Click on title to link to Mao's "THE TASKS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE PERIOD OF RESISTANCE TO JAPAN", May 3, 1937. Mao Tse-tung delivered this report at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China, held in Yenan in May 1937.
BOOK REVIEW
A History Of The Chinese Communist Party 1921-1949, Jacques Guillermaz, Random House, New York, 1972
I am using the then current spelling of names and places as they are used in this edition of the book.
For militant leftists the defense of October 1917 Russian Revolution was the touchstone issue of international politics for most of the 20th century. In the end the demise of the Soviet Union and the other non-capitalists states of East Europe in the early 1990’s formally, at least, put an end to that question in those areas. However, the issue of the fate of China in the first half of the 21st century is in an important sense the touchstone Russian question of international politics today. The question, forward to socialism or back to some neo-capitalist formation like those in Russia and East Europe to this reviewer is an open question today. With that perspective in mind, and not unmindful of the publicity given China recently as the host of the 2008 Olympics, it is high time that this reviewer spent more time on this issue than he has thus far in this space. As preparation, it is always best to get some historical background, especially so for that new generation of militants who are unfamiliar with the last hundred years of leftist history.
As I have recently mentioned in another China review in this space, that of Edgar Snow’s Red Star Over China, the Communist International and Russian Communist Party fights over strategy for the Chinese revolution between the Stalinists and the Trotsky-led Left Opposition in the mid-1920’s are must reading. As is the history of the defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution in the cities in 1927 and a little later. And I would add here, as well, an overview of the creation and evolution of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) before the seizure of power is also necessary, especially for those who were neither pro-Maoists in the 1960’s and 1970’s nor Soviet Stalinists in any period. To that end Jacques Guillermaz’s well-researched and reasonably balanced academic efforts is a solid way to get the basics of the Chinese Communist political perspective in this period down in the same way that Edgar Snow chronicled the organized soviets under the tutelage of the CCP in the late 1930’s.
I do not believe that it is incorrect to label the Chinese Revolution of 1949 and thus the CCP as extensions of the Soviet Russian and Bolshevik experiences. With this caveat, however, that after 1927 (if not before) these two experiences were reflected through a Stalinist prism. Thus, with the defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution and the exodus from the cities to the countryside the CCP’s strategy, tactics, organizational structure and political prospective changed in the same manner (if not to the same degree) that the Russian party’s changed. A very strong argument can be made, and is made in this book although tangentially, that the CCP was in essence the Eastern border guards for the Soviets rather than a though-going Bolshevik revolutionary organization fighting for political power in its own right-except when backed up against the wall by the Nationalist forces under Chiang kai-shek. That in turn created the distortions of politics and organization that were endemic to the early consolidation of CCP after 1949 and continue in diluted form today.
Needless to say that an academic (although quite readable) book that has detailed, in over four hundred pages, the history of early Chinese communism is not going to get its proper fully worked out review in this small space. However, I would point out the highlights that readers should think through as they read. A nice job has been done by Guillermaz in setting the framework of Chinese communism in the context of the first Chinese revolution of 1912, the various nationalist, anti-imperialist and left-wing tendencies that existed prior to the formation of the CCP in 1921 and the thorny question of the relationship between the CCP and the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) that was to, in the end, lead to a massive quarter century battle between these two forces. To emphasize how very important the correct analysis (or in the actual case, incorrect) of that relationship were I would note here that Leon Trotsky changed and extended his Theory of Permanent Revolution (basically that worldwide, not just in the advanced capitalist countries, the proletariat would have to led the national liberation struggle and the fight for the first steps into socialism) based on the Chinese experiences. That, in the end, is how important those political fights were.
After a full exposition of the role of the CCP in the cities in the Second Chinese Revolution the key areas that this book is helpful in evaluating are the rather murky periods from the defeat in the cities until Mao’s accession of leadership in the mid1930’s. That period entailed the establishment of rural soviets in Kiangsi, the on again, off again Nationalist (KMT) campaigns to destroy the CCP-led peasant armies that culminated in the famous Long March to Yenan; the fight against the Japanese and then after the defeat of the Japanese in World War II the renewed fight for political power that culminated in victory in 1949.
Along the way we get a glimpse at the internal power struggle between the various factions, the role of the Soviet Union in those fights and the various factions in the post-World War II power struggle. Well done. I might also add, in conclusion, that this book was written at the tail end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and just before the breakout pact with American imperialism under the Nixon-Kissinger worldwide anti-Soviet front doctrine so that we find out the fates of many of the early leaders of the CCP and other state and party functionaries as well as KMT personalities. There is more than enough information to bolster the case of those of us who still see the Chinese experience as a socialist one, if a rather wobbly one at this time.
BOOK REVIEW
A History Of The Chinese Communist Party 1921-1949, Jacques Guillermaz, Random House, New York, 1972
I am using the then current spelling of names and places as they are used in this edition of the book.
For militant leftists the defense of October 1917 Russian Revolution was the touchstone issue of international politics for most of the 20th century. In the end the demise of the Soviet Union and the other non-capitalists states of East Europe in the early 1990’s formally, at least, put an end to that question in those areas. However, the issue of the fate of China in the first half of the 21st century is in an important sense the touchstone Russian question of international politics today. The question, forward to socialism or back to some neo-capitalist formation like those in Russia and East Europe to this reviewer is an open question today. With that perspective in mind, and not unmindful of the publicity given China recently as the host of the 2008 Olympics, it is high time that this reviewer spent more time on this issue than he has thus far in this space. As preparation, it is always best to get some historical background, especially so for that new generation of militants who are unfamiliar with the last hundred years of leftist history.
As I have recently mentioned in another China review in this space, that of Edgar Snow’s Red Star Over China, the Communist International and Russian Communist Party fights over strategy for the Chinese revolution between the Stalinists and the Trotsky-led Left Opposition in the mid-1920’s are must reading. As is the history of the defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution in the cities in 1927 and a little later. And I would add here, as well, an overview of the creation and evolution of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) before the seizure of power is also necessary, especially for those who were neither pro-Maoists in the 1960’s and 1970’s nor Soviet Stalinists in any period. To that end Jacques Guillermaz’s well-researched and reasonably balanced academic efforts is a solid way to get the basics of the Chinese Communist political perspective in this period down in the same way that Edgar Snow chronicled the organized soviets under the tutelage of the CCP in the late 1930’s.
I do not believe that it is incorrect to label the Chinese Revolution of 1949 and thus the CCP as extensions of the Soviet Russian and Bolshevik experiences. With this caveat, however, that after 1927 (if not before) these two experiences were reflected through a Stalinist prism. Thus, with the defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution and the exodus from the cities to the countryside the CCP’s strategy, tactics, organizational structure and political prospective changed in the same manner (if not to the same degree) that the Russian party’s changed. A very strong argument can be made, and is made in this book although tangentially, that the CCP was in essence the Eastern border guards for the Soviets rather than a though-going Bolshevik revolutionary organization fighting for political power in its own right-except when backed up against the wall by the Nationalist forces under Chiang kai-shek. That in turn created the distortions of politics and organization that were endemic to the early consolidation of CCP after 1949 and continue in diluted form today.
Needless to say that an academic (although quite readable) book that has detailed, in over four hundred pages, the history of early Chinese communism is not going to get its proper fully worked out review in this small space. However, I would point out the highlights that readers should think through as they read. A nice job has been done by Guillermaz in setting the framework of Chinese communism in the context of the first Chinese revolution of 1912, the various nationalist, anti-imperialist and left-wing tendencies that existed prior to the formation of the CCP in 1921 and the thorny question of the relationship between the CCP and the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) that was to, in the end, lead to a massive quarter century battle between these two forces. To emphasize how very important the correct analysis (or in the actual case, incorrect) of that relationship were I would note here that Leon Trotsky changed and extended his Theory of Permanent Revolution (basically that worldwide, not just in the advanced capitalist countries, the proletariat would have to led the national liberation struggle and the fight for the first steps into socialism) based on the Chinese experiences. That, in the end, is how important those political fights were.
After a full exposition of the role of the CCP in the cities in the Second Chinese Revolution the key areas that this book is helpful in evaluating are the rather murky periods from the defeat in the cities until Mao’s accession of leadership in the mid1930’s. That period entailed the establishment of rural soviets in Kiangsi, the on again, off again Nationalist (KMT) campaigns to destroy the CCP-led peasant armies that culminated in the famous Long March to Yenan; the fight against the Japanese and then after the defeat of the Japanese in World War II the renewed fight for political power that culminated in victory in 1949.
Along the way we get a glimpse at the internal power struggle between the various factions, the role of the Soviet Union in those fights and the various factions in the post-World War II power struggle. Well done. I might also add, in conclusion, that this book was written at the tail end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and just before the breakout pact with American imperialism under the Nixon-Kissinger worldwide anti-Soviet front doctrine so that we find out the fates of many of the early leaders of the CCP and other state and party functionaries as well as KMT personalities. There is more than enough information to bolster the case of those of us who still see the Chinese experience as a socialist one, if a rather wobbly one at this time.
Guillermaz has an interesting chapter on the Li-Li San (General Secreatry of the CCP) political line of 1930. The role of the Communist International after the defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution and the expulsion or murder of its agents in 1927 was at times murky and at other times seemingly non-existent. Li-Li San, as direct a Chinese Comintern agent as one is likely to get in this period (having studied in the Soviet Union and with many links to the Russian party) , attempted to carry out the Comintern “third period” Stalinist policy after the purge of Chen Duchieu, the scapegoat for the failed previous popular front policy (with the KMT). The Comintern “third period” policy was predicated on an analysis that international capitalism was in its last throes, literally, and that the immediate order of the day for communists was to start insurrections everywhere in this “final” showdown with capitalism.
ReplyDeleteOne of the serious problems with the bureaucratic triumph of Stalin in the Soviet party and in the Comintern was the rigidity of the line regardless of where and under what circumstances action was possible. I would note that, despite this Stalinist frenzy in favor of insurrection everywhere there is scant evidence that insurrections were carried out anywhere internationally and that where they were they were defeated fairly easily. The period, remember, rather than a time of final battle was a more defensive time for the international working class as the effects of the rolling international economic depression began to make itself felt. In the specifics of the Chinese situation, after the recent (1927-28) defeat and decimation of the CCP in the cities among the proletariat, the CCP was on the defensive as it started to go to the countryside and was not the time for a major struggle for power with the central government. Mao and his cohorts drew other conclusions from that policy and Li-Li San was unceremoniously removed from party political power.
On The Popular Front and Right to National Self-determination in 1930’s China
ReplyDeleteIn a previous comment on this entry I mentioned the "Third Period” policy of the Stalinized Communist International (hereafter Comintern) in the early 1930’s as represented in China by the Li-Li San line of immediate armed struggle after the defeat of the Second Chinese revolution in the late 1920’s. There is more of interest in this book later concerning the application of other Comintern policies to China.
In the aftermath of a major result of the uncriticized ultra left “third period” Comintern policy, that being the Nazis taking power in Germany virtually unopposed, or at least without a shot being fired in anger the Comintern sharply shifted gears to the right with the famous Popular Front policy after the famous (and last) 7th Congress in 1936. In Europe this resulted in uncritical political and military alliances with bourgeois forces that derailed promising revolutionary situations in France and Spain, among others. That policy had it own twist in the China situation of the mid-1930’s.
In the scheme of world politics the place of modern China in the early 20th century was one of being a virtual semi-colony of first the Western imperialists and then from 1931 the Japanese imperialists who occupied Manchuria and made increasingly threatening advances on China itself which ultimately resulted in China being occupied by various Japanese armies. In this case the slogan of the democratic right of national self-determination for China had full force.
Revolutionaries have long supported such struggles not only those led by fellow communists of various persuasions (Vietnam, North Korea, etc) but national bourgeois forces. Thus a policy of unified military opposition by the CCP and KMT to imperialist forces was appropriate, and was in the Chinese context in the 1930’s and 1940’s up to Pearl Harbor. The international implications of the Stalinist popular front policy however submerged the military question (as it did as well in Spain) to the political question.
Thus, no struggle for a Soviet China was sanctioned in this period but rather a simple fight for national self-determination. This shift was reflected most dramatically in the shift by the CCP in the critical peasant land policy where rather than the slogan “land to the tiller” (made famous by the Bolsheviks in the Russian context) the party pursued a policy of rent reduction. Guillermaz does a good job of detailing this and the internal struggles with the CCP over this policy which was a dramatic shift from the Kiangsi days. I will address that issue more fully at a later time when I review another book that describes these fights in more detail.
Finally, while we are discussing the question of the national right to self-determination in its pre-1949 Chinese application I should mention that our support for, or call for that right is not absolute. The right to national self-determination is one of the more important rights associated with the bourgeois revolutions. Thus it is a democratic rather than an explicitly socialist demand.
Our approach, as least as I have come to look at it in going over the checkered history of this question in the international working class movement, is to take the national question off the table and put the class question to the fore. Sometimes the slogan cannot be applied in the context of a wider conflict. In the Chinese context the early self-contained struggle against Japanese imperialism made it applicable. Once the war in the Pacific turned into an inter-imperialist rivalry with the entry of the United States into the equation as de facto leader of Chinese KMT military forces (through the personal agency of General Stilwell as symbolic figure of that transference) then for socialist purposes the national question was off the agency. At that point continued support for that right gets one into a choice of which imperialist camp one wants to support. No thank you. In a further twist to the Chinese situation revolutionaries COULD support the CCP’s New Fourth Route and Eight Route Armies (essentially red armies) which were independently fighting the Japanese despite the formal arrangements with the KMT government.
All of this is by way of saying that this thorny question of the national right to self-determination is, with the delays and defeats of the socialist revolution, still with us. Case in point- Kosovo. Earlier this year I called for support to the slogan of independence for Kosovo as a reflection of that right to self-determination. After thinking about that situation in light of my recent re-reading of the Chinese situation in 1941, I am not at all sure that that was a correct call under the circumstances. In the abstract Kosovo certainly qualifies as a nation. Certainly, unless it separated from Serbia the national question would trump the class question (and that Kosovo national question does not exclude a formulation of the national rights of those Serbians still in Kosovo). Thus, while it is not out of the question for revolutionaries to support the same national rights as the Western imperialists do (as was clearly the case in Kosovo) the NATO factor as the de facto guarantor of Kosovar independence makes me extremely uneasy about that earlier call for independence. I think the better course is right now to support the “real” right to national self-determination in combination with a call for ALL NATO troops out of Kosovo now! More later.