat groupings and individual pro-socialist proponents.
Some, maybe most of the material presented here, cast as weak-kneed programs for struggle in many cases tend to be anti-Leninist as screened through the Stalinist monstrosities and/or support groups and individuals who have no intention of making a revolution. Or in the case of examining past revolutionary efforts either declare that no revolutionary possibilities existed (most notably Germany in 1923) or alibi, there is no other word for it, those who failed to make a revolution when it was possible.
The Spanish Civil War can serve as something of litmus test for this latter proposition, most infamously around attitudes toward the Party Of Marxist Unification's (POUM) role in not keeping step with revolutionary developments there, especially the Barcelona days in 1937 and by acting as political lawyers for every non-revolutionary impulse of those forebears. While we all honor the memory of the POUM militants, according to even Trotsky the most honest band of militants in Spain then, and decry the murder of their leader, Andreas Nin, by the bloody Stalinists they were rudderless in the storm of revolution. But those present political disagreements do not negate the value of researching the POUM’s (and others) work, work moreover done under the pressure of revolutionary times. Hopefully we will do better when our time comes.
Finally, I place some material in this space which may be of interest to the radical public that I do not necessarily agree with or support. Off hand, as I have mentioned before, I think it would be easier, infinitely easier, to fight for the socialist revolution straight up than some of the “remedies” provided by the commentators in these entries from the Revolutionary History journal in which they have post hoc attempted to rehabilitate some pretty hoary politics and politicians, most notably August Thalheimer and Paul Levy of the early post Liebknecht-Luxemburg German Communist Party. But part of that struggle for the socialist revolution is to sort out the “real” stuff from the fluff as we struggle for that more just world that animates our efforts. So read, learn, and try to figure out the
wheat from the chaff.
The Kapp Putsch and the Working Class
On 13 March 1920 a coup organised by General Walther von Lüttwitz, the military commander of Berlin, deposed the coalition government under the Social Democratic Chancellor Gustav Bauer. A new government was announced, with Wolfgang Kapp, a senior state official in East Prussia and the founder of the extreme nationalist Fatherland Party, as Chancellor. The most reactionary elements in the armed forces and the Freikorps, which the Social Democratic leaders had unleashed upon the revolutionary workers of Berlin in 1919, had turned upon their masters. The national government fled to Stuttgart, but Karl Legien, the leader of the Socialist trade union federation, who had once described Rosa Luxemburg’s theory of the revolutionary mass strike as ‘mass nonsense’, called a general strike, which paralysed the country, and led to the rapid collapse of Kapp’s government.
When Legien issued the strike call, the Central Committee of the German Communist Party (KPD) considered that the German workers were too apathetic to respond, and declared that the KPD was not prepared to take part in a fight between two reactionary forces. Paul Levi, who was in prison, immediately protested against this imbecility, which was a forerunner of many to come, such as the theory of ‘Social Fascism’, which stated that there was no difference between Fascism and Social Democracy, and which played a major part in facilitating Hitler’s victory in 1933. The tremendous response of the working class to Legien’s call led the KPD’s leaders to reverse their attitude on the next day, and to support the strike.
We reproduce below some extracts translated by Mike Jones from Arthur Rosenberg’s classic account of the Weimar Republic, Geschichte der Weimarer Republik (EVA, Frankfurt am Main 1961). An English edition of this book was published under the title of A History of the German Republic (Methuen, London 1936), but has not been republished since. These extracts mainly deal with the workers’ response to the putsch, and the struggle to form a government after its defeat, as it has been argued that in 1920 the German revolutionary left was presented with an opportunity which it wasted. A general description of the Kapp Putsch can be found in Chris Harman’s The Lost Revolution (Bookmarks, London 1982, pp. 157–91).
The ascendancy which the army and the middle classes had gradually regained in the Weimar Republic was seriously endangered by Kapp’s premature rebellion, as the middle classes and the troops were divided over their attitude to it, and were therefore to some extent paralysed. On the other hand, the working class surged forward with a will to struggle and a desire for unity. The working-class supporters of the Majority Socialists were now demanding the removal of Noske and Heine, and for an alliance with the USPD.  Even the Christian workers were prepared to join a bloc in defence of democracy and against the old ruling class. The forces that opposed Kapp were for the most part not the supporters of the Weimar Republic and the policies of Noske and Ebert , but the advocates of working-class action which intended to reverse the ebb of the revolution, and to continue the work of 9 November. 
It took only four days to finish off Kapp’s government. Receiving unfavourable reports from most parts of Germany, Kapp fell into despair, and he resigned on 17 March. The question then arose: who was to succeed him? The majority of the working class did not want a return to the discredited Weimar system, which had allowed the Kapp Putsch to occur, but desired the creation of a political system in which the Socialist workers would have a decisive voice. It was, after all, the trade unions, with the Majority Socialist Legien  at their head, which recognised the necessity of such a step. Legien wished to replace the Weimar coalition government with a workers’ government based upon the SPD, the USPD and the Socialist and Christian trade unions. Noske’s tendency in the SPD had been so weakened by the recent events that it would have been incapable of putting up any resistance to such a development. The army was so disintegrated by the putsch, especially since its collapse, that it would have been incapable of taking action against a workers’ government.
Such a workers’ government, which was at this point an absolute possibility, could well have been able genuinely to democratise the German army and state administration, and thus have stemmed the retrogressive development of the revolution. The failure to establish a workers’ government was not so much the fault of the SPD, but was largely due to the doctrinaire rigidity of the left-wing of the USPD, and above all of Däumig , the most influential member in its Berlin organisation. As the USPD refused to participate, the SPD had no other choice but to create another coalition in the old manner …  Since, however, the new coalition was not backed by any new forces, everything remained much the same as before. The working class had once more demonstrated in March that it could conduct a united armed struggle. But it was not capable of politically rebuilding Germany, and the Kapp Putsch effectively resulted in the defeat, not of the army, but of the working class.