Trump and the Nuclear Button

Trump 

and the Nuclear Button

Pablo Delcan; Photo by David Paul Morris/Bloomberg

To the Editor:

Re “Rethinking the President’s Nuclear Trigger” (editorial, Nov. 16): We applaud the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s decision to hold hearings on the president’s authority to launch nuclear weapons. As you note, President Trump’s “glib talk about nuclear weapons and his impulsiveness” constitute reason to scrutinize this power.

Virtually any first use of nuclear weapons would constitute an act of war. International law prohibits their use except to address a threat that is “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”

Our Constitution imposes a further constraint. Absent an actual or imminent attack, the president must seek prior congressional authorization to initiate war.

Congress has not authorized use of force against North Korea. Nor does the president’s status as commander in chief carry a right to declare or commence war. If that were so, the power of Congress to declare war and the constitutional check on unilateral action would be meaningless.

In light of the threat that nuclear weapons pose, further constraints may be appropriate. But existing laws already limit the president’s power to use them.

JOHN KIERNAN, MARK R. SHULMAN
NEW YORK

The writers are, respectively, president of the New York City Bar Association and the chairman of its Task Force on National Security and the Rule of Law.

To the Editor:

In view of the devastation that would result from nuclear war, there is an obvious need for checks on the president’s authority to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike. That need will continue in the future, regardless of who occupies the Oval Office.

Moreover, this is an international problem: The world would be a safer place if all nuclear-weapon states took steps to limit the authority of their civilian and military leaders to launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack.

Verification of any international agreement would be difficult, but the process of negotiating it could lead to safer procedures in other capitals. Making this an international process should also make new checks on presidential authority more palatable to the president.

LAWRENCE FINCH, CARMEL, CALIF.

The writer, a retired Foreign Service officer, served with the United States delegation to the comprehensive test ban negotiations in Geneva in the Carter administration.

To the Editor:

There is a clean solution to prevent a trigger-happy president from launching a nuclear attack: a declaration by the United States of no first use of nuclear weapons, backed by federal law. In the absence of verifiable evidence of first use by another party, no first strike could be ordered.

Earlier advocacy of no first use was not against a rogue nuclear state like North Korea, so it is legitimate to ask whether no first use might undermine the deterrent capability of the United States.

If North Korea launched a nuclear attack against South Korea, Japan or even the United States, it would face a devastating retaliatory response, and its leadership knows it. There is no evidence that Kim Jong-un is suicidal.

What about deterring a major power like Russia or China? Because of the United States’ strong second-strike capability, no first use will remain effective against major powers.

There is no good reason for the United States to remain a laggard. The adoption of no first use might well induce other nuclear states to choose it, which could lead to a new equilibrium: an effective ban on the use of nuclear weapons.

STEVEN J. BRAMS, NEW YORK

The writer is a professor of politics at N.Y.U. and a co-author of “Game Theory and National Security.’’

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